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INTERNATIONAL LAW, AFRICAN CUSTOMARY 
LAW, AND THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF 
CHILDREN  
John Mukum Mbaku* 
During the last several decades, the global community has become 
concerned about the violation of the rights of children. Of particular 
interest to the international human rights community is the protection of 
children from traditional, customary, religious, and other practices (e.g., 
female genital mutilation, breast ironing, servitude in fetish shrines, 
forced service by children as “child soldiers,” the use of children to 
produce pornography or in prostitution and sex tourism, and the sale of 
children in the illegal organ transplantation market) that harm children. 
While several international human rights instruments have outlawed 
many of the practices that are harmful to children, the provisions in these 
international human rights instruments have not created rights that are 
justiciable in the domestic courts of the various countries in Africa. 
Hence, the way forward for the protection of the rights of children in 
Africa calls for each country to internationalize its national constitution 
and create rights that are directly justiciable in domestic or municipal 
courts. Such a process must, at the minimum, bring both national 
constitutional law and customary law into line with the provisions of 
international human rights instruments. In addition, each country must 
provide itself with effective independent judiciaries so that the latter can 
serve as a legal mechanism to strike down laws and customs that are 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the end of World War II, international law has developed to 
more effectively protect the rights of children and minimize their 
exposure to various forms of exploitation.1 Consider, for example, the 
military exploitation of children. In 1977, the adoption of Additional 
Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 allowed for the 
prohibition of the recruitment and subsequent use of children under the 
age of fifteen years in military activities.2 According to Additional 
Protocol I, “[c]hildren shall be the object of special respect and shall be 
protected against any form of indecent assault.”3  
In addition, “[t]he Parties to the conflict shall provide [children] with 
the care and aid they require, whether because of their age or for any 
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1
 See, e.g., John Mukum Mbaku, The Rule of Law and the Exploitation of Children in 
Africa, 42 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 287 (2019) [hereinafter Mbaku, The Rule of 
Law]. These forms of exploitation include, but are not limited to, use of children in the 
production of pornography, as well as, for sex; use of children as “child-soldiers” in 
various conflicts; illegal harvesting and sale of the organs of children; subjecting children 
to servitude labor in mines, factories, plantations, and other economic pursuits; placing 
children on the streets to beg for alms that accrue to various adults, including parents, 
elders in the childrens’ communities, as well as, leaders of various community 
organizations (e.g., schools); and forcing children, particularly girls, to “serve” 
indefinitely, in fetish shrines and the homes of rich urban dwellers. In addition, 
throughout the African continent, children, particularly girls, are subjected to traditional 
and customary practices that are harmful to children (e.g., female genital mutilation—
FGM). Id. 
 2. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 
77(2), June 8, 1977, https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf 
/INTRO/470 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. 
 3. Id. art. 77(1). 
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other reason.”4 Perhaps, more importantly, “[t]he Parties to the conflict 
shall take all feasible measures in order that children who have not 
attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities and, 
in particular, they shall refrain from recruiting them into their armed 
forces.”5 If, however, children who are under the age of fifteen years find 
themselves directly participating in hostilities and through the process, 
are captured by an adverse Party, “they shall continue to benefit from the 
special protection accorded by this Article, whether or not they are 
prisoners of war.”6 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“Rome 
Statute”), which was adopted by the UN Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International Criminal 
Court on July 17, 1998, at Rome and entered into force on July 1, 2002, 
also provides various protections for children.7 Specifically, the Rome 
Statute made it a war crime to conscribe or enlist children “under the age 
of fifteen years into the national armed forces” or to use “them to 
participate actively in hostilities.”8 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”), which was 
adopted by the UN General Assembly (“UNGA”) through its Resolution 
44/25 of November 20, 1989, and entered into force on September 2, 
1990,9 reaffirmed the prohibition against the military recruitment and use 
of children under the age of fifteen years.10 The CRC also provided a 
  
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. art. 77(2). 
 6. Id. art. 77(3). See also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol II), art. 4(3), June 8, 1977, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/INTRO/475?OpenDocument. 
 7. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 U.N.T.S. 38544 
(2002), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/show 
Details.aspx?objid=0800000280025774&clang=_en. 
 8. Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi). This provision of the Rome Statute applies to both state-
controlled (i.e., government-controlled) armed forces and those of non-state groups. See 
id. art. 8(2)(f). 
 9. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 
(1989), https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38f0.html [hereinafter United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child]. 
 10. See id. art. 38 (noting, inter alia, that “States Parties shall refrain from 
recruiting any person who has not attained the age of fifteen years into their armed 
forces.”). 
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definition for a child: “every human being below the age of eighteen 
years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained 
earlier.”11 Then, on May 25, 2000, the UNGA adopted the Optional 
Protocol to the CRC on the involvement of children in armed conflict 
(“OPAC”), whose main focus was the abolishment of the military 
exploitation of children.12 
The OPAC, which entered into force on February 12, 2002, prohibits 
the recruitment or conscription of children under the age of eighteen 
years into the armed forces of Member States and their direct 
participation in hostilities.13 It also prohibits the compulsory recruitment 
of children under the age of eighteen years into the armed forces of 
Member States.14 The OPAC states further that: 
States Parties that permit voluntary recruitment into their national 
armed forces under the age of 18 years shall maintain safeguards to 
ensure, as a minimum, that: 
(a) Such recruitment is genuinely voluntary;  
(b) Such recruitment is carried out with the informed consent of the 
person’s parents or legal guardians;  
(c) Such persons are fully informed of the duties involved in such 
military service;  





 11. Id. art. 1. 
 12. See Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict [OPAC], 2173 U.N.T.S. 27531 (2002), 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/OPACC 
RC.aspx [hereinafter OPAC]. 
 13. Id. arts. 1, 2. According to art. 1, “States Parties shall take all feasible 
measures to ensure that members of their armed forces who have not attained the age of 
18 years do not take a direct part in hostilities.” Id. art. 1. Article 2 states that “States 
Parties shall ensure that persons who have not attained the age of 18 years are not 
compulsorily recruited into their armed forces.” Id. art. 2. 
 14. See OPAC, supra note 12, art. 2. 
 15. Id. art. 3(3)(a)–(d). 
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With respect to the recruitment of children for military purposes, the 
OPAC states that “[a]rmed groups that are distinct from the armed forces 
of a State should not, under any circumstances, recruit or use in 
hostilities persons under the age of 18 years.”16 In addition, OPAC 
mandates that “States Parties shall take all feasible measures to prevent 
such recruitment and use, including the adoption of legal measures 
necessary to prohibit and criminalize such practices.”17 
The International Labor Organization (“ILO”), the first specialized 
agency of the UN, has, since its founding on October 29, 1919, been 
interested in protecting children, especially from the worst forms of child 
labor. The ILO was instrumental in the adoption of the Worst Forms of 
Child Labor Convention (“WFCLC”).18 In addition to defining “worst 
forms of child labor” and instructing States Parties to “take immediate 
and effective measures to secure the prohibition and elimination of the 
worst forms of child labor as a matter of urgency,” the WFCLC also 
prohibits the compulsory enlistment of children below the age of 
eighteen years.19 
The term “child” is defined as “all persons under the age of 18”20 and 
the “worst forms of child labor”21 are defined as comprising: 
(a) all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale 
and trafficking of children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or 
compulsory labor, including forced or compulsory recruitment of 
children for use in armed conflict; 
(b) the use, procuring or offering of a child for prostitution, for the 
production of pornography or for pornographic performances; 
(c) the use, procuring or offering of a child for illicit activities, in 
particular for the production and trafficking of drugs as defined in the 
relevant international treaties; 
  
 16. Id. art. 4(1). 
 17. Id. art. 4(2). 
 18. Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the 
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor, June 17, 1999, ILO C182, 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ddb6e0c4.html [hereinafter WFCLC]. 
 19. Id. arts. 1, 3.  
 20. Id. art. 2 
 21. Id. art. 3. 
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(d) work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried 
out, is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children.
22
 
The focus of this article is the moderating role that international law, 
notably international human rights law, can play in the recognition and 
protection of the rights of African children. However, before we proceed, 
it is necessary that we provide an overview of the major international 
legal instruments designed to protect the rights of children. 
II. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 
A. UN Declaration of the Rights of the Child 
The UN Declaration of the Rights of the Child (“DRC 1959”) was 
adopted unanimously by the UNGA on November 20, 1959.23 The DRC 
1959, which “marked the first major international consensus on the 
fundamental principles of children’s rights,”24 built on the rights that had 
been elaborated in the League of Nations’ Declaration of the Rights of 
the Child 1924.25 The DRC 1959 must be distinguished from the CRC.26 
  
 22. Id. 
 23. G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), Declaration of the Rights of the Child, 14 U.N. 
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 19, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (Nov. 20, 1959), 
http://www.cirp.org/library/ethics/UN-declaration/. [hereinafter DRC 1959] The 
declaration was adopted by all 78 Member States of the United Nations General 
Assembly. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. The Declaration of the Rights of the Child 1924, which is also referred to 
or known as the Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child, was drafted by British 
social reformer, Eglantyne Jebb, and adopted by the League of Nations in 1924. The 
1924 Declaration was adopted in extended form by the UN General Assembly in 1959 
under the name “Declaration of the Rights of the Child.” 
 26. See United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 9, at 
46, art. 2(1). This international convention is officially known as the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC” or “UNCRC”). The CRC was adopted by 
the UN General Assembly on November 20, 1989 through its resolution 44/25. It entered 
into force on September 2, 1990 after it had been ratified by the required number of 
States Parties. Id 
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The DRC 1959 makes reference to the UN’s UDHR,27 noting that “the 
child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special 
safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as 
well as after birth,”28 and that “mankind owes to the child the best it has 
to give.”29 In proclaiming the DRC 1959, the UNGA called “upon 
parents, men and women as individuals, and upon voluntary 
organizations, local authorities and national Governments to recognize 
[the rights provided in the DRC 1959] and strive for their observance by 
legislative and other measures progressively taken in accordance with 
[the principles elaborated in the Declaration].”30 
The DRC 1959 then proceeds to elaborate on ten principles that 
embody the rights that children are expected to “enjoy.” For example, 
Principle 2 mentions that “[t]he child shall enjoy special protection, and 
shall be given opportunities and facilities, by law and by other means, to 
enable him to develop physically, mentally, morally, spiritually and 
socially in a healthy and normal manner and in conditions of freedom 
and dignity.”31 In addition, Principle 2 states what has now evolved into 
the generally accepted standard for the legal treatment of all issues 
involving children—”the best interests of the child” standard.32 Hence, in 
the enactment of laws for the purpose of protecting children, the 
“paramount consideration” should be “the best interests of the child.”33 
Other principles elaborated in the DRC 1959 deal with other 
important aspects of the protection of children. For example, Principle 3 
emphasizes the right of a child from birth “to a name and nationality,” 
while Principle 5 deals with special rights for children who are 
“physically, mentally or socially handicapped”—these children “shall be 
given the special treatment, education and care required by [their] 
  
 27. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN General Assembly Res. 217 A 
(III), Dec. 10, 1948, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948), 
https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/217(III), [hereinafter 
UDHR]. With respect to children, the UDHR states that “[m]otherhood and childhood are 
entitled to special care and assistance” and that “[a]ll children, whether born in or out of 
wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.” Id. art. 25(2). 
 28. DRC 1959, supra note 23, at pmbl. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at principle 2. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
544 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 28.3 
particular condition.”34 Other rights, such as a right “to receive education, 
which shall be free and compulsory, at least in the elementary stages,”35 
protection from “all forms of neglect, cruelty and exploitation,”36 and 
protection “from practices which may foster racial, religious and other 
form of discrimination,”37 are also elaborated in the DRC 1959. 
B. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 
The UNGA adopted the CRC on November 20, 1989, through its 
resolution 44/25.38 The CRC entered into force on September 2, 1990.39 
The CRC, with its fifty-four articles, is considered by most international 
legal experts as the “most comprehensive document on the rights of 
children.”40 In addition to addressing the granting and implementation of 
children’s substantive rights, the CRC also deals with how children must 
be treated in situations of armed conflict.41 The CRC is considered a very 
important international law instrument for the protection of the rights of 
children because it enshrines “for the first time in binding international 
law, the principles upon which adoption is based, viewed from the 
child’s perspective.”42  
Professor Geraldine Van Bueren, an expert on international law and 
the Director of the Program on International Rights of the Child at the 
University of London, states that the CRC can be broken into four 
specific aspects of children’s rights. She refers to them as “the four ‘P’s: 
the participation of children in decisions affecting their own destiny; the 
protection of children against discrimination and all forms of neglect and 
exploitation; the prevention of harm to children; and the provision of 
  
 34. Id. at principle 5. 
 35. Id. at principle 7. 
 36. Id. at principle 9. 
 37. Id. at principle 10. 
 38. CRC, supra note 26. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See, e.g., Wendy Zeldin, International Laws: Children’s Rights, LAW 
LIBRARY OF CONG., Doc. No. 04112, at 2 (2007), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/child-
rights/pdfs/Children’s%20Rights-International%20Laws.pdf. 
 41. Zeldin, supra note 40, at 2. 
 42. Geraldine van Bueren, The International Law on the Rights of the Child, 18 
FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 832 (1995). 
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assistance for their basic needs.”43 As argued further by Van Bueren, 
“[t]he breakdown of the Convention in this way is useful, as, in addition 
to making the treaty easy to explain and digest for both children and 
adults, a duty which is expressly placed upon governments by the 
Convention, it points to the four complementary principal approaches to 
children’s rights.”44 
The CRC defines a child as “every human being below the age of 
eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is 
attained earlier.”45 The CRC has made some very significant 
achievements in the global effort to protect the rights of children. First, 
the CRC has created, under international law, new rights for children that 
did not exist before. For example, Article 7 provides a legal mechanism 
for the child to preserve his or her identity. As mandated by Article 7, 
“[t]he child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the 
right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and, as far 
as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.”46 
In addition, Article 8 imposes a duty on States Parties to “undertake to 
respect the right of the child to preserve his or her identity, including 
nationality, name and family relations as recognized by law without 
unlawful interference.”47 In other words, States Parties must not only 
guarantee the protection of the child’s identity48 but must also make 
certain that state actors do not illegally interfere with the ability of the 
child to exercise his or her rights. 
Second, the CRC imposes a duty on each State Party to provide 
“special protection and assistance” to children who, because of their 
circumstances, are vulnerable to exploitation by both state and non-state 
actors. According to Article 20, then, “[a] child temporarily or 
permanently deprived of his or her family environment, or in whose own 
  
 43. Van Bueren, supra note 42, at 15 (emphasis added). 
 44. Id. 
 45. CRC, supra note 26, art. 1. 
 46. Id. art. 7(1) (emphasis added). 
 47. Id. art. 8 (1). 
 48. Id. This includes making certain that the country’s laws—that is, the 
constitution, legislative acts, and customary law—protect and safeguard each child’s 
rights to an identity. 
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best interests cannot be allowed to remain in that environment, shall be 
entitled to special protection and assistance provided by the State.”49 
Third, the CRC grants every child the right to participate in, as well as 
practice, his or her own culture. According to Article 30, “[i]n those 
States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities or persons of 
indigenous origin exist, a child belonging to such a minority or who is 
indigenous shall not be denied the right, in community with other 
members of his or her group, to enjoy his or her own culture, to profess 
and practice his or her own religion, or to use his or her own language.”50 
Fourth, the CRC makes rights that are already applicable to the 
citizens of most countries, either through their national constitutions or 
treaties and conventions, specifically applicable to children. Article 13 
specifically grants the child “the right to freedom of expression.”51 It 
states that “[t]he child shall have the right to freedom of expression; this 
right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in 
print, in the form of art, or through any other media of the child’s 
choice.”52 The CRC notes, however, that “this right may be subject to 
certain restrictions.”53 Those restrictions, however, “shall only be such as 
are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or 
reputations of others; or (b) For the protection of national security or of 
public order (ordre public), or of public health and morals.”54 
Fifth, children are granted the right to a fair trial by the CRC. Article 
40 contains various provisions that guarantee and “recognize the right of 
  
 49. CRC, supra note 38, art. 20(1). Although not specifically mentioned, such 
vulnerable children include refugees, orphans, and those who, for a variety of reasons, 
have been rejected by their parents, as well as those whose parents can no longer take 
care of them. The CRC mandates, in Article 20, that “States Parties shall in accordance 
with their national laws ensure alternative care for such a [vulnerable] child.” Id. art. 
20(2). The CRC also provides examples of such care—it includes, “foster placement, 
kafalah of Islamic law, adoption or if necessary placement in suitable institutions for the 
care of children.” Id. art. 20(3). This list, however, is not exhaustive. The CRC notes that, 
in determining the nature and type of assistance to be granted to a vulnerable child, the 
State Party shall pay “due regard” to “the desirability of continuity in a child’s upbringing 
and to the child’s ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic background.” Id. art. 20(3). 
 50. CRC, supra note 26, art. 30. 
 51. Id. art. 13. 
 52. Id. art. 13(1). 
 53. Id. art. 13(2). 
 54. Id. 
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every child alleged as, accused of, or recognized as having infringed the 
penal law”55 to a fair trial. For example, Article 40 instructs States Parties 
to ensure that:  
[e]very child alleged as or accused of having infringed the penal law 
has at least . . . (i) To be presumed innocent until proven guilty 
according to law; (ii) To be informed promptly and directly of the 
charges against him or her, and, if appropriate, through his or her 
parents or legal guardians, and to have legal or other appropriate 
assistance in the preparation and presentation of his or her defense; (iii) 
To have the matter determined without delay by a competent, 
independent and impartial authority or judicial body in a fair hearing 
according to law, in the presence of legal or other appropriate 
assistance and, unless it is considered not to be in the best interest of 
the child, in particular, taking into account his or her age or situation, 
his or her parents or legal guardians; (iv) Not to be compelled to give 
testimony or to confess guilt; to examine or have examined adverse 
witnesses and to obtain the participation and examination of witnesses 
on his or her behalf under conditions of equality.
56
 
Sixth, as argued by Zeldin, “the CRC enshrines in a global treaty 
rights that hitherto had only been found in case law under regional 
human rights treaties (e.g., children’s right to be heard in proceedings 
that affect them).”57  
Seventh, “[t]he CRC also replaced non-binding recommendations 
with binding standards (e.g., safeguards in adoption procedures and with 
regard to the rights of disabled children).”58 Of particular interest to the 
protection of children in Africa is the fact that the CRC imposes “[n]ew 
obligations . . . on States Parties in regard to the protection of children, in 
such areas as banning traditional practices prejudicial to children’s health 
and offering rehabilitative measures for victims of neglect, abuse, and 
exploitation.”59 For example, Article 39 states that: 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to promote physical 
and psychological recovery and social reintegration of a child victim 
  
 55. Id. art. 40(1). 
 56. Id. art. 40(2)(b). 
 57. Zeldin, supra note 40, at 3. 
 58. Id. See also CRC, supra note 26, at arts. 21, 23. 
 59. Zeldin, supra note 40, at 3. See also CRC, supra note 26, arts. 28(3), 39. 
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of: any form of neglect, exploitation, or abuse; torture or any other 
form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; or armed 
conflicts. Such recovery and reintegration shall take place in an 




Finally, the CRC imposes an obligation on States Parties to ensure 
that children are not discriminated against in their efforts to exercise and 
enjoy the rights guaranteed them under the Convention.61 It is argued that 
the right of the child to take part in proceedings affecting his or her 
welfare, “together with the principles of non-discrimination in Article 2 
and provision for the child’s best interests in Article 3, form the guiding 
principles of the Convention [i.e., CRC], which reflect the vision of 
respect and autonomy which the drafters wished to create for children.”62 
C. The Optional Protocols to the UN Convention on the Rights of 
the Child 
In 2000, the United Nations adopted two protocols to the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, which were expected to deal with specific 
activities and behaviors that are harmful to children. These include child 
trafficking; child prostitution; child pornography; and armed conflict. 
Specifically, the UN adopted the Optional Protocol to the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and 
Child Pornography (“Sex Trafficking Protocol”)63 and the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement 
of Children in Armed Conflict (“Child Soldier Protocol”).64 The Sex 
  
 60. See CRC, supra note 26, art. 39. 
 61. See Zeldin, supra note 40, at 3. 
 62. Ursula Kilkelly, The Best of Both Worlds for Children’s Rights? Interpreting 
the European Convention on Human Rights in the Light of the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 308, 311 (2001). 
 63. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of 
Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, May 25, 2000, 2171 U.N.T.S. 227 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/ 
OPSCCRC.aspx [hereinafter Sex Trafficking Protocol]. 
 64. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, May 25, 2000, 22173 U.N.T.S. 222 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/OPACCRC.aspx [hereinafter Child 
Soldiers Protocol]. 
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Trafficking Protocol consists of seventeen articles and deals with one of 
the most important forms of child abuse and exploitation—the sale of 
children for use in various types of sexual activities.65 The Preamble of 
the Sex Trafficking Protocol considers the “purposes of the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child” and then sets forth or elaborates measures, 
which “States Parties should undertake in order to guarantee the 
protection of the child from the sale of children, child prostitution and 
child pornography.”66  
The Sex Trafficking Protocol specifically imposes certain duties on 
States Parties in order to protect children from being sold for the purpose 
of use in prostitution and other abusive and exploitative practices, 
including, for example, indentured servitude and hazardous work.67 The 
Sex Trafficking Protocol is also cognizant of the fact “that a number of 
particularly vulnerable groups, including girl children, are at greater risk 
of sexual exploitation and that girl children are disproportionately 
represented among the sexually exploited.”68 In addition, the Sex 
Trafficking Protocol is aware of and expresses grave concern over “the 
growing availability of child pornography on the Internet and other 
evolving technologies.”69 In addition to recognizing and taking note of 
the various threats faced by children, the Sex Trafficking Protocol 
elaborates measures, which it believes States Parties should take to 
protect children against abuse and exploitation. For example, Article 1 
states that “States Parties shall prohibit the sale of children, child 
prostitution and child pornography as provided for by the present 
Protocol.”70 
Besides prohibiting certain activities that are harmful to children, 
which include, for example, the “sale of children,”71 “child 
  
 65. The other forms of child abuse and exploitation include forced or servitude 
labor; service as child-soldiers; under-age marriage; and the harvesting and sale of the 
child’s organs. See also Cris R. Revaz, The Optional Protocols to the UN Convention on 
the Rights of the Child on Sex Trafficking and Child Soldiers, 9 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 13 
(2001). 
 66. Sex Trafficking Protocol, supra note 63, at pmbl. ¶ 1. 
 67. That is work that can threaten or even destroy the health of the child and 
prevent him or her from enjoying a productive life. See, e.g., Revaz, supra note 65, at 14. 
 68. Sex Trafficking Protocol, supra note 63, at pmbl. ¶ 5. 
 69. Id. at pmbl. ¶ 6. 
 70. Id. art. 1. 
 71. Id. 
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prostitution,”72 and “child pornography,”73 the Sex Trafficking Protocol 
imposes an obligation on States Parties to criminalize these acts or 
behaviors. For example, according to Article 3, “[e]ach State Party shall 
ensure that, as a minimum, the following acts and activities are fully 
covered under its criminal or penal law, whether these offenses are 
committed domestically or transnationally or on an individual or 
organized basis.”74 The listed offenses include “(i) offering, delivering or 
accepting, by whatever means, a child for the purpose of: a. Sexual 
exploitation of the child; b. Transfer of organs of the child for profit; 
[and] c. Engagement of the child in forced labor.”75 For example: 
Article 5 strengthens the ability of States Parties to pursue extradition 
of those who commit offenses under the Sex Trafficking Protocol, and 
includes such violations as extraditable offenses in any current and 
future extradition treaty existing between State[s] Parties. It further 
provides that the Protocol may serve as a legal basis for extradition in 
cases where no extradition treaty exists.
76
 
The Sex Trafficking Protocol reminds States Parties that the “best 
interest[s] of the child”77 is “the guiding principle in the treatment of 
children in and by the judicial system,”78 and mandates that “States 
Parties should adopt appropriate measures to protect the rights and 
interests of child victims of the practices prohibited under the present 
[Sex Trafficking] Protocol at all stages of the criminal justice process.”79 
So as to strengthen and “enhance the ability of child victims of the 
various behaviors prohibited under the Sex Trafficking Protocol to seek 
and secure compensation for the wrongs done to them,”80 the Sex 
Trafficking Protocol directs that “States Parties shall ensure that all child 
victims of the offenses described in the present Protocol have access to 
  
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. art. 3(1). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Revaz, supra note 65, at 14. 
 77. Sex Trafficking Protocol, supra note 63, art. 8(3). 
 78. Mbaku, The Rule of Law, supra note 1, at 337. 
 79. Sex Trafficking Protocol, supra note 63, art. 8(1). 
 80. Mbaku, The Rule of Law, supra note 1, at 337. 
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adequate procedures to seek, without discrimination, compensation for 
damages from those legally responsible.”81 
Given the fact that sex trafficking can often involve multiple 
jurisdictions, the “Sex Trafficking Protocol strengthens and enhances the 
ability of States Parties to cooperate with one another,”82 and “provides 
for specific reporting requirements.”83 
The Child Soldiers Protocol “provides further affirmation of the belief 
of many in the international community, especially advocates for 
children,”84 that “the rights of children require special protection.”85 
While taking note of the “harmful and widespread impact of armed 
conflict on children,”86 the Child Soldiers Protocol “condemns activities, 
especially in conflict situations, that harm children or place them in 
harm’s way.”87 The Child Soldiers Protocol also makes note of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (“Rome Statute”) and 
specifically refers to the “[c]onscripting or enlisting children under the 
age of fifteen years into national armed forces or using them to 
participate actively in hostilities” as serious and significant violations of 
international humanitarian law.88 
In the Preamble to the Child Soldiers Protocol, a note is made on the 
definition of a “child” that is provided in the CRC.89 The Child Soldiers 
Protocol then argues that: 
[A]n optional protocol to the Convention that raising the age of 
possible recruitment of persons into armed forces and their 
participation in hostilities will contribute effectively to the 
  
 81. Sex Trafficking Protocol, supra note 63, art. 9(4). 
 82. Mbaku, The Rule of Law, supra note 1, at 337. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Child Soldiers Protocol, supra note 64, at pmbl. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Mbaku, The Rule of Law, supra note 1, at 337. Activities condemned by the 
Child Soldiers Protocol include “the targeting of children in situations of armed conflict,” 
“direct attacks on objects protected by international law, including places that generally 
have a significant presence of children, such as schools and hospitals.” See Child Soldiers 
Protocol, supra note 64, at pmbl. 
 88. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8(b)(xxvi), U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF. 183/9 (July 17, 1998), http://legal.un.org/icc/statute/99_corr/cstatute.htm. 
 89. The definition of what constitutes a child is provided in art. 1 of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. See CRC, supra note 26, art. 1.  
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implementation of the principle that the best interests of the child are to 
be a primary consideration in all actions concerning children.
90
 
The Child Soldiers Protocol then raises the age “for direct 
participation in armed conflict and conscription”91 to eighteen years92 and 
prohibits non-state military groups from recruiting or employing children 
in military conflicts.93 
Article 4 of the Child Soldiers Protocol states specifically as follows: 
1. Armed groups that are distinct from the armed forces of a State 
should not, under any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities 
persons under the age of 18 years.  
2. States Parties shall take all feasible measures to prevent such 
recruitment and use, including the adoption of legal measures necessary 
to prohibit and criminalize such practices.  
3. The application of the present article under this Protocol shall not 
affect the legal status of any party to an armed conflict.
94
 
With respect to “voluntary recruitment into [States Parties] national 
armed forces,”95 the Child Soldiers Protocol requires States Parties that: 
[P]ermit voluntary recruitment into their national armed forces under 
the age of 18 [years to] maintain safeguards to ensure, as a minimum, 
that: (a) [s]uch recruitment is genuinely voluntary; (b) [s]uch 
recruitment is done with the informed consent of the person’s parents 
or legal guardians; (c) [s]uch persons are fully informed of the duties 
involved in such military service; (d) [s]uch persons provide reliable 




 90. Child Soldiers Protocol, supra note 64, at pmbl. 
 91. Zeldin, supra note 40, at 4. 
 92. Child Soldiers Protocol, supra note 64, arts. 1, 2. 
 93. See, e.g., Mbaku, The Rule of Law, supra note 1, at 338. 
 94. Child Soldiers Protocol, supra note 64, art. 4. 
 95. Id. art. 3(3). 
 96. Id. art. 3(3)(a)–(d). 
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As concerns children who have been “recruited into armed conflict or 
used in hostilities,”97 the Child Soldiers Protocol mandates that:  
States Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure that persons 
within their jurisdiction recruited or used in hostilities contrary to the 
present Protocol are demobilized or otherwise released from service. 
States Parties shall, when necessary, accord to such persons all 
appropriate assistance for their physical and psychological recovery 
and their social reintegration.
98
 
D. The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
1990 
The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
(“ACRWC”), which was adopted on July 1, 1990, and entered into force 
on November 29, 1999, is the first regional treaty that deals specifically 
with children’s rights.99 Earlier in 1979, the Organization of African 
Unity had adopted the Declaration on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child (“African Child Rights Declaration”),100 which became the 
foundation for the ACRWC. Although the ACRWC builds on the 
African Child Rights Declaration, “most of [the ACRWC’s] provisions 
are modeled after those of the CRC.”101 
Zeldin argues that “[t]he main difference lies in the existence of 
provisions concerning children’s duties,102 . . . in line with the African 
Human Rights Charter.”103 In its Preamble, the ACRWC recognizes that 
  
 97. Zeldin, supra note 40, at 4. 
 98. Child Soldiers Protocol, supra note 64, art. 6(1)–(3). 
 99. Org. of African Unity [OAU], African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of 
the Child, AU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), 
https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/30913-doc-acrwc-en.pdf [hereinafter 
ACRWC]. 
 100. Organization of African Union, Declaration on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child, OAU Doc. AHG/St. 4(XVI) Rev. 1 (1979) [hereinafter OAU]. 
 101. Zeldin, supra note 40, at 5. 
 102. According to Article 31, “Every child shall have responsibilities towards his 
family and society, the State and other legally recognized communities and the 
international community. The child, subject to his age and ability, and such limitations as 
may be contained in the present Charter, shall have the duty: (a) to work for the cohesion 
of the family, to respect his parents, superiors and elders at all times and to assist them in 
case of need[.]” ACRWC, supra note 99, art. 31(a). 
 103. Zeldin, supra note 40, at 5. 
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“the child occupies a unique and privileged position in the African 
society” and “requires legal protection in conditions of freedom, dignity 
and security,” as well as “particular care with regard to health, physical, 
mental, moral and social development.”104 The ACRWC defines a child 
as “every human being below the age of 18 years.”105 
The ACRWC also sets forth important principles that are critical to 
the protection of the rights of children. These include “non-
discrimination,”106 the “best interests of the child,”107 and “survival and 
development.”108 Other principles elaborated in the ACRWC also include 
the right of a child to: a name and nationality;109 freedom of 
expression;110 freedom of association;111 freedom of thought; conscience 
and religion;112 privacy;113 education;114 and leisure, recreation, and 
cultural activities.115  
  
 104. ACRWC, supra note 99, at pmbl.  
 105. Id. art. 2. 
 106. Id. art. 3. 
 107. Id. art. 4. This article states that “[i]n all actions concerning the child 
undertaken by any person or authority the best interests of the child shall be the primary 
consideration.” Id. art. 4(1). Article 4 also deals with the child’s rights during judicial or 
administrative proceedings affecting the child. Id. art. 4. It states that “[i]n all judicial or 
administrative proceedings affecting a child who is capable of communicating his/her 
own views, an opportunity shall be provided for the views of the child to be heard either 
directly or through an impartial representative as a party to the proceedings, and those 
views shall be taken into consideration by the relevant authority in accordance with the 
provisions of appropriate law.” See id. art. 4(2). 
 108. ACRWC, supra note 99, arts. 3–5. Specifically, this article provides that 
“[e]very child has an inherent right to life” and that “[t]his right shall be protected by 
law.” See id. art. 5(1). In addition, the “[d]eath sentence shall not be pronounced for 
crimes committed by children.” See id. art. 5(3). 
 109. ACRWC, supra note 99, art. 6. For example, “[e]very child shall have the 
right from birth to a name.” See id. art. 6. 
 110. ACRWC, supra note 99, art. 7. Specifically, “[e]very child who is capable of 
communicating his or her own views shall be assured the rights to express his opinions 
freely in all matters and to disseminate his opinions subject to such restrictions as are 
prescribed by law.” See id. art 7. 
 111. ACRWC, supra note 99, art. 8. 
 112. Id. art. 9. The exercise of this right, however, is subject to guidance by the 
child’s parents. Nevertheless, the exercise of parental rights is subject to national laws 
and policies. See id. arts. 9(2)–(3). 
 113. ACRWC, supra note 99, art. 10. Specifically, “[n]o child shall be subject to 
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family home or correspondence, or to 
the attacks upon his honor or reputation, provided that parents or legal guardians shall 
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The ACRWC provides special protections for handicapped children. 
According to Article 13, “[e]very child who is mentally or physically 
disabled shall have the right to special measures of protection in keeping 
with his physical and moral needs and under conditions which ensure his 
dignity, promote his self-reliance and active participation in the 
community.”116 Children are also to be guaranteed “the right to enjoy the 
best attainable state of physical, mental and spiritual health.”117 Article 
15 deals with child labor and mandates that “[e]very child shall be 
protected from all forms of economic exploitation and from performing 
any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child’s 
physical, mental, spiritual, moral, or social development.”118 
The child must also be protected against abuse and torture,119 harmful 
social and cultural practices,120 and all forms of sexual exploitation.121 
The ACRWC also protects children from the harmful effects of narcotics 
and illicit drugs,122 as well as from trafficking and abduction.123 The 
ACRWC imposes a duty on States Parties “to take appropriate measures 
  
have the right to exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of their children. The 
child has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” See 
id. art. 10. 
 114. Article 11 provides that “[e]very child shall have the right to an education.” 
ACRWC, supra note 99, art. 11. 
 115. For example, “States Parties recognize the right of the child to rest and 
leisure, to engage in play and recreational activities appropriate to the age of the child and 
to participate freely in cultural life and the arts.” See id. art. 12(1). 
 116. Id. art. 13(1). 
 117. Id. art. 14(1). 
 118. Id. art. 15(1). 
 119. Id. art. 16. 
 120. ACRWC, supra note 99, art. 21. These include “customs and practices 
prejudicial to the health or life of the child,” and “those customs and practices 
discriminatory to the child on the grounds of sex or other status.” Id. art. 21(1). In 
addition, Article 21 prohibits “[c]hild marriage and the betrothal of girls and boys” and 
imposes a duty on the State Party to “specify the minimum age of marriage to be 18 years 
and make registration of all marriages in an official registry compulsory.” See id. art. 
21(2). 
 121. States Parties are required to “undertake to protect the child from all forms of 
sexual exploitation and sexual abuse and shall in particular take measures to prevent: (a) 
the inducement, coercions or encouragement of a child to engage in any sexual activity; 
(b) the use of children in prostitution or other sexual practices; (c) the use of children in 
pornographic activities, performances and materials.” ACRWC, supra note 99, art. 27. 
 122. Id. art. 28. 
 123. Id. art. 29. 
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to prevent: (a) the abduction, the sale of, or traffic in children for any 
purpose or in any form, by any person including parents or legal 
guardians of the child; [and] (b) the use of children in all forms of 
begging.”124 
E. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 
The UNGA proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(“UDHR”) in Paris (France) on December 10, 1948, as an international 
bill of human rights.125 The UDHR deals with children’s rights in two 
articles—25 and 26.126 Article 25(2) states that “[m]otherhood and 
childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, 
whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social 
protection.”127 In Article 26, the UDHR deals with the child’s right to 
education and states that “[e]ducation shall be directed to the full 
development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms.”128 In addition to declaring 
that “[e]veryone has the right to education,”129 and that “[e]ducation shall 
be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages,”130 Article 26 
also grants parents “a prior right to choose the kind of education that 
shall be given to their children.”131 
F. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(“ICESCR”), together with the UDHR and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), are generally referred to as the 
International Bill of Human Rights. The ICESCR and the ICCPR, which 
are binding treaties between the Member States of the United Nations, 
and the non-binding UDHR, which is a declaration of the UN General 
  
 124. Id. art. 29(a), (b). 
 125. UDHR, supra note 27, at 71. 
 126. Id. arts. 25, 26. 
 127. Id. arts. 25(2). 
 128. Id. arts. 26(2). 
 129. Id. arts. 26(1). 
 130. Id.  
 131. Id. arts. 26(3). 
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Assembly, form the foundation of modern international human rights 
law.132 Christopher N. J. Roberts, an expert on human rights and 
Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota, states that the three 
documents—the ICESCR, the ICCPR, and the UDHR—”are considered 
to be the foundational human rights texts within the modern system of 
international human rights” and that “[t]hey have opened the door for the 
hundreds of human rights treaties, charters, laws, governmental bodies, 
public and private organizations, groups, and individuals that now 
comprise this global regime.”133 
The ICESCR recognizes that human rights “derive from the inherent 
dignity of the human person” and hence, are applicable to children as 
well.134 In the Preamble, the ICESCR notes that “recognition of the 
inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of 
the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world.”135 While many of the Covenant’s provisions can be applied to 
children, those in Articles 10 and 12 deal specifically with children.136 
According to Article 10:  
1. The widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to 
the family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society, 
particularly for its establishment and while it is responsible for the care 
and education of dependent children. Marriage must be entered into 
with the free consent of the intending spouses.  
2. Special protection should be accorded to mothers during a reasonable 
period before and after childbirth. During such period working mothers 
should be accorded paid leave or leave with adequate social security 
benefits.  
  
 132. All these three documents were drafted under the auspices of the United 
Nations. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER N. J. ROBERTS, THE CONTENTIOUS HISTORY OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2015) (examining, inter alia, the evolution of 
human rights, as embodied in the International Bill of Human Rights). 
 133. Id. at 3. 
 134. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 
2200 A (XXI), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (1966), at pmbl., 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cescr.aspx, [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
 135. Id. at pmbl.  
 136. For example, when Article 13 states that “[p]rimary education shall be 
compulsory and available free to all,” the word “all” includes children. Id. art. 13(2)(a). 
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3. Special measures of protection and assistance should be taken on 
behalf of all children and young persons without any discrimination for 
reasons of parentage or other conditions. Children and young persons 
should be protected from economic and social exploitation. Their 
employment in work harmful to their morals or health or dangerous to 
life or likely to hamper their normal development should be punishable 
by law. States should also set age limits below which the paid 




Article 12 recognizes all human beings’138 right to the “enjoyment of 
the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.”139 In order 
for these rights to be realized, States Parties to the Covenant are 
instructed to put in place measures to reduce “the stillbirth-rate,” “infant 
mortality,” and provide for the “healthy development of the child.”140 
Finally, the ICESCR provides for the right to an education for all and 
specifically makes “primary education . . . compulsory and available free 
to all.”141 
G. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
Like the ICESCR, the ICCPR contains provisions that are designed to 
benefit children and protect their rights.142 For example, Article 2 
imposes an obligation on each State Party to the Covenant “to respect 
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status.”143 Article 2 also imposes an obligation on each State Party 
to pass the necessary legislation to give effect to the rights elaborated in 
  
 137. Id. art. 10(1)–(3). 
 138. “Human beings,” of course, includes “children.” 
 139. ICESCR, supra note 134, art. 12(1). 
 140. Id. art. 12(2)(a). 
 141. Id. art. 13(2)(a). 
 142. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A 
(XXI), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 143. Id. art. 2(1). 
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the ICCPR.144 The ICCPR also requires that each State Party to the 
Covenant make sure that “any person whose rights or freedoms as herein 
recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding 
that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official 
capacity.”145 
How all people, including children, are treated before the courts and 
tribunals, is dealt with in Article 14, which states that “[a]ll persons shall 
be equal before the courts and tribunals.”146 In addition, Article 14 states 
that “[i]n the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his 
rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair 
and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law.”147 Although Article 14 encourages transparency and 
openness in judicial proceedings, it notes that cognizance must be taken 
of the need to protect children: “any judgment rendered in a criminal 
case or in a suit at law shall be made public except where the interest of 
juvenile persons otherwise requires or the proceedings concern 
matrimonial disputes or the guardianship of children.”148 
Article 14(4) provides procedures for the treatment of juvenile 
persons in court proceedings. Specifically, “[i]n the case of juvenile 
persons, the procedure shall be such as will take account of their age and 
the desirability of promoting their rehabilitation.”149 Moreover, 
“[a]ccused juvenile persons shall be separated from adults and brought as 
speedily as possible for adjudication.”150 The ICCPR also prohibits the 
imposition of the death penalty “for crimes committed by persons below 
eighteen years of age”151 and in addition, the death penalty shall not be 
“carried out on pregnant women.”152 
The ICCPR recognizes the “family” as the “natural and fundamental 
group unit of society,” which must be protected by “society and the 
State.”153 States Parties are obligated by the Covenant to “undertake to 
  
 144. Id. art. 2(2). 
 145. Id. art. 2(3)(a). 
 146. Id. art. 14(1). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. art. 14(4). 
 150. Id. art. 10(2)(b). 
 151. Id. art. 6(5). 
 152. Id.  
 153. Id. art. 23(1). 
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have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal 
guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in 
conformity with their own convictions.”154 If a marriage is dissolved, 
“provision shall be made for the necessary protection of any children.”155 
All of Article 24 is devoted to elaborating on various rights for 
children. Accordingly, it states that “[e]very child shall have, without any 
discrimination as to race, color, sex, language, religion, national or social 
origin, property or birth, the right to such measures of protection as are 
required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and 
the State.”156 Also, the ICCPR prescribes that “[e]very child shall be 
registered immediately after birth and shall have a name” and shall have 
“the right to acquire a nationality.”157 
Other international legal instruments dedicated to the protection of the 
rights of children include the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities 2006,158 the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
1981,159 CEDAW,160 and various documentation dealing with or related 
to adoption and other forms of child placement.161 
  
 154. Id. art. 18(4). 
 155. Id. art. 23(4). 
 156. Id. art. 24(1). 
 157. Id. art. 24(2)–(3). 
 158. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 




 159. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, opened for signature June 
27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986), O.A.U. Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/instree/z1afchar.htm, (also called the 
Banjul Charter, after the town in The Gambia where the treaty was adopted) [hereinafter 
Banjul Charter]. The Banjul Charter was designed to protect the civil, political, 
economic, social, and cultural rights of the African peoples. See id. at pmbl. Although the 
child is specifically mentioned only once in the treaty, it is important to note that most of 
the treaty’s provisions can be applied to children. For example, when Article 3 states that 
“[e]very individual shall be equal before the law” and “[e]very individual shall be entitled 
to equal protection of the law,” the use of the expression “every individual” includes 
children. Id. art. 3(1)-(2) (emphasis added). 
 160. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, art. 5 (entered into force 
Sept. 3, 1981), https://www.ohchr.org/en/professional 
interest/pages/cedaw.aspx, [hereinafter CEDAW]. The CEDAW is considered an 
international bill of rights for women and was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 
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III. AFRICAN CUSTOMARY AND TRADITIONAL PRACTICES 
AND THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 
A. Introduction 
It has been argued that traditional African institutions, including 
customs, are very important for effective governance on the continent.162 
For example, the UN Economic Commission for Africa (“UNECA”) 
states that “[a] number of studies have affirmed the resiliency, legitimacy 
and relevance of African traditional institutions in the socio-cultural, 
economic and political lives of Africans, particularly in the rural 
areas.”163 Research has also determined that if Africa’s modern State is to 
perform its functions well and effectively serve its constituents, it must 
be “grounded on indigenous social values and contexts, while adapting to 
changing realities.”164 The construction of such a governing process, one 
that is grounded in the values of each country’s various subcultures, will 
  
December 18, 1979. Id. The CEDAW positively affirms the principle of equality of men 
and women and requires States Parties to take “all appropriate measures, including 
legislation, to ensure the full development and advancement of women, for the purpose of 
guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms on a basis of equality with men.” Id. art. 3. With respect to children, CEDAW 
utilizes the principle of “best interests of the child” when it directs States Parties to 
“ensure that family education includes a proper understanding of maternity as a social 
function and the recognition of the common responsibility of men and women in the 
upbringing and development of their children, it being understood that the interest of the 
children is the primordial consideration in all cases.” See id. art. 5(b). 
 161. These include, but are not limited to, (i) the Hague Convention on 
Jurisdiction; (ii) the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Recognition 
of Decrees Relating to Adoptions, 1965; (iii) the European Convention on the Adoption of 
Children, 1967; (iv) the Inter-American Convention on Conflict of Laws Concerning the 
Adoption of Minors, 1984; (v) the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children in 
Intercountry Adoption, 1993; (vi) the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction, 1980; and (vii) the Worst Forms of Child Labor 
Convention, 1999. Mbaku provides an overview of these international legal instruments. 
See Mbaku, The Rule of Law, supra note 1, at 355–67. 
 162. See, e.g., U.N. Economic Commission for Africa, African Traditional 
Institutions of Governance, iii (2007), 
http://repository.uneca.org/bitstream/handle/10855/3086/bib.%2025702_I.pdf?sequence=
1 [hereinafter UNECA]. 
 163. Id. at iii.  
 164. Id. at iii. See also Mbaku The Rule of Law, supra note 1, at 392. 
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require, at the very minimum, “aligning and harmonizing traditional 
governance institutions with the modern State.”165 
Scholars who study traditional African institutions have identified at 
least four governance functions for these institutions.166 First, Africa’s 
traditional institutions can “advise the modern State in its efforts to serve 
the people, protect their rights, and provide them with public goods and 
services.”167 Second, within each African country, “traditional 
institutions can serve in a developmental role, helping the government 
carry out its development plans.”168 Third, traditional institutions can 
serve as important instruments and mechanisms for the “resolution of 
conflicts, including those arising from trade and voluntary exchange.”169 
Finally, traditional African institutions can “provide the moral structure 
for raising children and helping them develop into responsible adults.”170 
The critical issue for the development of effective governance 
processes in the African countries, that is, those that are capable of 
protecting human rights, including especially those of children, is how to 
integrate modern and traditional institutions to “produce a governing 
process that can deliver justice and enhance human development in each 
country in the continent.”171 And in doing so, the blended governing 
process must also recognize and protect human rights, including those of 
vulnerable groups, such as children and women.  
Although traditional African institutions can potentially provide a 
strong foundation for effective governance processes in the continent, “it 
is important to note that some traditions and customs have actually been 
and are still major contributors to the abuse and exploitation of 
children.”172 Thus, in an effort to combine traditional and modern 
institutions to produce a governing process capable of enhancing the 
recognition and protection of human rights, Africa’s constitutional 
“framers must take cognizance of the fact that any resulting laws and 
institutions must be those that reflect and align with provisions of 
  
 165. UNECA, supra note 162, at iii. 
 166. See, e.g., GEORGE B. N. AYITTEY, INDIGENOUS AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS 555 (2d 
ed. 2006) 
 167. Mbaku, The Rule of Law, supra note 1, at 393. 
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 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
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international human rights instruments.”173 Thus, “any custom and 
tradition that violates human rights, as reflected in international human 
rights laws, must not be allowed to become part of the country’s standing 
laws—such harmful practices, as embodied in these traditions [and 
customs], must be prohibited by law.”174 
Several international human rights instruments have called for the 
elimination or moderation of customary and traditional practices that 
violate human rights and hence, are harmful to citizens, including 
especially children and members of other vulnerable groups, such as 
women. For example, in its “Introduction,” the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(“CEDAW”) states that the “general thrust of the Convention aims at 
enlarging our understanding of the concept of human rights, as it gives 
formal recognition to the influence of culture and tradition on restricting 
women’s enjoyment of their fundamental rights.”175 CEDAW imposes an 
obligation on States Parties to:  
take all appropriate measures: (a) To modify the social and cultural 
patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the 
elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which 
are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the 
sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women; (b) To ensure that 
family education includes a proper understanding of maternity as a 
social function and the recognition of the common responsibility of 
men and women in the upbringing and development of their children, it 
being understood that the interest of the children is the primordial 
consideration in all cases.
176
 
While the ACRWC states that “[t]he education of the child shall be 
directed to: (c) the preservation and strengthening of positive African 
morals, traditional values and cultures,”177 the ACRWC also provides 
that “[a]ny custom, tradition, cultural or religious practice that is 
inconsistent with the rights, duties and obligations contained in the 
present Charter shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be 
  
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. CEDAW, supra note 160, at Introduction.  
 176. Id. art. 5. 
 177. ACRWC, supra note 99, art. 11(2)(c). 
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discouraged.”178 The ACRWC then imposes an obligation on States 
Parties to the Charter regarding the protection of children against harmful 
social and cultural practices.179According to Article 21: 
State[s] Parties to the present Charter shall take all appropriate 
measures to eliminate harmful social and cultural practices affecting the 
welfare, dignity, normal growth and development of the child and in 
particular: (a) those customs and practices prejudicial to the health or 
life of the child; and (b) those customs and practices discriminatory to 
the child on the ground of sex or other status.
180
  
In addition, the Charter prohibits another customary practice that is 
harmful to African children: “Child marriage and the betrothal of girls 
and boys shall be prohibited and effective action, including legislation, 
shall be taken to specify the minimum age of marriage to be 18 years and 
make registration of all marriages in an official registry compulsory.”181 
B. Custom, Tradition, Culture, Religion, Superstition and the 
Rights of Children in Africa 
Several scholars and commentators have argued that “traditional 
values are often deployed as an excuse to undermine human rights.”182 
Nongovernmental organizations that study the recognition and protection 
of human rights around the world, for example, Human Rights Watch, 
have “documented how discriminatory elements of traditions and 
customs have impeded, rather than enhanced, people’s social, political, 
civil, cultural, and economic rights,”183 including, of course, those of 
children. The Human Rights Study, conducted by Graeme Reid, also 
found that throughout the world, many state- and non-state actors invoke 
cultural, religious and customary norms and use them to justify their 
  
 178. Id. art. 1(3). 
 179. Id. art. 21. 
 180. Id. art. 21(1)(a)–(b). 
 181. Id. art. 21(2). 
 182. Graeme Reid, The Trouble with Tradition: When “Values” Trample Over 
Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2009), https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-
chapters/africa#. 
 183. Id. 
2020] International Law, African Customary Law 565 
violation of the rights of certain groups, including especially historically 
vulnerable groups, such as women and children.184  
For example, “[i]n Saudi Arabia, authorities cite cultural norms and 
religious teachings in denying women and girls the right to participate in 
sporting activities—’steps of the devil’ on the path to immorality, as one 
religious leader calls them.”185 In the United States, “traditional values” 
or “traditional family values” have been invoked to oppose legal 
protections for LGBT persons and women.186 In many African countries, 
the customary laws of many subcultures discriminate against women and 
girls when it comes to inheritance and the ownership of real property.187 
For example, research by Human Rights Watch has determined that in 
Kenya, “women find it almost hopeless to pursue remedies for property 
rights violations. Traditional leaders and government authorities often 
ignore women’s property claims and sometimes make the problems 
worse.”188 It is important to note here that African customary, traditional, 
and religious practices that discriminate against women often do so 
against girls.189 
During its third, fourth, and fifth meetings, held April 25–26, 2005, to 
consider the initial report of the Government of Zambia on the 
implementation of the ICESCR, the UN Economic and Social Council’s 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“CESCR”) made 
the following observations: (i) that “the persistence of customs and 
  
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. See also Peggy Campolo, Just Family Values: How Can Christians 
Advocate Justice for Non-Traditional Families?, in THE JUSTICE PROJECT 129, 130 (Brian 
McLaren, Elisa Padilla & Ashley Bunting Seeber eds., 2009) (arguing, inter alia, that 
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 187. See ISSUES IN WOMEN’S LAND RIGHTS IN CAMEROON (Lotsmart N. Fonjong 
ed., 2012) (presenting a series of essays that examines the impact of tradition and custom 
on the rights of women, particularly land rights).  
 188. Double Standards: Women’s Property Rights Violations in Kenya, HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, (March 4, 2003), https://www.hrw.org/report/2003/03/04/double-
standards/womens-property-rights-violations-kenya. 
 189. Manisuli Ssenyongo, Human Rights of Women in Africa: A Prerequisite for 
Human Security, in PROTECTING HUMAN SECURITY IN AFRICA 176, 182 (Ademola Abass 
ed., 2010) (noting, inter alia, that groups that are vulnerable to discrimination in many 
African countries include “the girl child”). 
566 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 28.3 
traditions harmful to women, children and older persons”190 is one of the 
factors constraining or impeding the full and effective implementation of 
the ICESCR by Zambia; (ii) “the prevalence of customary law—certain 
traditions, customs and cultural practices—leads to substantial 
discrimination against girls and women”;191 (iii) Article 23(4) of the 
Constitution of Zambia provides for exclusions and exceptions to the 
prohibition against discrimination, including with respect to “adoption, 
marriage, divorce, burial, devolution of property on death, and other 
matters of personal law, and to the application of customary law”;192 (iv) 
“the harsh living conditions of widows and girl orphans due to, among 
other things, harmful traditional practices such as ‘widow-cleansing’, 
early marriages and denial of inheritance”;193 (v) “the large number of 
street children, especially in the capital, Lusaka, who are particularly 
exposed to physical and sexual abuse, prostitution, and a high risk of 
being infected with HIV/AIDS”;194 and (v) “traditional attitudes continue 
and that discrimination against girl children is prevalent” in Zambia.195 
In addition to the fact that the customary laws and practices of many 
subcultures within the African countries do not allow women or girls to 
inherit real property, they have forced many women, particularly 
widows, into extreme poverty, a situation that renders the children of 
such women highly vulnerable to exploitation and abuse—these children 
easily fall victims to sex traffickers, producers and distributors of 
pornography, purveyors of sex tourism, and traffickers of children for 
body parts sold in the international organ transplantation market.196 
  
 190. U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rights, Consideration of Reports 
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Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/1/Add.106 (June 23, 2005) [hereinafter CESCR].  
 191. CESCR, supra note 192, ¶ 14. 
 192. CESCR, supra note 192, ¶ 10. See also CONST. OF ZAMBIA (1991) art. 23(4), 
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Zambia_2016.pdf?lang=en.  
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In general, many African cultural, customary, religious, and 
traditional practices often promote activities that are extremely harmful 
to children. These include, but are not limited to, female genital 
mutilation (“FGM”),197 forced and under-age child marriage,198 the 
abduction of children for various purposes, including prostitution and the 
production of pornography,199 discrimination against girls in the access to 
various services, including, for example, education,200 and the traditional 
myth that having sex with virgin girls can “cure and cleanse a man of 
various ills, including HIV.”201 
Throughout many countries in Africa, children are exposed to 
customary, traditional, and religious practices that are condoned by their 
  
 197. FGM is also referred to as female circumcision. It is practiced by many 
subcultures in Africa. It is quite prevalent among various subcultures in Nigeria, Kenya, 
and the Republic of Sudan, just to name a few. See generally FEMALE “CIRCUMCISION” IN 
AFRICA: CULTURE, CONTROVERSY, AND CHANGE (Bettina Shell-Duncan & Ylva Hernlund 
eds., 2000) (presenting a series of essays that examines FGM as a cultural and religious 
practice among several subcultures in Africa). 
 198. See generally MARRIAGE BY FORCE? CONTESTATION OVER CONSENT AND 
COERCION IN AFRICA (Annie Bunting et al. eds., 2016) (presenting a series of essays that 
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eradicate child marriage in Nigeria). 
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abuse and exploitation of children in Southern Africa). See also NEGOTIATING THE 
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VIE: LES ENFANTS ET LES JEUNES DANS LES ESPACES URBAINS DE L’AFRIQUE (Michael F. C. 
Bourdillon & Ali Sangare eds., 2012) (presenting a series of essays, in both French and 
English, that examines the lives of children and youth in various urban centers in Africa). 
 200. See generally KATARINA TOMASEVSKI, EDUCATION DENIED: COSTS AND 
REMEDIES (2003) (examining, inter alia, the denial of educational opportunities to girls, 
including those in Africa). See also Esi Sutherland-Addy, Gender Equity in Junior and 
Senior Secondary Education in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank Working Paper No. 
140, 2008) (examining, inter alia, the challenges of maintaining gender equity in primary 
and secondary schools in sub-Saharan Africa).  
 201. See HIV/AIDS IN SOUTH AFRICA 25 YEARS ON: PSYCHOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 71 (Poul Rohleder et al., eds., 2009) (presenting a series of essays that 
examines the impact of the so-called “virgin cure” on child rape in South Africa). 
568 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 28.3 
parents and other community leaders, but which cause harm. Any 
activity or practice that violates the rights of children, regardless of 
whether it is sanctioned by custom and tradition or even national 
constitutional law, must be considered a practice that is harmful to 
children and which does not belong in a modern State.202 It is important 
for each African State that each government understands that violence 
against children, even if it is considered an essential part of the culture 
and customary practices of an ethnic and/or religious group within a 
State, must never be justified. Unfortunately, throughout Africa, both 
physical and mental violence against children continues to be justified on 
“spurious grounds of tradition, culture or religion.”203 
In the section that follows, this Article takes a closer look at some of 
the most important practices that are harmful to children. Specific 
emphasis is placed on those harmful practices that are based on tradition, 
culture, superstition, and/or religion.204 
1. Practices Harmful to African Children: Overview 
In a resolution dated December 17, 1954, the UNGA made a note of 
the treatment of women under private law in Member States and Non-
Self-Governing and UN Trust Territories around the world.205 The 
UNGA then called on all Member States,  
Including States which have or assume responsibility for the 
administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, to take all 
appropriate measures in the countries and Territories under their 
jurisdiction with a view to abolishing such customs, ancient laws and 
practices by ensuring complete freedom in the choice of spouse; 
abolishing the practice of bride-price; guaranteeing the right of widows 
to the custody of their children and their freedom as to remarriage; 
eliminating completely child marriages and the betrothal of young girls 
  
 202. See, e.g., Violating Children’s Rights: Harmful Practices based on Tradition, 
Culture, Religion or Superstition, CRIN (Jan. 17, 2013), 
https://archive.crin.org/en/library/publications/violating-childrens-rights-harmful-
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before the age of puberty and establishing appropriate penalties where 
necessary; establishing a civil or other register in which all marriages 
and divorces will be recorded; ensuring that all cases involving 
personal rights be tried before a competent judicial body; ensuring also 
that family allowances, where these are provided, be administered in 
such a way as to benefit directly the mother and child.
206
 
With respect to children, the UNGA Resolution called for the 
abolition of “customs, ancient laws and practices” that are harmful to 
children.207 This includes completely eliminating child marriages and the 
betrothal of young girls before they reach the age of puberty.208 In 
addition, the Resolution also called for the Member States to establish 
appropriate penalties for anyone convicted of engaging in the prohibited 
practices.209  
Since the UDHR was adopted by the UNGA in 1948, the UN has 
devoted a lot of effort to find ways to outlaw practices, regardless of their 
source, that are harmful to children. Specifically, UN Women, a UN 
agency dedicated to empowering women, has called on all countries to 
abolish FGM and child marriage and other practices harmful to 
children.210 Although some advocates for children have argued in favor 
of dropping the word “traditional” from publications advocating for the 
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 210. UN Women is the “United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the 
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the Advancement of Women, into a composite entity, taking into account the existing 
mandates.” See G.A. Res. 63/311, ¶ 1 (Sept. 14, 2009). 
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recognition and protection of children’s rights because of their belief that 
its continued use “may offend [those] communities who value their 
traditions,” others have suggested that the concept of “harmful traditional 
practices” must be extended or enlarged to include “harmful practices 
based [specifically] on tradition, culture, religion or superstition.”211 
Throughout the continent of Africa, many communities have 
continued to embrace and engage in practices that are harmful to 
children. In addition to the fact that these practices have continued to be 
accepted and viewed favorably by many of the continent’s subcultures, 
they are also considered an integral part of the cultural identity of many 
of these groups. These practices are viewed favorably by many 
subcultures in Africa because of at least one of the following: (a) 
tradition; (b) culture; (c) religion; (d) custom; and (e) superstition.212 
Nevertheless, this list is not exhaustive—that is, harmful practices based 
on tradition, culture, religion or superstition, “does not necessarily cover 
all the violations of children’s rights.”213 Other practices, which have not 
been listed above, such as the denial of opportunity for the education of 
girls, “discrimination against children with disabilities, including their 
exclusion from participating in the lives of their communities, poor and 
discriminating treatment of minorities, particularly religious and ethnic 
minorities, and child imprisonment,” are equally harmful to children in 
Africa.214 
Several international human rights instruments have made a note of 
practices that are harmful to children. For example, the CRC imposes an 
obligation on States Parties to “take all effective and appropriate 
measures with a view to abolishing traditional practices prejudicial to the 
health of children.”215 Article 16(2) of CEDAW also outlaws practices 
based on traditions and customs that are prejudicial to the rights of 
children. Specifically, the article states that “[t]he betrothal and the 
marriage of a child shall have no legal effect, and all necessary action, 
including legislation, shall be taken to specify a minimum age for 
marriage and to make the registration of marriages in an official registry 
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compulsory.”216 The ACRWC also recommends that practices based on 
“custom, tradition, cultural or religious practice that [are] inconsistent 
with the rights, duties and obligations contained in . . . the Charter” 
should “be discouraged.”217 
Very young African children or infants, like their counterparts in 
other parts of the world, lack either the capacity to consent or the 
capacity to withhold consent. As a consequence, “harmful practices 
based on tradition, culture, religion or superstition are often perpetrated” 
on these children and infants.218 African customs and traditions, as well 
as national laws, grant parents’ powers and/or rights over their children. 
For example, the Constitution of the Republic of Kenya states that 
“[e]very child has the right (e) to parental care and protection, which 
includes equal responsibility of the mother and father to provide for the 
child, whether they are married to each other or not.”219 In addition, 
Article 31 of the ACRWC states that “[c]hildren have responsibilities 
towards their families and societies, to respect their parents, superiors 
and elders, to preserve and strengthen African cultural values in their 
relation with other members of their communities.”220 These assumptions 
of “parental powers or rights over their children”221 and the fact that 
children are expected to “respect their parents, superiors and elders,”222 
as well as the belief in and fidelity to, the cultures and traditions of their 
subcultures by many African parents, renders many children vulnerable 
to harmful practices. 
Parental rights or power over their children must be exercised 
responsibly and based on the principle of the “best interests of the child” 
and with the expressed understanding that “[t]here is no parental right to 
subject a child to harmful practices.”223 While parents may legitimately 
help their children in developing their capacity to exercise their freedom 
of thought, conscience, and religion, they must only do so “in a manner 
consistent with the evolving capacities of the child.”224 Accordingly, 
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African parents must not use “their adult religious beliefs and practices 
to justify subjecting children to harmful practices, which violate their 
children’s rights.”225 States Parties should make certain that perpetrators 
of “[h]armful practices that involve direct physical violence on children” 
must be prosecuted according to the law and punished accordingly if 
found guilty.226 
2. Harmful Traditional Practices Affecting Children in 
Africa: Detailed Analysis 
The Gender & Development Network (“GADN”) defines harmful 
traditional practices (“HTPs”) as “a form of discrimination; they violate 
the human rights of affected individuals, particularly women and girls. 
They arise from gender inequality and discriminatory values, which lead 
to unequal power relations in communities and societies and to violence 
against women and girls.”227 While there is no universally-agreed upon 
definition of HTPs, it is generally agreed that they “stem from value-
based discrimination against particular groups of people, and they 
challenge the human rights of the people affected by them.”228 As argued 
by the GADN, HTPs’ roots can be found in “particular cultural and 
social norms229 and beliefs” of various subcultures or ethnocultural 
groups, as well as, “particular interpretations of religion.”230 
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Some groups have objected to the inclusion of the word “traditional” 
when scholars study the impact of harmful practices on women and girls 
and other vulnerable groups (e.g., young boys). Nevertheless, it has been 
argued that including the word “traditional” in the study of harmful 
practices “allows the harmful nature of HTPs to be addressed, while 
respecting and working within the context of that tradition.”231 
In each country and within each subculture, any individual whose 
behavior does not conform with the social norms of the community (i.e., 
a particular subculture) would be severely punished by members of the 
community. Such punishment can include, but is not limited to, 
isolation/ostracism, shunning, banishment/forced exile, 
flogging/beatings, shaming, and even death.232  
Not all traditional practices are harmful to women and children. Some 
of these practices actually contribute significantly to the promotion of 
“social solidarity and equity” in various subcultures, both in Africa and 
around the world.233 For example, the “Islamic requirement of kafala or 
guardianship of unparented [or orphaned] children” significantly 
improves not just the welfare of the child in question, but also the 
community as a whole.234 Throughout Africa, many subcultures have 
traditions and customary practices and norms that call for the entire 
community to get together to help those members that are aggrieved 
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(e.g., from losing a loved one).235 In Rwanda, for example, the principle 
of Ubudehe makes certain that members of each community work 
together to protect the weakest among them, as well as the environment 
in which they live.236 Moreover, various ethnocultural groups in 
Cameroon and Nigeria maintain social savings systems that are used to 
help those who are in need.237 
Research shows that the failure of large groups of individuals to 
adhere to social norms, as is occurring in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (“DRC”), can lead to extreme violence and a breakdown in the 
social order.238 This is evident in the rise of violent youth militias in 
major metropolitan areas of the DRC, particularly Kinshasa, where many 
young people have totally detached themselves from their communities 
and no longer consider themselves bound by the various social or 
communal norms of their parents. Instead, they have formed their own 
communities where socio-political interaction is regulated by a new code 
developed and adopted by them. The result has been brutal and extreme 
violence on the part of these youths who have gone on to form their own 
communities, armed with alternative social norms.239 
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the African saying: “[i]t takes a whole village to raise a child,” which means that “it takes 
a whole community, and not just two parents, to bring up a child.” Adam Rhaiti, ‘It Takes 
a Whole Village to Raise a Child’ – An African Saying, RIGHT FOR EDUC. (Jul. 7, 2016), 
https://rightforeducation.org/2016/07/it-takes-a-whole-village/. See also POLYCARP 
IKUENOBE, PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON COMMUNALISM AND MORALITY IN AFRICAN 
TRADITIONS 1–3 (2006) (examining, inter alia, the African system of extended family). 
 236. MARGEE M. ENSIGN & WILLIAM E. BERTRAND, RWANDA: HISTORY AND HOPE 
1 (2010) (examining, inter alia, the Ubudehe process in Rwanda). 
 237. Dan Soen & Patrice de Comarmond, Savings Associations Among the 
Bamilèkè: Traditional and Modern Cooperation in Southwest Cameroon, 74 AMERICAN 
ANTHROPOLOGIST 1170, 1170–71, 1174 (1972) (examining, inter alia, social savings 
systems among the Bamilèkè ethnocultural group in Cameroon); KATE MEAGHER, 
IDENTITY ECONOMICS: SOCIAL NETWORKS & THE INFORMAL ECONOMY IN NIGERIA 109 
(2010) (examining, inter alia, social savings networks in Nigeria). 
 238. See Kuluna: Congo Plagued by Lawless Youth Gangs, DOCUMENTARY 
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In the African subcultures where HTPs exist, many members of these 
groups and sometimes the majority, believe that these practices are 
“necessary to improve the well-being of the whole community.”240 It has 
been argued that many African parents who force their children to 
undergo FGM do not do so in order to harm them or put their lives in 
danger. However, these parents actually believe that subjecting their 
children to this insidious practice will better their lives since it “is 
necessary to secure their daughters a good marriage, a good future, and 
acceptance into their community.”241 For those interested in fostering a 
culture of respect for and protection of the rights of children in the 
African countries, the key is “to find ways to respect different cultures, 
and protect positive traditions [i.e., traditional practices],” while at the 
same time, encouraging and enhancing “social change away from 
harmful practices that deny girls and women their human rights.”242 
It is important to note that HTPs remain pervasive in many African 
subcultures, not just because members of these communities mistakenly 
believe that they are “necessary or helpful to their [communities],” but 
also because many national governments either do not have the political 
will to deal with them or are unwilling to do so.243 In addition, the 
international community continues to see these HTPs as “culturally 
sensitive” and hence, quite “difficult” to fully eradicate or modify, 
especially by external actors.244 As a result of dysfunctional legal and 
judicial systems or pervasive bureaucratic corruption, many African 
countries do not have the legal capacity to deal with HTPs fully. 
Even in African countries where the government is committed to 
eliminating or moderating HTPs, it may still not be able to do so because 
of several constraints. For example, the government may owe its survival 
to the groups (e.g., religious or ethnic groups) whose HTPs are to be 
modified or eliminated by law. For example, in many African countries, 
issues of “female cleanliness, cultural identity, protection of virginity, 
prevention of immorality, better marriage prospects, greater pleasure for 
  
 240. GENDER & DEV. NETWORK, supra note 227, at 4. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. at 7. 
 244. Id.  
576 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 28.3 
the husband and improvement of fertility”245 are considered a key to the 
survival of many subcultures. Hence, leaders of these subcultures not 
only force their members to conform to these practices but also fight any 
efforts by the government and NGOs to eradicate them.246  
As argued by the Gender & Development Network, “it is often 
difficult for people to challenge beliefs and practices, which are deeply 
embedded within their own cultures.”247 Of course, some countries 
simply do not have the necessary resources to undertake the type of 
educational processes that are needed to fully inform the population of 
the dangers of HTPs and why it is necessary to eradicate them. This is 
especially true in African countries where most people do not speak or 
understand the official or national language.248 Then, there is the problem 
of extreme poverty. For example, many poor families are often forced to 
marry-off their underage daughters to rich old men in order to use the 
“bride-price” paid on the girl’s head for the upkeep of the family.249 In 
addition, securing a husband for the girl-child also reduces the number of 
people that the family has to support—after the marriage has been 
effected, the family will no longer have to provide for the upkeep of the 
child, including providing her with an education.  
The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (“BDPA”)250 
recognized the fact that States should not use culture, tradition, religion, 
or superstition to justify harmful practices, which violate the rights of 
women and girls. At the Beijing Conference, where the BDPA was 
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adopted, States agreed to “[c]ondemn violence against women and 
refrain from invoking any custom, tradition or religious consideration to 
avoid their obligations with respect to its elimination as set out in the 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women.”251  
HTPs can “cause girls and women physical, psychological, emotional 
and spiritual pain” and can “lead to life-long damage and trauma and 
may even result in early death.”252 In addition, HTPs can make it 
virtually impossible for girls to enjoy their basic human rights and these 
include (a) the right to life and health; (b) the right not to be 
discriminated against on the basis of sex; (c) the right for girls not to be 
subjected to various forms of violence but to enjoy being nurtured by 
their parents and the community in which they live; and (d) the right to 
freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment.253 
Although international human rights instruments offer significant 
protection against HTPs, national laws, which include constitutions, 
legislative acts, and customs and traditions, are also critical to the 
protection of children against harm from practices associated with 
traditions, customs, religion, and superstition. Many of these 
international human rights instruments were examined earlier. Just to 
reiterate, they include the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights; and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare 
of the Child. 
In the sections that follow, this Article will examine some, but not all, 
of the HTPs. Our interest is primarily in those HTPs that are commonly 
found among many subcultures in the African countries and which are 
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a. Acid Violence and Children in Africa 
 
According to the International NGO Council on Violence Against 
Children, “[a]cid violence involves intentional violence in which 
perpetrators throw, spray, or pour acid onto the victims’ faces and 
bodies.”254 In a study of acid violence in South Asia, Solotaroff and 
Pande argue that “[a]cid violence is a particularly damaging and 
shocking form of violence: acid is hurled at the victim, often targeting 
the head and face, with the intention to maim, disfigure, and blind.”255 
Solotaroff and Pande go on to state that “[t]he great majority of victims 
are women and girls, many of them below 18 years of age, but men and 
boys are also targeted.”256 In South Asian communities, “[a]cid violence 
reflects deeply ingrained gender inequality and discrimination in a 
society, whereby women are attacked for transgressing the traditional 
gender roles that place them in subordinate positions.”257 
Although acid attacks may sometimes be orchestrated and carried out 
by mentally unstable individuals, most of the acid assaults on girls and 
women are undertaken by individuals who believe that the victims have 
violated or transgressed behavior norms established by tradition and 
custom.258 The main objective of the perpetrators of acid violence is not 
to kill the victim but to permanently maim, disfigure, and inflict physical 
and mental pain on the individual.259 Girls who have been physically 
disfigured and mutilated by acid violence are usually considered outcasts 
and treated as such by the communities in which they live. As a 
consequence, fear of being attacked and subsequently ostracized severely 
“represses [these] girls’ and women’s willingness to challenge 
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established norms,”260 even if, like FGM, these practices are extremely 
harmful to them.  
Although acid violence has historically been linked primarily to 
cultures in South Asia, this type of violence can be found in several 
countries in Africa. The incidence of acid violence against both 
men/boys and women/girls has been reported in Ethiopia, Liberia, 
Nigeria, Uganda, South Africa, and Tanzania (Zanzibar). In a study of 
acid violence in Uganda, Amy Fallon noted that “[w]ith broad 
availability of dangerous chemicals and light punishments, acid attacks 
were just waiting to happen.”261 In fact, acid attacks have become so 
common in Uganda that a non-governmental organization called the 
Center for Rehabilitation of Survivors of Acid and Burns Violence 
(“CERESAV”) was started in 2012 to “offer legal advice and health 
services to survivors” of acid violence.262 
In Uganda, most acid violence is usually perpetrated by co-wives in 
polygamous households. However, there have been cases in which 
jealous ex-husbands have hired individuals to attack wives who left 
abusive relationships.263 In addition, boyfriends have also plotted acid 
attacks on their girlfriends for refusing to submit to their demands.264 
Although most of the acid violence in Uganda is directed primarily at 
women, children are also affected by acid violence in this East African 
country—many mothers, blinded by acid attacks are no longer able to 
take care of their young children, and, in at least one case, a pregnant 
mother who was burned by acid almost died while giving birth and 
afterward found it very difficult to take care of her child.265 For example, 
a Ugandan woman named Gloria Kankunda, whose co-wife hired 
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someone to throw acid on her, was not just scarred “physically, 
psychologically, and socially,” but she spent two years in South Africa 
where she underwent “20 skin-graft reconstructions” and several 
operations, during which time she was unable to care for her family.266 
In 2017, the UK-based Independent newspaper reported that the 
mouth of an Ethiopian woman was “melted shut in horrific acid attack by 
husband.”267 Other writers have reported that these attacks are part of the 
country’s “hidden culture of violence against women.”268 Acid violence 
against Ethiopian women is not limited to those living in mainland 
Ethiopia. For example, an Ethiopian immigrant woman living in 
Hyattsville, Maryland, was attacked with sulfuric acid by a male 
roommate who was also an Ethiopian.269 The victim, Selamawit Tefera 
Kelbessa, a former Ethiopian Airlines hostess, spent nearly a year in the 
hospital and eventually took her own life on April 12, 2019.270 
Additionally, in April 2011, a Liberian man was attacked by acid and 
eventually flown to the Johns Hopkins Burn Center in Baltimore, 
Maryland for treatment.271 The perpetrator of the attack was never 
found.272 In 2015, a man in Liberia’s Bong County was arrested and 
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charged with killing his girlfriend by pouring acid on her. The 
perpetrator, named Tetoe Sumo, later confessed to the crime.273 
Acid violence, especially against girls, has also been on the rise in 
Nigeria,274 South Africa,275 and Tanzania.276 While most acid violence is 
directed at adults, particularly women, children are still affected by them. 
For one thing, a lot of the women who suffer from acid attacks either die 
or are permanently disabled and rendered incapable of taking care of 
their children. In addition to psychological and mental problems, many 
of these women are physically incapacitated, making it very difficult for 
them to contribute to family care. In situations in which the women are 
ostracized by their communities as a result of the disfigurement suffered 
from acid violence, the shaming also affects the children and could 
permanently impair their ability to function as productive adults. 
 
b. Superstitions Regarding Birth 
 
In Africa, “superstitions among various subcultures about births have 
a significant impact on children.”277 Within some subcultures in Africa, 
certain types of births are considered unlucky or capable of bringing 
  
 273. See Lennart Dodoo, Liberia: Man Allegedly Kills Girlfriend with Acid, FPA, 
https://frontpageafricaonline.com/front-slider/liberia-man-allegedly-kills-girlfriend-with-
acid/ (last updated May 15, 2018). 
 274. See Kehinde Oluseyi Macaulay, Assessing Domestic Violence in Nigeria, 3 
TEXILA INT’L J. ACAD. RES. at 1–3 (2016) (noting, inter alia, that acid attacks have 
become an important part of domestic violence in Nigeria). See also Osai J. Ojigho, 
Prohibiting Domestic Violence Through Legislation in Nigeria, 82 GENDER & LEGAL 
SYS. 86, 89 (2009) (noting, inter alia, that so-called “acid baths” have become an 
important source of violence against women). 
 275. See Yolisa Tswanya, Sulphuric Acid Attack Shocks Paarl Family, IOL (Mar. 
26, 2018), https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/western-cape/sulphuric-acid-attack-
shocks-paarl-family-14072259 (discussing that in 2018, sulfuric acid was dumped on a 
married man with a wife and three children and who was involved in a minor traffic 
accident, was attacked with sulfuric acid). 
 276. See Faith Karimi, Tanzania Arrests 15 Suspects in Acid Attacks, CNN, 
https://www.cnn.com/2013/09/18/world/tanzania-acid-attack-arrests/index.html (last 
updated Sept. 18, 2013, 11:11 AM). See also Raziye Akkoc, Zanzibar Acid Attack 




 277. See Mbaku, The Rule of Law, supra note 1, at 399. 
582 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 28.3 
“evil spirits to the family or community.”278 Although superstitions differ 
among the continent’s different ethnocultural groups, the following can 
be identified as births that are considered by several subcultures to create 
problems for the family and/or community:279 (i) multiple births; (ii) birth 
order and the sex of the child; (iii) premature births; (iv) “fast” or 
“quick” births; and (v) unusual position of the infant during labor.280 
For example, research has determined that children have been 
abandoned or killed by some subcultures in Madagascar because they 
were supposedly born on an “unlucky” day.281 At its 34th Session held on 
September 23, 2003, to consider reports submitted by the Government of 
Madagascar under Article 44 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child noted that “the 
murder or rejection of children thought to be ‘born on an unlucky day’ is 
beginning to disappear, but remains deeply concerned that such murders 
still occur and at the rejection or abandonment of twins in the Mananjary 
region.”282  
There is a long history of twin-killings in Nigeria. In an article 
published in the West African Journal of Medicine, Asindi, Young, and 
Udo determined that about 10% of the Efik, Ibibio, and Annang 
ethnocultural groups still “hold a taboo against twins: as babies derived 
from the devil, non-human and punishment from the gods for 
sinfulness.”283 The study also determined that many of the twins were 
subsequently “rejected and killed.”284 It has long been a taboo in most 
parts of Southeastern Nigeria to bear twins and “[m]others who bore 
twins were thought to have had intercourse with the devil spirit and given 
birth to something monstrous and unnatural.”285 In addition to brutally 
killing the twins, “the mother was shunned by her husband and cast out 
of the family” and subsequently “relegated to live in ‘twin villages.’”286 
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However, in the mid-1880s, Scottish nurse and Christian missionary, 
Mary Mitchell Slessor, arrived in Nigeria to convert the “natives” to 
Christianity and fight to abolish the practice of twin infanticide among 
various subcultures in Southeastern Nigeria.287 While Slessor was quite 
successful in her work, the problem of twin infanticide was not 
completely eliminated from Nigeria. For example, the Bassa Komo 
ethnocultural group, which is located on the outskirts of Nigeria’s capital 
city, Abuja, still brands twin children as evil and hence, subject to being 
killed. In 2017, Chika Oduah, a reporter for the Voice of America News 
reported that the killing of twin babies, who are branded “evil children,” 
continues to this day in Kaida Village, which is a community of the 
Bassa Komo.288 Nigeria is not the only country where traditional and 
customary practices support and condone the killing of twin babies. The 
killing of twins has also been reported in Kenya289 and Cameroon.290 
 
c. The Flattening of the Breasts of Young Girls  
 
Breast flattening, which is also known generally as “breast ironing,” is 
a common practice in many African countries. In Cameroon, for 
example, when “girls start showing signs of puberty, mothers begin 
‘ironing’ their breasts, using heated tools like stones, spatulas, and 
pestles to pound or massage their chests, in an attempt to prevent them 
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from developing.”291 Like perpetrators of FGM, those who impose this 
insidious practice on their daughters claim that it is being undertaken for 
the good of these girls.292 
Although research has determined that breast ironing is present 
among various subcultures in Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Benin, and Togo, it 
is a most common practice in Cameroon, where it is estimated that “a 
quarter of girls and women have had their breasts ‘ironed.’”293 
Cameroonian practitioners of this atrocious abuse of children believe that 
it protects their children from “unwanted sexual advances.”294 However, 
the practice, which is considered a major form of physical and sexual 
abuse of children, inflicts significant amounts of mental and physical 
trauma on the affected children and scars them for life.295  
Short-term effects of breast ironing include “tissue damage, pain, 
burns, irritation, infection, scarring, depression and shame, among 
others.”296 However, while researchers argue that there are many long-
term psychological and physical side effects, no detailed studies have yet 
been undertaken to figure them out. Those parents who undertake the 
ironing or flattening of the breasts of their daughters, as are those who 
undertake other harmful practices based on tradition, religion, customs, 
and superstition, believe and argue that they are doing so in the best 
interests of their children. Unfortunately, the results are usually physical, 
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d. Blood-Letting 
 
Until the advent of modern medicine, blood-letting was considered by 
many cultures around the world as a cure for a range of diseases, 
including elephantiasis, rheumatism, and meningitis, as well as high 
fevers and headaches.298 However, in addition to the fact that blood-
letting can cause “severe bleeding,” it can also produce “anemia, 
infection, contraction of STIs, and death.”299 Although advances in 
science and medicine have disproven blood-letting’s curative powers and 
resulted in its being abandoned or outlawed in many Western societies, 
the practice remains quite popular in several parts of Africa.300 
For example, studies of blood-letting have determined that two types 
of practices, “wagemt” and “mognbagegn” are quite popular in the 
highlands of the Amhara and Tigray regions of Ethiopia.301 These 
practices are carried out through “vein resection on the scalp and on the 
arms” and “the rationale behind [this practice] is that the body is believed 
to be decaying internally causing tissue swelling and deteriorating 
health.”302 In these regions of Ethiopia, blood-letting is prescribed for the 
treatment of “encephalitis, rheumatism, high fever and headache (usually 
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e. Corporal Punishment  
 
Research shows that corporal punishment, which is also referred to as 
“violent physical discipline,”304 is by far one of the most important and 
popular forms of violence imposed on children, including those in 
Africa.305 The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has noted that 
any efforts, whether at the national or international level, to improve and 
ensure the recognition and protection of the rights of the child must 
include a strategy to significantly reduce and perhaps, even eliminate, 
corporal punishment and other cruel or degrading forms of 
punishment.306 
In addition to the general agreement that “corporal punishment is 
incompatible with the [Convention on the Rights of the Child], many 
child-advocacy groups, including the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child, have argued that corporal punishment is “a long standing and 
pervasive practice, still socially approved and lawful in the home and 
family in a large majority of states” and that “[i]n some cases it is 
supported by religious belief, although influential leaders of all the major 
religions have called for its prohibition and elimination.”307 
The Committee on the Rights of the Child defines “corporal” or 
“physical” punishment as “any punishment in which physical force is 
used and intended to cause some degree of pain or discomfort, however, 
light.”308 Most corporal punishment involves “hitting (‘smacking’, 
‘slapping’, ‘spanking’) children, with the hand or with an implement—a 
whip, stick, belt, shoe, wooden spoon, etc.”309 Corporal punishment can 
also involve “kicking, shaking or throwing children, scratching, 
pinching, biting, pulling hair or boxing ears, forcing children to stay in 
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uncomfortable positions, burning, scalding or forced ingestion (for 
example, washing children’s mouths out with soap or forcing them to 
swallow hot spices).”310 
While parents and the community are expected to guide, correct, and 
help the child develop into a productive and responsible adult, they must 
do so only in ways that do not involve the justification of violence 
against and humiliation of the child.311 The Committee on the Rights of 
the Child recognizes “that parenting and caring for children, especially 
babies and young children, demand frequent physical actions and 
interventions to protect them.”312 However, such nurturing activities must 
be separated from “the deliberate and punitive use of force to cause some 
degree of pain, discomfort or humiliation” to the child.313 
UNICEF has noted that “[v]iolent child discipline may be either 
physical or psychological in nature” and that “[b]oth forms matter with 
respect to children’s rights and childhood outcomes.”314 Violent 
psychological discipline, argues UNICEF, “involves the use of guilt, 
humiliation, the withdrawal of love, or emotional manipulation to control 
children.”315 Like physical discipline (i.e., corporal punishment), violent 
psychological discipline has repercussions for children.316 
The CRC recognizes the “inherent dignity” and “equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family” as the “foundation of 
freedom, justice and peace in the world.”317 The CRC also notes that “in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the [UN] has proclaimed 
that childhood is entitled to special care and assistance.”318 Article 37 of 
the CRC imposes an obligation on States Parties to ensure that “[n]o 
child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
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treatment or punishment.”319 The Committee on the Rights of the Child 
notes that Article 37 of the CRC “is complemented and extended by 
article 19,”320 which imposes an obligation on all States Parties to:  
Take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational 
measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental 
violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment 
or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s), 
legal guardian(s) or any other person who has the care of the child.
321
 
The Committee on the Rights of the Child notes that the CRC’s 
provision regarding child discipline is not ambiguous because the 
provision specifically refers to “all forms of physical or mental 
violence”322 and such a mandate on States Parties “does not leave room 
for any level of legalized violence against children.”323 The CRC also 
deals with child discipline outside the home. Specifically, Article 28, 
paragraph 2, imposes an obligation on States Parties to “take all 
appropriate measures to ensure that school discipline is administered in a 
manner consistent with the child’s human dignity and in conformity with 
the present Convention.”324 
The CESCR has noted that “corporal punishment is inconsistent with 
the fundamental guiding principle of international human rights law 
enshrined in the Preambles to the [UDHR] and both Covenants: the 
dignity of the individual,” and that “[o]ther aspects of school discipline 
may also be inconsistent with human dignity, such as public 
humiliation.”325 
The Committee on the Rights of Child also notes that “[c]orporal 
punishment has also been condemned by regional human rights 
mechanisms,” including “[t]he European Court of Human Rights,” 
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which, “in a series of judgments, has progressively condemned corporal 
punishment of children, first in the penal system, then in schools, 
including private schools, and most recently in the home.”326 The African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“African Commission”) is 
tasked with monitoring the implementation of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights.327  
In 2003, the African Commission delivered a decision concerning 
possible violations of Article 5 of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, which prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading treatment.328 According to the Complainant, on June 13, 1999, 
“the students of the Nubia Association of Ahlia University held a picnic 
in Buri, Khartoum.”329 The government’s security agents and policemen 
subsequently beat some students and arrested others.330 The students 
were alleged to have “violated ‘public order’ contrary to Article 152 of 
the Criminal Law of 1991 because they were not properly dressed or 
acting in a manner considered being immoral.”331 Specifically, the 
“Complainant avers that the acts constituting these offences comprised of 
girls kissing, wearing trousers, dancing with men, crossing legs with 
men, sitting with boys and sitting and talking with boys.”332 
The students arrested by the security forces and the police were 
subsequently convicted and sentenced by the court to fines and lashes.333 
In the complaint sent to the African Commission on March 17, 2000, the 
Complainant alleged a violation of Article 5 of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights.334 In its decision, the African Commission 
held that “[t]here is no right for individuals, and particularly the 
government of a country to apply physical violence to individuals for 
offenses. Such a right would be tantamount to sanctioning State 
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sponsored torture under the Charter and contrary to the very nature of 
this human rights treaty.”335 
In Christian Education South Africa v. Minister of Education, the 
Constitutional Court (“CC”) of South Africa was called upon to 
determine whether “when Parliament enacted a law to prohibit corporal 
punishment in schools, did it violate the rights of parents of children in 
independent schools who, in line with their religious convictions, had 
consented to its use?”336 The CC upheld the High Court’s ruling that 
“corporal punishment in schools infringed the children’s right to dignity 
and security of the person and was accordingly not protected by Section 
31 of the Constitution.”337 
The Committee on the Rights of the Child argued further that any 
interpretation of the principle “best interests of the child” must be 
“consistent with the whole Convention [CRC], including the obligation 
to protect children from all forms of violence and the requirement to give 
due weight to the child’s views; it cannot be used to justify practices, 
including corporal punishment and other forms of cruel or degrading 
punishment, which conflict with the child’s human dignity and right to 
physical integrity.”338 
  
f. Cosmetic Mutilation  
 
Throughout the continent, many subcultures undertake what are 
considered “cosmetic” procedures to significantly improve and enhance 
their children’s beauty.339 For example, several types of heavy metal 
rings may be placed around the necks of young girls and used to stretch 
their necks and enhance their beauty and appeal to future husbands.340 Of 
course, the enhanced beauty will not only make the girl more attractive 
to prospective suitors but also significantly increase the bribe price that is 
supposed to be paid to the girl’s family by the husband-to-be.341 
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According to the International NGO Council on Violence Against 
Children, this practice is quite pervasive in Asia and southern Africa.342 
In various parts of Ethiopia, partly to “highlight a girl’s beauty or to 
scare enemies, cuts are made in the lips, and sometimes ears, of young 
girls and a plate of variable size, is inserted.”343 Practitioners of this 
tradition quite often go further and, in addition to the cuts, also extract 
the front teeth in order to enhance the inserting of the plates.344 With 
time, larger and larger plates are inserted in order to stretch the girl’s lips 
to the size that reflects beauty standards generally recognized by the 
community.345 This practice is known to seriously affect the health of the 
victims—in addition to various infections, the victim can find it very 
difficult to eat and hence, may suffer from malnutrition.346 
 
g. Cursing  
 
Cursing rituals practiced by many subcultures in Africa are known to 
contribute to the sexual exploitation and abuse of children. In many 
instances, children are forced or coerced to take “oaths of allegiance” to 
various traditional religious deities and spirits.347 These rituals form an 
effective instrument of control over children, and if the child attempts to 
breach the terms of the ritual, they are punished severely by the deity, as 
well as the community of which the child is a member. Children who 
take these oaths live in extreme fear and are highly susceptible to 
trafficking and sexual exploitation.348 
ECPAT UK, the NGO which works to protect children globally, has 
determined that it is often the case that children who are trafficked “take 
part in ritual oaths before they leave their country of origin which they 
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are told is to keep them or their traffickers safe.”349 During the ritual 
ceremonies, a child is usually required to provide samples of their “hair, 
blood or personal belongings which will be contained in a ‘packet’ and 
the child is taken to a shrine or graveyard to swear an oath or 
promise.”350 While some subcultures have claimed that the oath is 
designed to ensure the child’s “ongoing beauty and prosperity,” it can 
also be used “to prevent [the child] from speaking out about their 
experiences, from running away, or as a means of ensuring that they 
work off a ‘debt.’”351 Many children who are subjected to these oaths are 
usually afraid to breach them for fear that “either they or a member of 
their family will suffer severe consequences, including death.”352 
 
h. Female Genital Mutilation  
 
Globally and in Africa, FGM is by far the most recognized harmful 
traditional practice. The World Health Organization (“WHO”) has 
defined FGM as “all procedures that involve the partial or total removal 
of the external female genitalia, or other injury to the female genital 
organs for non-medical reasons.”353 FGM has been classified into four 
categories, “depending on the degree and severity” and these are: “i) 
clitoridectomy, ii) excision, iii) infibulation, and iv) other.”354 
The practice of FGM “violates numerous human rights, including the 
right to health and the right to protection from all forms of violence.”355 
FGM has also been recognized by international, regional and national 
human rights organizations as “violating a child’s right to protection 
from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.”356 Research has 
determined that FGM is widely practiced by many subcultures in Africa, 
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the Middle East, and South Asia.357 For example, it has been determined 
that in the Somali Region of Ethiopia and what until 2010, was the North 
Eastern Province of Kenya, as much as 97.3% and 98.8% of girls 
respectively have been subjected to the most severe form of FGM.358 
Globally, it is estimated that over 140 million girls and women are 
subjected to FGM, many of them before they reach the age of fifteen 
years.359 The subcultures that subject their girl children to FGM argue 
that the procedure will render the girl (i) cleaner and more suitable for 
marriage; (ii) more fertile and hence, more attractive to prospective 
husbands; (iii) more beautiful, attractive, and pleasing to suitors; (iv) less 
likely to be promiscuous—the girl who has undergone FGM, it is argued, 
will most likely retain her virginity until marriage and remain faithful to 
her husband in marriage; and (v) more acceptable to the community.360 
As countries and communities around the world have become aware 
of the short- and long-term harmful effects of FGM, some individuals 
and organizations in these countries have begun to argue that, given its 
persistence, trained and licensed surgeons should be legally allowed to 
perform the procedure in modern medical facilities since this will 
significantly reduce the complications that have, heretofore, plagued this 
procedure, as performed by traditional “experts.” Nevertheless, FGM, 
even if it is performed by trained and skilled physicians, can still threaten 
the short- and long-term health of the girl—in addition to the “increased 
risk of disease transmission,” the girl who has undergone FGM is also 
exposed to the risk of contracting fistulas, as well as, “increased 
complications and difficulty during childbirth, including hemorrhaging, 
shock, sepsis, and death to both the mother and child.”361 Hence, despite 
the efforts to “modernize” FGM and how it is undertaken, it remains a 
serious threat to the lives of girls in Africa and other parts of the world. 
The violation of the person of the girl-child, at the very least, is a major 
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infringement on her human rights and does not serve any medical 
purpose.362 
In countries where FGM is practiced, many proponents of the practice 
have argued that it is a major religious rite. In fact, FGM in Africa is 
undertaken by members of Christian and Muslim families, as well as 
those of households that practice traditional African religions. Scholars 
have argued, however, that “none of the holy texts of Christianity, 
Judaism, or Islam requires or prescribes the practice [i.e., FGM] and 
many religious scholars have spoken publicly against this belief.”363 
Scholars have long argued that “FC/FGM [female cutting/female genital 
mutilation] is a cultural, not a religious, practice” and that “[t]he practice 
predates the arrival of Christianity and Islam in Africa and is not a 
requirement of either religion.”364 FC/FGM, it is argued, is “practiced by 
Jews, Christians, Muslims and indigenous religious groups in Africa.”365 
In 2006, Dr. Ali Gom’a, then Grand Mufti of Egypt, “confirmed the un-
Islamic character of female circumcision and [subsequently] issued a 
fatwa accordingly.”366 
During the period July 20–23, 1998, medical scholars and 
practitioners, as well as religious leaders, met in convention in The 
Gambian capital, Banjul, under the auspices of the Inter-African 
Committee on Traditional Practices, to discuss issues associated with 
  
 362. GENDER & DEV. NETWORK, supra note 227, at 11. 
 363. Violating Children’s Rights, supra note 202, at 27. 
 364. FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: A GUIDE TO LAWS AND POLICIES WORLDWIDE 
6 (Anika Rahman & Nahid Toubia eds., 2000). 
 365. Id. 
 366. Gritt Klinkhammer, Costs of Religious Pluralism in Liberal Societies, in ON 
EXIT: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE RIGHT OF EXIT IN LIBERAL 
MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES 157, 167 n.26 (Dagmar Borchers & Annamari Vitikainen 
eds., 2012) In Egypt, the Grand Mufti is the government’s main source of religious 
authority and is considered by both the government and the people as the symbolic 
religious representative of the government. They can issue fatwas on religious matters. 
Professor Gom’a served as the Grand Mufti of Egypt from September 28, 2003 to 
February 11, 2013. See Amr Osman, Ali Gom’a: Kill Them, They Stink, Memo Middle 
East Monitor (Jan. 27, 2014, 11:07 AM), https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20140127-
ali-gomaa-kill-them-they-stink/. The al-Azhar Mosque and al-Azhar University and the 
Grand Mufti are considered the most important sources of authority for Sunni Muslims. 
See MARIZ TADROS, THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN CONTEMPORARY EGYPT: DEMOCRACY 
REDEFINED OR CONFINED 152 (2012). 
2020] International Law, African Customary Law 595 
FGM.367 The delegates  confirmed that “FGM has neither Islamic nor 
Christian origin or justifications,” and that they were “[s]eriously 
concerned by the incorrect interpretations and misuse of Islamic 
teachings to perpetuate violence against women, particularly FGM.”368 
They also pledged to uphold “the principle of equality and justice for all, 
without discrimination between men and women.”369 Finally, the 
delegates to the Banjul Convention “strongly condemned the 
continuation of female genital mutilation” and committed themselves to 
finding ways to “clarify the misinterpretation of religion and to teach the 
true principles of Islam and Christianity with regard to violence against 
women, including FGM.”370 
In a recent article, Reyhana Patel, Director of External Relations for 
Islamic Relief Canada, stated that “Islam does not advocate FGM and 
has a key role to play in eradicating this brutal practice.”371 The article 
also noted that the “first-ever conviction” of an individual for practicing 
“female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C)” had just occurred in the 
UK, “more than 30 years after the practice was criminalized in that 
country.”372 The hope is that the UK will continue the use of the law to 
eradicate this practice and that other countries, including especially those 
in Africa, will learn from the UK’s experience and example and 
criminalize the practice, as well as make certain that those laws 
prohibiting FGM/C are fully enforced and done so effectively and 
judiciously. 
If FGM cannot be justified on religious grounds and it is banned in 
many countries, then why is it that the practice remains quite pervasive 
in many countries? A possible answer to this question is that in many 
countries, especially in Africa, laws are usually not enforced effectively 
or only done so capriciously and arbitrarily, usually in ways that 
disadvantage girls and women or discriminate against them. However, 
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there are many organizations, both at the international and national 
levels, that are working to fully and effectively challenge the continued 
practice of FGM. For example, in 2008, eleven UN and UN-related 
agencies issued a joint statement on eliminating female genital mutilation 
and in this statement, they argued that “[f]emale genital mutilation is a 
dangerous practice, and a critical human rights violation.”373 
It is important to note that these UN agencies have pledged their 
support to regional and national organizations, including governments, 
that are fighting to eliminate FGM. Enacting legislation to prohibit the 
practice of FGM must be part of a holistic approach to the elimination of 
this insidious practice. Elsewhere, I have argued, however, that “while 
legal prohibition is an important first step to the eradication of FGM, it is 
a necessary but not sufficient condition.”374 Sufficiency “requires that the 
legal prohibition actually be enforced within the country.”375 Although 
many African countries legally prohibit FGM, many subcultures still 
engage in this practice because of “the failure of local authorities to 
enforce the laws prohibiting the practice.”376 
 
i. Marriage of Under-Age Girls  
 
In a book published in 2014, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, 
stated that “[a]nother serious and pervasive example of gender abuse is 
the marriage of young girls, often without their consent and contrary to 
their best interests.”377 He then goes on to note that “[t]here are an 
estimated 14 million girls married every year before they reach the age of 
eighteen, and 1 in 9 of these are younger than fifteen.”378 Of particular 
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interest to scholars studying child abuse and exploitation in Africa is 
what President Carter determined during his study of religion and its role 
in the oppression of women and girls.379 He found that poverty is a major 
factor in the decision to marry off an underage daughter.380 He went on to 
argue that “marrying off a daughter is a convenient way to eliminate the 
need to feed her” and, in addition, the family also gets to keep the “bride 
price” paid on her head by the future husband.381 
Child marriage is defined as “a marriage of a girl or boy before the 
age of 18 and refers to both formal marriages and informal unions in 
which children under the age of 18 live with a partner as if married.”382 
Although child marriage affects both boys and girls, in Africa and parts 
of Asia, it disproportionally affects girls.383 In terms of the prevalence of 
child marriage, of the thirty countries with the highest prevalence rates, 
twenty-one, or 70%, of them are found sub-Saharan Africa.384 
Most international human rights instruments provide protections for 
children, and these include the requirement that there should be a 
minimum age for marriage and that Member States enact national 
legislation to affect this marriage requirement. In addition, governments 
are required to stop harmful social and cultural practices, such as child 
marriage, that affect the welfare and dignity of children.385  
For example, according to the Convention on Consent to Marriage, 
Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages 
States Parties to the present Convention shall take legislative action to 
specify a minimum age for marriage. No marriage shall be legally 
entered into by any person under this age, except where a competent 
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authority has granted a dispensation as to age, for serious reasons, in 
the interest of the intending spouses.
386
  
In addition, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women in its General Recommendation 21, has recommended 
that “[t]he betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no legal effect, 
and all necessary action, including legislation, shall be taken to specify a 
minimum age for marriage and to make the registration of marriages in 
an official registry compulsory.”387  
Nevertheless, despite these international efforts to eradicate child 
marriage and other practices that are harmful to children, many countries 
in Africa have not yet provided themselves with legal and judicial 
institutions that are capable of eradicating child marriage and other 
practices that exploit children, violate their human rights, and deprive 
them of the right to self-actualization. 
Why does child marriage persist in many countries in Africa despite 
international efforts to eradicate this insidious practice? One factor 
enhancing and promoting child marriage in Africa is the economic status 
of the family.388 Children of poor families, much more so than those in 
families that are economically more well-off, are more likely to be forced 
into early marriage.389 In fact, research shows that poverty increases the 
risk for child marriage and that the “poorest countries have the highest 
child marriage rates.”390 Research by Jain and Kurz has determined that 
“[a] girl from the poorest household in Senegal, for example, is more 
than four times as likely to marry before age 18 as a girl in the richest 
household” and “[i]n Nigeria, 80 percent of the poorest girls marry 
before the age of 18, compared to 22 percent of the richest girls.”391 In 
many African countries, such as Senegal and Nigeria, “[m]any families 
say they marry their daughters early because girls are an economic 
  
 386. G.A. Res. 1763 A (XVII), at art. 2 (Nov. 7, 1962). 
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burden that can be relieved through marriage.”392 Of course, such 
marriages also produce significant economic benefits for the poor family 
through the receipt of money and other resources from the daughter’s 
prospective husband/family.393 
Another risk factor for early or child marriage is illiteracy and low 
levels of education. Education actually protects the girl from early 
marriage and allows her to develop into a productive adult before she 
gets married. Studies show that throughout Africa and other regions of 
the world, “higher levels of schooling for girls decrease their risk of child 
marriage.”394 Specifically, “[g]irls with eight or more years of education 
are less likely to marry young than girls with zero to three years of 
school.”395 Hence, one way to minimize a girl’s chances of marrying 
young is to provide her with opportunities for education and training.396 
For example, the World Bank has argued that “[b]y keeping girls in 
school, girls would have a better chance for safety and security, to health 
and education, and to make their own life choices and decisions.”397 
Other factors contributing to child marriage include the following: (i) 
a child becomes an orphan and marriage is seen as a form of safety net or 
security; (ii) a poor family is displaced by some form of conflict (e.g., 
sectarian violence, civil war, or natural disaster) and becomes homeless 
and as a consequence, the child becomes more of an economic burden to 
the family, necessitating the need to marry her off; and (iii) cultural, 
religious and customary beliefs that mandate that “a child, especially a 
girl, is better off or safer in the house of her ‘husband.’”398 
Unfortunately, girls who are forced into early or underage marriages 
often “end up being subjected to a lot of physical, emotional, and 
psychological abuse and exploitation by their husbands.”399 In addition, 
research has determined that child marriage usually leads to early 
childbirth and that “[g]irls who have babies also have a high risk of 
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suffering from obstetric fistula, a condition in which the vagina, bladder 
and/or rectum tear during childbirth and, if left untreated, causes lifelong 
leakage of urine and feces.”400  
In addition, “[c]hild marriage also exposes young married girls to a 
greater risk of HIV infection.”401 For example, a study of Kenya and 
Zambia determined that “15- to 19-year old married girls were 75 
percent more likely to have HIV than sexually active, unmarried girls.”402 
The study also determined that “[m]arried girls may be more vulnerable 
to HIV infection because they have little option to change their sexual 
behavior even with knowledge about HIV” and that “[c]hild brides also 
have less access to quality health care services and information compared 
to girls who marry when they are older.”403 
Of course, girls who are forced to marry early usually do not have the 
opportunity to go to school or complete their schooling.404 As a 
consequence, they are less likely to acquire the skills that they need to 
function as productive adults.405 Early marriage tends to “preclude further 
education and reinforce poverty.”406 Most child brides end up in marriage 
relationships in which the wife is totally dependent on the husband, a 
situation that can lead to significant levels of “domestic violence, sexual 
abuse, and isolation from family and the community.”407 
 
j. Domestic and Sexual Slavery  
 
In many countries throughout Africa, children from poor families are 
“sold” into servitude in the homes of rich urban families. For example, in 
a study of Oyo State, Nigeria, Tade and Aderinto determined that the 
“employment of domestic servants is a common phenomenon . . . where 
vulnerable children are internally trafficked to work as domestic servants 
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in affluent urban households.”408 A study by the Bureau of International 
Affairs of the U.S. Department of Labor also determined, with respect to 
Ghana, that “[t]he majority of children subject to human trafficking are 
transported within Ghana for labor in cocoa, domestic work, commercial 
sexual exploitation, and fishing.”409 Since children who are trafficked for 
domestic work in the houses of rich urban dwellers are usually hidden in 
these homes, “they are not visible to activists who are seeking to 
eliminate this practice and improve the welfare of these children.”410 
In a convention adopted in 1930, the ILO defined “forced or 
compulsory labor” as “all work or service which is exacted from any 
person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person 
has not offered himself voluntarily.”411 The Convention to Suppress the 
Slave Trade and Slavery of September 25, 1926 (“Slavery Convention”) 
defines slavery as “the status or condition of a person over whom any or 
all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.”412 
Moreover, it defines the slave trade as “all acts involved in the capture, 
acquisition or disposal of a person with intent to reduce him to slavery; 
all acts involved in the acquisition of a slave with a view to selling or 
exchanging him; all acts of disposal by sale or exchange of a slave 
acquired with a view to being sold or exchanged, and, in general, every 
act of trade or transport in slaves.”413 
In 1956, the United Nations adopted the Supplementary Convention 
on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and 
Practices Similar to Slavery, which imposed obligations on Member 
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States to abolish certain institutions and practices similar to slavery. 414 
These included (a) debt bondage; (b) serfdom; as well as: 
(c) Any institution or practice whereby:  
(i) A woman, without the right to refuse, is promised or given in 
marriage on payment of a consideration in money or in kind to her 
parents, guardian, family or any other person or group; or  
(ii) The husband of a woman, his family, or his clan, has the right to 
transfer her to another person for value received or otherwise; or  
(iii) A woman on the death of her husband is liable to be inherited by 
another person;  
(d) Any institution or practice whereby a child or young person under 
the age of 18 years, is delivered by either or both of his natural parents 
or by his guardian to another person, whether for reward or not, with a 
view to the exploitation of the child or young person or of his labor.
415
 
In 1948, the United Nations’ UDHR reaffirmed the proclamations of 
the League of Nations and UN conventions and resolutions by stating in 
Article 4 that no one shall be subjected to “slavery or servitude; slavery 
and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.”416 Then, in 
1957, the ILO adopted Convention No. 105: Abolition of Forced Labor 
Convention, which provides for “the immediate and complete abolition 
of forced or compulsory labor as specified in Article 1 of this 
Convention.”417 
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Eventually, the international community came to the conclusion that 
slavery and the slave trade had mutated and had assumed forms not 
covered by existing legislation. Thus, delegates at the 1998 session of the 
UN Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery adopted a 
recommendation that stated that “trans-border trafficking of women and 
girls for sexual exploitation is a contemporary form of slavery and 
constitutes a serious violation of human rights.”418 Then, in 1999, the 
General Assembly of the ILO unanimously adopted Convention 182 on 
the worst forms of child labor.419 In Convention 182, the ILO prohibits 
“all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and 
trafficking of children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or 
compulsory labor, including forced or compulsory recruitment of 
children for use in armed conflict.”420 
As part of its effort to fully eradicate and end the trafficking of 
persons, the UN adopted the Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime in 2000.421 The purpose of the Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime is: 
(a) To prevent and combat trafficking in persons, paying particular 
attention to women and children; 
(b) To protect and assist the victims of such trafficking, with full 
respect for their human rights; and  
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The term “trafficking in persons” is defined as: 
[T]he recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of 
persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of 
coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or 
of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments 
or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over 
another person, for the purpose of exploitation.
423
 
When the UDHR was adopted in 1948 by the UN General Assembly, 
the world organization included in it a clause that effectively prohibited 
slavery and the slave trade (in all its forms) in all Member States.424 
According to Article 4, “[n]o one shall be held in slavery or servitude; 
slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.”425 
Nevertheless, slavery and the slave trade remain a pervasive practice in 
many Member States of the United Nations even to this day. For 
example, Lisa Kristine, a photographer who depicts modern-day slavery, 
notes that “[t]here are 27 million slaves in the world today” and that, 
although “[s]lavery is illegal everywhere,” it nevertheless, “exists all 
over the world.”426  
In an article published in 2018, in Oxygen Media, a division of the 
United States’ NBC Universal,427 Sharon Lynn Pruitt noted that the 
“Global Slavery Index [had] counted 45.8 million enslaved people in 167 
countries, with one in four victims being children.”428 She went on to list 
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six countries where slavery is still a part of daily life for many people, 
and these are Mauritania, India, People’s Republic of China, Uzbekistan, 
Libya, and North Korea.429 However, Mauritania has made some 
progress in its efforts to deal with slavery—in addition to outlawing the 
practice, its national courts, in 2018, “handed down the country’s 
harshest anti-slavery ruling,” sentencing two slave-owners to prison 
terms of 10 and 20 years.430 
The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights issued a 
press release on November 21, 2014, to laud Niger’s 2003 law 
criminalizing slavery and slavery-like practices.431 The 2003 law 
amended the country’s Penal Code (Code pénal) and criminalized 
slavery and slavery-like practices in Article 270–2.432 The relevant article 
is 270–2, which imposes a penalty of ten to thirty years in prison and a 
fine of CFA Francs 1,000,000 to 5,000,000 for anyone convicted of 
enslaving others or forcing them into slavery; inciting others to alienate 
their freedom or dignity or that of a dependent in order to turn them into 
slaves.433 
Although Niger has criminalized slavery and slavery-like practices 
and, in addition, is a State Party to the Supplementary Convention on the 
Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices 
Similar to Slavery,434 Nigeriens continue to practice a modern form of 
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slavery referred to as wahaya. This is due primarily to the lack of 
political will, made possible by the fact that most of the country’s 
political elites are opportunists who seek public office simply in order to 
enrich themselves and their benefactors.435 A “wahaya” is a girl or 
woman who is sold as a “fifth wife” to other men.436 These girls are 
referred to “as ‘fifth wives’ because they have a different status to the 
four wives legally permitted in Niger. A man might have three or four 
legal wives and then any number of ‘fifth wives.’”437 The organization 
Anti-Slavery International notes that the acquisition of the wahaya does 
not involve any marriage ceremony, traditional or otherwise, and the 
girls sold into this form of slavery “don’t benefit from any of the legal 
rights or protections that legal wives have. They are essentially treated as 
domestic and sexual slaves.”438 
Besides wahaya, there are other forms of customary child slavery. 
First is child servitude in wealthy urban households—both boys and girls 
as young as five years old are sent to the urban centers by their parents to 
live in the homes of wealthier families and perform “housework in 
exchange for room, board, and possibly an education.”439 Studies have 
determined that while the experience may be positive for some children, 
the majority of them become trapped “in domestic slavery in degrading 
treatment and conditions, including gruelling [sic] 10–14 hour work days 
and denial of basic rights, an education, and contact with families.”440 
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Second is Trokosi, a practice that is common in several countries in 
West Africa in which “young girls are given to fetish temples to live as 
domestic or sexual slaves.”441 In Benin, Ghana, and Togo, these girls are 
sent to the shrines as payment or punishment for a crime committed by a 
member of the family.442 Within subcultures that practice Trokosi, it is 
generally believed that “the girl forced into such servitude is actually 
serving and married to the god or gods of the subculture.”443 Each 
shrine’s priests, who serve as the “eyes” or “representatives of the gods,” 
usually “sexually abuse the girls” and if any children are born through 
such a process, they are considered children of the gods.444 Although 
ritual servitude has been outlawed in Ghana’s Volta Region, it remains 
quite pervasive even though perpetrators could potentially face a 
minimum of three years in prison if convicted.445 
The third is forced street begging. For example, researchers have 
determined that over 50,000 Senegalese children are forced to walk 
hazardous streets, begging for alms for their benefactors, which are 
Quranic schools called daaras.446 Senegalese parents send their children 
to the daaras to obtain an education, which they believe would be 
“undergirded by the Quran and Quranic principles.”447 Each of these 
schools is supervised by a spiritual leader called a marabout.448 
Unfortunately, in Senegal, the students who are called talibés, are 
exploited by the marabout and forced to spend most of their day and 
even nights begging on the streets.449 
Research conducted by Human Rights Watch on Senegal’s talibés has 
uncovered some of the dangers of this harmful practice. For example, 
“[d]uring the first half of 2016, at least five children living in residential 
Quranic schools died, allegedly as a result of beatings meted out by their 
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teachers, known as marabouts, or in traffic accidents while being forced 
to beg.”450 The “forced beggars of Senegal” are considered by some 
scholars of international human rights as one of the ten worst horrifying 
examples of modern-day child slavery.451 Kristance Harlow notes that in 
Senegal, the talibés are assessed a daily quota which they must meet or 
face extremely harsh and swift penalties, which include being “chained 
in total isolation to violent beatings.”452 The money collected by the 
talibés is not used for their own benefit or that of their schools but ends 
up in the pockets of the marabouts.453 
Harlow argues that given the fact that marabouts are politically very 
active and “hold immense sway,” the government has been quite 
reluctant to crack down on this horrific practice.454 Many human rights 
activists, both at the national and international levels, “want the 
Senegalese government to fast-track state-sponsored daars, where 
traditional religious teachings can persist but forced child labor 
cannot.”455 
Fourth is Ukuthwala, which is practiced by some subcultures in the 
Republic of South Africa. According to the South African Department of 
Justice and Constitutional Development, “Ukuthwala is a form of 
abduction that involves kidnapping a girl or a young woman by a man 
and his friends or peers with the intention of compelling the girl or young 
woman’s family to endorse marriage negotiations.”456  
Ukuthwala, as it is practiced in South Africa’s Eastern Cape, 
“increasingly involves the kidnapping, rape and forced marriage of minor 
girls as young as twelve years, by grown men old enough to be their 
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grandfathers.”457 In addition to the fact that Ukuthwala robs girls of their 
childhood and puts an end to the “carefree existence that all children are 
entitled to,” it forces them to assume duties and responsibilities (e.g., 
taking care of a husband, bearing children, providing for in-laws, etc.) 
that are the purview of adults. In addition, girls that are subjected to 
Ukuthwala are most likely to suffer from “numerous health 
complications,” including “HIV and other sexually transmitted 
infections,” as well as “pregnancy related complications such as infant 
mortality, maternal mortality and fistula related diseases.”458  
The practice of Ukuthwala also impacts the female child’s physical 
and mental development. Early and forced marriage automatically 
removes the child from school and deprives her of the opportunity to 
learn and develop the skills that she needs to function as a productive 
adult.459 Through this type of marriage, the girl-child is forced to forgo 
necessary social development forcing the child to enter an adult world 
for which she is not fully prepared.460 As has been argued by some 
experts, child-marriage is “a symptom of and exacerbates gender 
inequality.”461 The continued practice of Ukuthwala, hence, contributes 
significantly to the exploitation, abuse, and denigration of girls and 
women. 
The Government of the Republic of South Africa has noted that 
“Ukuthwala and the cruelty it inflicts on the girl-child by denying her 
right to be a child, among other things, are further inconsistent with the 
African value of Ubuntu” and that in “[i]n this day and age, the 
kidnapping and abduction of girl-children that have barely reached 
puberty cannot be reconciled with the ancient practice of Ukuthwala, 
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k. Witchcraft  
 
Witchcraft is a common and popular practice among many 
subcultures in Africa.463 Throughout Africa, “[a]n increasing number of 
children are being accused of witchcraft,” according to UNICEF.464 
Among those who are most at risk of being labeled witches are 
“[o]rphans, street children, albinos and the disabled.”465 Once accused of 
being a witch, the child is likely to be “burned, beaten and even 
killed.”466 
In general, a child who is accused of witchcraft is usually “subject to 
both physical and psychological violence by family, community 
members, and religious leaders.”467 In addition, these children are 
“stigmatized and discriminated against, are mistreated, abused, 
ostracized, and abandoned.”468 Quite often, these children are taken to 
churches where they are subjected to so-called deliverance ceremonies in 
an effort to free them of the evil spirits that inhabit them.469 Mbaku notes 
that “[i]t is not unusual for children subjected to deliverance ceremonies 
to be beaten, burned, poisoned, buried alive, or forced to undergo some 
form of violent exorcism.”470 
One reason why it is very difficult to eradicate witchcraft in the 
African countries is that “well-established religions, such as Christianity 
and Islam, which have a very strong presence in virtually all African 
countries, generally believe in possession by spirits and the need to rid 
the body and mind of such spirits.”471 This is why many religious 
organizations in the African countries are quite reluctant to rid their 
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belief systems of the branding of children as witches.472 In fact, the rise 
of Pentecostal churches in Nigeria is intertwined with the concept of 
deliverance from evil spirits. As argued by Sandra Fancello, deliverance 
from sin and infection by evil spirits is “at the heart of the explosion of 
Pentecostalism in Africa since the beginning of the 1990s.”473  
What we have learned from an overview of several harmful traditional 
practices is that they can have a destructive effect on Africa’s children. 
In addition to the fact that these traditional practices can stunt a child’s 
normal development, deny the child of the opportunity to obtain an 
education and the necessary training to evolve into a productive adult, 
they can also lead to the child’s premature death.474 As argued by the UN 
Secretary-General, “[n]o violence against children is justifiable; all 
violence against children is preventable.”475 However, studies show that 
such violence against children remains an integral part of life in many 
countries in Africa and cuts across “culture, class, education, income and 
ethnic origin.”476 
The UN Secretary-General went on to argue that Member States must 
put “an end to adult justification of violence against children, whether 
accepted as ‘tradition’ or disguised as ‘discipline.’”477 The UN official 
also noted that “[t]here can be no compromise in challenging violence 
against children” and that “[c]hildren’s uniqueness—their potential and 
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vulnerability, their dependence on adults—makes it imperative that they 
have more, not less, protection from violence.”478 
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW, JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION AND 
THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS IN AFRICA 
A. Introduction 
What can be done by the international community and African 
governments “to modify or if necessary, fully eradicate, harmful 
practices based on tradition, culture, religion or superstition” that 
threaten or endanger the rights of Africa’s children? First, African 
countries should make certain that national laws, including the 
constitution, are in compliance with or reflect provisions of international 
human rights instruments. Second, traditional values and customary 
practices, regardless of the subculture to whom they belong, must not be 
utilized as justification for violating the rights of children. Third, 
customary and traditional practices that harm children, and hence, violate 
their rights, must either be modified or eradicated. Fourth, customary 
law, whether codified or not, must be brought into line with the 
provisions of international human rights instruments. Fifth, local courts 
should use international and comparative sources of law as an 
interpretive device in order to make certain that judicial decisions reflect 
generally-accepted international human rights standards and norms. 
Sixth, anyone who makes decisions on behalf of a child (e.g., parents, 
government officials, legal guardians, and other elders) “must act only in 
the best interests of the child.”479 I have argued elsewhere that: 
[E]ven [i]f national governments take measures to force a modification 
or transformation of traditions and customs that are harmful to children, 
as well as pass laws that prohibit certain activities or behaviors that are 
injurious to children, these are necessary but not sufficient conditions 
for the effective and full protection of the rights of children.”480  
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I have argued further that “[s]ufficiency . . . requires that the law be 
enforced.481 
The ability of each African country to enforce national laws and fully 
protect its children will depend, to a large extent, on the quality of the 
country’s governance institutions. Hence, in addition to 
internationalizing constitutional law, as well as bringing all traditional 
and customary practices into line with the national constitution, the 
country should provide itself with a governing process that is 
undergirded by the rule of law. The relevant governing process is one 
that, at the minimum, must be characterized by separation of powers with 
effective checks and balances, including an independent judiciary, a 
robust civil service that is capable of checking on the exercise of 
government power, and a free and independent press. It is important to 
note that the absence of effective checks and balances on the government 
has enhanced the ability of many African civil servants and political 
elites, including especially the national executive (i.e., the president), to 
act above the law and engage in behaviors that violate the rights of their 
fellow citizens, including those of children.  
B. Internationalization of National Constitutional Law as a Way to 
Protect the Rights of Children 
In the late-1940s, the international community, cognizant of the 
atrocities committed by various governments against their citizens during 
World War II, “became quite concerned about how national governments 
treated or were treating their citizens.”482 As a consequence, “[s]ince 
1945, numerous international instruments, both global and regional, have 
prescribed certain minimum standards of human rights protection with 
monitoring bodies to scrutinize national performance.”483 Thus, on 
December 10, 1948, the international community, through the UN, 
adopted the UDHR in Paris.484 Of course, one can argue that the UDHR 
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is only a “Declaration” and hence, is not legally binding on Member 
States of the UN. However, since 1948, the provisions of the UDHR 
“have over the years been so extensively incorporated in other 
international and regional instruments as well as national constitutions 
that [the UDHR’s] provisions are now considered to express principles of 
customary international law.”485 
Given the special status of the UDHR’s provisions, “the UDHR and 
other instruments which contain rules considered to be customary 
international law are automatically applicable in most common law 
countries . . . as part of national law and must therefore be taken into 
account in any interpretation of the constitution.”486 Although many of 
the provisions of modern African constitutions, particularly those that 
recognize and protect human rights, “have been substantially influenced 
by international human rights instruments and standards,” this, however, 
“does not necessarily make these instruments part of the constitution nor 
does it mean that they will have a direct role to play in interpretation.”487  
Generally, “international human rights instruments do not 
automatically confer justiciable rights in national courts.”488 However, 
some African constitutions refer to international human rights 
instruments or their provisions. For example, in the Preamble to the 
Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon, reference is made to a few 
international human rights instruments. It is stated as follows: “We, the 
people of Cameroon, . . . “[a]ffirm our attachment to the fundamental 
freedoms enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
Charter of the United Nations and the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, and all duly ratified international conventions.”489  
Granted, Cameroon’s constitution and that of many other African 
countries, have affirmed the fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined 
in various international human rights instruments.490 But, does this 
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constitutional affirmation make the rights contained in these international 
instruments directly justiciable in national courts? As argued by Fombad, 
an international constitutional scholar, this affirmation “does not render 
any of these instruments part of national law nor can they be invoked on 
this basis alone in the interpretation of the constitution.”491  
However, a country can make the provisions of international human 
rights instruments directly justiciable in national courts by not only 
making reference to the provisions of these human rights instruments in 
its national constitution but also by stating, for example, that these 
instruments “from part of this constitution” or that they “make up an 
integral part of this constitution and of national law.” This is illustrated 
by the Constitution of the Republic of Benin. 
First, the Preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of Benin states 
as follows: 
WE, THE BÉNINESE PEOPLE, [r]eaffirm our attachment to the 
principles of democracy and human rights as they have been defined by 
the Charter of the [UN] of 1945 and the [UDHR] 1948, by the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted in 1981 by the [OAU] 
and ratified by Bénin on 20 January 1986 and whose provisions make 
up an integral part of this present Constitution and of Béninese law and 
have a value superior to the internal law.
492
 
Since the Constitution of the Republic of Benin makes the provisions 
of the UDHR and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights “an 
integral part” of the country’s constitution, as well as of “Béninese law,” 
it creates rights that are directly justiciable in Béninese courts. Article 7 
specifically reaffirms part of what is provided in the Preamble. It states 
as follows: “The rights and duties proclaimed and guaranteed by the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted in 1981 by the 
Organization of African Unity and ratified by Bénin on January 20, 1986 
shall be an integral part of the present Constitution and of Béninese 
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law.”493 Once this internationalization of national constitutional law has 
been accomplished, the next step for the country to take in order to make 
certain that the rights of children are recognized and enforced, is to make 
sure that its courts have the capacity to enforce the laws and that there is 
no political interference in the ability of the courts to do so. For example, 
a survey undertaken in Ghana in 2014, determined that “more than 8 out 
of every 10 Ghanaians (85%) said judges and magistrates were some of 
the most corrupt public officials in the country,”494 a situation that does 
not augur well for the enforcement of the country’s laws. 
An investigation by Ghanaian journalist, Anas Aremeyaw Anas, 
found widespread corruption among judiciary officers—”judges 
accepting bribes to either throw out cases or pass lower sentences.”495 In 
addition to corruption, the lack of judicial independence, particularly 
from the executive branch of government, is one of the main reasons 
why many African judiciaries are unable to perform their functions in a 
fair and non-arbitrary manner.496 The Honorable Patricia Timmons-
Goodson, a retired justice of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, has 
stated that “ in the absence of an independent judiciary . . . rights are 
mere ‘empty promises.’”497 
It has been argued, however, that a country “can technically have an 
independent judiciary, but informal pressures on judges can lead to 
bias.”498 This can be the case in countries such as those in Africa “where 
the institutions are in the formative stage.”499 Hence, it is important that 
each African country internationalize its national constitutional law, as 
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well as, provide itself with a governing process undergirded by 
separation of powers with checks and balances, which include an 
independent judiciary. 
Although the Republic of Angola does not directly incorporate 
provisions of international human rights instruments into its national 
constitution, significant effect, however, is given to international law in 
that constitution. “The Constitution of the Republic of Angola makes 
express reference to the applicability of international law in applying and 
interpreting the national constitution.”500 According to Article 26, which 
is titled Scope of fundamental rights,  
1. The fundamental rights established in this Constitution shall not 
exclude others contained in the laws and applicable rules of 
international law. 2. Constitutional and legal precepts relating to 
fundamental rights must be interpreted and incorporated in accordance 
with the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man, the African 
Charter on the Rights of Man and Peoples and international treaties on 
the subject ratified by the Republic of Angola. 3. In any consideration 
by the Angolan courts of disputes concerning fundamental rights, the 
international instruments referred to in the previous point shall be 
applied, even if not invoked by the parties concerned.
501
 
Additional elaboration is provided in Article 27, which states that 
“[t]he principles set out in this chapter shall apply to the rights, freedoms 
and guarantees and to fundamental rights of a similar nature that are 
established in the Constitution or are enshrined in law or international 
conventions.”502 Moreover, Article 13 clarifies the status of treaties, viz-
à-viz the Angolan legal system: “Duly approved or ratified international 
treaties and agreements shall come into force in the Angolan legal 
system after they have been officially published and have entered into 
force in the international legal system, for as long as they are 
internationally binding upon the Angolan state.”503 Article 13 also makes 
reference to customary international law: “General or common 
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international law received under the terms of this Constitution shall form 
an integral part of the Angolan legal system.”504 
Ghana’s constitution imposes a duty on the state to consider 
international human rights instruments when enacting national laws. 
According to Article 37(3), “[i]n the discharge of the obligations stated 
in clause (2) of this article, the State, shall be guided by international 
human rights instruments which recognize and apply particular 
categories of basic human rights to development processes.”505 In 
addition, Article 40(c) imposes an obligation on the Ghanaian 
Government to “promote respect for international law, treaty obligations 
and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.”506 
The people of Kenya adopted a new constitution in 2010. This 
constitution introduced the concept of separation of powers with checks 
and balances, which included an independent judiciary.507 The new 
constitution gave effect to international law. Article 2(5) states, for 
example, that “[t]jhe general rules of international law shall form part of 
the law of Kenya.”508 In addition, it also clarified the role of international 
treaties in the Kenyan legal system. According to Article 2(6), “[a]ny 
treaty or convention ratified by Kenya shall form part of the law of 
Kenya under this Constitution.”509 
South Africa’s post-apartheid constitution, in Article 39, imposes a 
duty on the country’s courts, tribunals, or forums to consider 
international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights. According to 
Article 39(1), “[w]hen interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or 
forum . . . (b) must consider international law; and (c) may consider 
foreign law.”510 The Constitution of the Republic of Cabo Verde states, 
in Article 17(3), that “[c]onstitutional and legal rules with respect to 
fundamental rights must be interpreted and integrated in conformance 
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with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”511 Finally, in a 
provision dealing with “[i]nterpretation,” the Constitution of the 
Republic of Malawi states that “[i]n interpreting the provisions of this 
Constitution a court of law shall (c) where applicable, have regard to 
current norms of public international law and comparable foreign case 
law.”512 
What happens, however, when there is no explicit or implicit 
authorization for courts to invoke or refer to international human rights 
law? Scholars of constitutional law have argued that the answer to this 
question differs from country to country.513 As I have argued elsewhere, 
“[i]n recent years, many African countries, which have not explicitly or 
implicitly authorized the invocation of international human rights 
instruments, have, nevertheless, been making reference in their 
constitutions to international human rights.”514 These references, while 
they may not constitute explicit or implicit authorization for national 
courts to refer to or apply international law, have actually provided 
“room for the large volume of international jurisprudence to influence 
the nature and scope of rights provided in the constitution and the 
manner in which these rights are recognized and enforced by the 
courts.”515 
Despite setbacks in countries, such as South Sudan, Somalia, Central 
African Republic, and others that are embroiled in either civil war or 
some form of sectarian conflict, constitutional makers in several African 
countries “are gradually warming up to the idea of recognizing 
international human rights instruments in their constitutions and 
constitutional interpretation and practice.”516 Throughout the continent, 
States “are slowly but steadily recognizing the importance of making 
certain that domestic law reflects international human rights laws and 
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norms.”517 It is hoped that more African countries will eventually 
incorporate the provisions of international human rights instruments into 
their national constitutions and create rights that are directly justiciable in 
each State’s national courts. Through the internationalization of its 
national constitutional law, each African country can provide itself with 
the necessary legal tools, as well as, place itself in a much more 
enhanced position, to protect the rights of its children. 
C. International Law and Municipal Law: Monist and Dualist 
Approaches 
Even in States whose constitutions do not “expressly mention the 
relevance of international law,” it is possible for “a duly ratified 
international instrument which is of relevance to constitutional matters” 
to “have effect on the national constitution.”518 The impact of the “duly 
ratified international instrument”519 on domestic legal processes will 
depend “on how effect is given to international instruments in the 
particular country.”520 There are two well-established approaches in the 
legal literature on how a country can give effect to international human 
rights instruments. First is the “monist approach,” which has been 
adopted by most of Africa’s Francophone and Lusophone countries, and 
second is the “dualist approach,” which is predominant in the 
Anglophone countries.521  
In those countries in which the monist approach regulates the 
relationship between domestic and international law, the two—that is, 
domestic and international law—make up or comprise one single legal 
order within the State’s legal system. Nevertheless, international law 
predominates or “prevails over national or domestic law” and hence, “in 
an African country which adheres to this approach, the provisions of 
international human rights instruments, for example, override any 
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contrary domestic law.”522 Within such a legal system, a State’s national 
or domestic courts, then, must “give effect to principles of international 
law over [superseding] or conflicting rules of domestic law.”523 
In the African countries, which have adopted the dualist approach, 
international law, and municipal law form two separate and independent 
legal systems.”524 While international law regulates the “relations 
between sovereign States in the international system,” the governing of 
the domestic or municipal legal system is the exclusive purview of 
municipal law.525 Within the dualist theory, in order for a municipal legal 
system to give effect to international law, “national legislatures must 
incorporate international law into domestic law, thereby creating 
justiciable rights suitable for enforcement by domestic courts.”526 
When examining the binding status of international law on domestic 
legal systems, international legal experts “distinguish between the types 
and sources of international law.”527 Under both the monist and dualist 
theories, “[i]nternational norms that have attained the status of 
international customary law . . . are considered to be part of municipal 
law”528 and, as such, “prevail over national law even in domestic 
courts.”529 Within such a legal system, “customary international law, now 
considered part of domestic law, will prevail over the latter and hence, 
serve as a constraint on the ability of national policymakers to retain their 
sovereign right to act in matters of law.”530 
But, how does international law determine “when norms and treaties 
of international law have attained the status of customary international 
law and hence, are eligible to be incorporated into municipal law?”531 
The answer can be found in taking a look at Article 387(1)(b) of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, which refers to 
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“international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as 
law.”532 
It has been determined that despite “the existence of these two distinct 
approaches to how effect is given to international instruments in the 
African countries,” one must “recognize the fact that there currently is no 
significant difference between African countries in the way in which they 
treat treaties, which they have signed and ratified.”533 Many African 
countries, whether they are Francophone, Anglophone, or Lusophone, 
sign and ratify treaties, as well as conventions, but rarely ever 
“domesticate these [legal] instruments even where the constitution states 
. . . that an international instrument on ratification takes immediate effect 
and prevails over national law.”534 
In Africa’s Anglophone countries, customary international law is 
considered an integral part of municipal law. Thus, if the principles 
present in an international instrument (e.g., a treaty) have “crystallized” 
into customary international law,535 these principles may still constitute 
part of national constitutional law even if the State has not signed and 
ratified the treaty in question. Hence, even if an Anglophone country has 
not yet signed and ratified an international human rights instrument, that 
does not, however, mean that that particular instrument’s provisions 
“cannot form part of national constitutional law, as long as these 
principles ‘crystallized into customary international law.’”536 
Whether an international instrument affects a municipal legal system 
depends, to a large extent, on the nature of the instrument, including its 
properties. For example, international treaties have a binding effect on 
States Parties.537 This “binding effect” is linked directly to the 
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international law principle referred to as pacta sunt servanda,538 which 
has been codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(“Vienna Convention”). Some treaties specifically include provisions 
that impose an obligation on States Parties “to adopt legislation or other 
measures to give effect to the provisions in these treaties—that is, to 
create rights that are justiciable by local or domestic courts.”539 For 
example, according to Article 1 of the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child:  
Member States of the Organization of African Unity, Parties to the 
present Charter shall recognize the rights, freedoms and duties 
enshrined in this Charter and shall undertake the necessary steps, in 
accordance with their Constitutional processes and with the provisions 
of the present Charter, to adopt such legislative or other measures as 
may be necessary to give effect to the provisions of this Charter.
540
 
An African State that wants to put to rest any doubts regarding 
whether international law, including customary international law, is law 
(or creates justiciable rights) within its national jurisdiction can use its 
constitution to do so. For example, the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa speaks directly to the conditions under which customary 
international law is applicable in the country. According to Article 232, 
  
 538. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties pmbl., May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 332. This principle is considered the most important principle of customary 
international law of treaties. Id. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention states as follows: 
“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed in good 
faith.” Id. According to Anthony Aust, “Pacta sunt servanda embodies a rule that is an 
elementary and universally agreed principle fundamental to all legal systems, and is of 
prime importance for the stability of treaty relations. The oft-quoted Latin phrase means 
no more than that a treaty is legally binding and so must be performed by the parties to 
it.” MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 160 (Anthony Aust ed., 3d. ed. 2013). 
 539. See Mbaku, International Law on the Sovereignty, supra note 479, at 72. 
 540. ACRWC, supra note 99, art. 1(1). The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights also imposes a similar obligation on Member States. See id. art. 1. Some 
scholars have argued that at the time the OAU drafter the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, Member States were quite cognizant of the “disparity between the effect 
of international law in monist and dualist States and sought through article 1 to 
emphasize the charter of the treaty as binding on States.” See Adjami, supra note 470, at 
110. See also LONE LINDHOLT, QUESTIONING THE UNIVERSALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE 
AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS IN BOTSWANA, MALAWI, AND 
MOZAMBIQUE 73 (1997). 
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“[c]ustomary international law is law in the Republic [of South Africa] 
unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.”541 
The applicability of international law generally is addressed by Article 
233: “When interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any 
reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with 
international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent 
with international law.”542 
But, why would citizens of a country like South Africa allow 
international law to interfere with their ability to determine the content of 
their constitutional law? One answer is that conformity with international 
law, particularly international human rights law, is in line with the 
desires of the citizens to live under a constitutional and legal order that 
recognizes, respects and protects certain fundamental rights.543 In 
drafting and adopting their post-apartheid constitution, the people of 
South Africa recognized that they were laying the foundation “for a 
society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental 
human rights.”544 Thus, granting international law the power to interfere 
with municipal law is in line with the desires of South Africans to live in 
a society undergirded by respect for and protection of human rights.545 
Since the Organization of African Unity (“OAU”) came into being in 
1963, Member States have been encouraged to allow international law to 
infringe on the “sovereign right of domestic lawmakers to freely 
legislate” in order “to eliminate authoritarian systems of governance and 
transition these countries to democracy, as well as integrate them into the 
  
 541. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 232. 
 542. Id. § 233, 1996.  
 543. For example, in the Preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 (that is, the country’s post-apartheid constitution), the people of South 
Africa state explicitly that they were adopting “this Constitution as the supreme law of 
the Republic [of South Africa] so as to [—] Heal the divisions of the past and establish a 
society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights.” See S. 
AFR. CONST., pmbl. 1996. Mbaku has noted that “[l]awmakers and citizens of countries 
like South Africa have voluntarily opted to allow international law to infringe on their 
sovereign right to determine the content of their constitutional law in an effort to enhance 
and improve the protection of human and peoples’ rights, as well as create, within the 
country, a culture that respects and protects human rights.” Mbaku, International Law on 
the Sovereignty, supra note 479, at 72–73. 
 544. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, pmbl. 
 545. See id. 
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global society of free nations.”546 The African Charter on Democracy, 
Elections and Governance states, for example, that the objectives of the 
Charter are to:  
1. [p]romote adherence, by each State Party, to the universal values and 
principles of democracy and respect for human rights; [and] 2. 
[p]romote and enhance adherence to the principle of the rule of law 
premised upon the respect for, and the supremacy of, the Constitution 




The African Union’s efforts to promote democracy, constitutional 
government and the respect and protection of human rights, including 
those of children, are contained in several major instruments, which 
include (1) the Constitutive Act of the African Union;548 (2) the 
Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional 
Changes of Government;549 (3) Declaration on the Principles Governing 
Democratic Elections in Africa;550 (4) Guidelines for AU Electoral 
Observation and Monitoring Missions;551 (5) African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights;552 and the African Charter on the Right and Welfare 
of the Child.553 
  
 546. Mbaku, International Law on the Sovereignty, supra note 479, at 73. See 
generally African Union, African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance 
(Jan. 30, 2007), https://au.int/en/treaties/african-charter-democracy-elections-and-
governance.  
 547. Africa Charter on Democracy, supra note 543, art. 2(1–2). 
 548. See generally African Union, Constitutive Act of the African Union (July 1, 
2000), https://au.int/en/constitutive-act. 
 549. Lomé Declaration of July 2000 on the Framework for an OAU Response to 
Unconstitutional Changes of Government, U.N. Doc. AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI) (July 2000),  
https://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/compilation_democracy/lomedec.htm. 
 550. See generally African Union, Declaration on the Principles Governing 
Democratic Elections in Africa (2002), 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/RuleOfLaw/CompilationDemocracy/Pages/AHG.aspx.  
 551. Guidelines for African Union Electoral Observation and Monitoring 




 552. See generally Banjul Charter, supra note 159.  
 553. See generally ACRWC, supra note 99.  
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The AU, through these instruments, supports the efforts of Member 
States to transition to democracy, promote human rights, including the 
protection of the rights of children. The values and principles evident in 
these instruments represent significant constraints on and challenges to 
the sovereignty of African States. Nevertheless, it is argued that:  
[T]he embrace of and commitment to democracy and good governance, 
including the protection of human and peoples’ rights by regional 
organizations, such as the AU, provides the wherewithal and 
opportunity for Member States to use peer pressure to force their 
neighbors to transition to democratic governance and respect the 
rights of their citizens.
554
 
Each African country must deal specifically with certain issues that 
are critical to good governance, democracy, the rule of law, and respect 
for and protection of human rights, including those of children. The 
constitutional law of each country must “incorporate provisions that 
enhance the deepening and institutionalization of democracy, 
advancement of governance, and the protection of human rights.”555 
Although these regional and international constraints are an infringement 
on the sovereign right of policymakers in the African countries to “freely 
legislate”556 and determine the content of their national constitutional 
law, they necessarily create “an institutional environment that is more 
suited to the promotion of democracy, good governance, and the 
promotion of human rights,”557 including especially, those of children. 
D. Judicial Interpretation of Municipal Law as a Mechanism to 
Protect the Rights of Children 
International law can influence how municipal or domestic law is 
interpreted by national courts. Many of the continent’s Anglophone 
countries have usually followed the well-known and well-established 
common law “presumption in statutory construction that courts will 
strive to interpret legislation in a manner that will not conflict with 
  
 554. Mbaku, International Law on the Sovereignty, supra note 479, at 75 
(emphasis added). 
 555. Id. at 76 (internal footnotes omitted).  
 556. Id. 
 557. Id. at 76–77. 
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international law.”558 Take, for example, the decision of the High Court 
of Botswana in the case Attorney General v. Unity Dow.559 In the leading 
judgment delivered by Amissah JP, the Court of Appeal held as follows:  
Botswana is a member of the community of civilized States which has 
undertaken to abide by certain standards of conduct, and, unless it is 
impossible to do otherwise, it would be wrong for its [c]ourts to 
interpret its legislation in a manner which conflicts with the 
international obligations Botswana has undertaken.
560
 
If, however, domestic legislation is clear and unambiguous, this 
principle of interpretation need not be employed.561 In the Unity Dow 
case, the court also addressed the situation where the State has signed an 
international instrument but has not necessarily ratified or domesticated 
it and shows that even in such a case, the international instrument can 
still have “important legal consequences domestically as an aid to 
constitutional interpretation.”562 In Unity Dow, Amissah JP cited with 
approval a passage from the judge a quo in the same case: 
I bear in mind that signing the convention does not give it power of law 
in Botswana but the effect of the adherence by Botswana to the 
convention must show that a construction of the section which does not 
do violence to the language but is consistent with and in harmony with 
the convention must be preferable to a “narrow construction” which 
results in a finding that section 15 of the Constitution permits 
unrestricted discrimination on the basis of sex.
563
 
Again, such an approach must be adopted only when “the domestic 
legislation in question is obscure.”564 In the UK case, Salomon v. 
Commissioners of Custom & Excise, Diplock L.J. held as follows:  
  
 558. Fombad, supra note 494, at 455–56. 
 559. See Att’y Gen. v. Unity Dow (2001) BLR 119 (Bots.).  
 560. Id. ¶ 109. 
 561. See, e.g., Salomon v. Customs and Excise Comm’rs [1967] 2 QB 116 (Eng.) 
(holding that “[i]f the terms of the legislation are clear and unambiguous, they must be 
given effect to, whether or not they carry out Her Majesty’s treaty obligations”). 
 562. Fombad, supra note 494, at 455–56. 
 563. Unity Dow, BLR 119, at ¶ 108. 
 564. Fombad, supra note 494, at 456. 
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[I]f the terms of the legislation are not clear[, however,] but are 
reasonably capable of more than one meaning, the treaty itself becomes 
relevant, for there is prima facie presumption that Parliament does not 
intend to act in breach of international law, including therein specific 
treaty obligations; and if one of the meanings which can reasonably be 
ascribed to the legislation is consonant with the treaty obligations and 
another and others are not, the meaning which is consonant is to be 
preferred. Thus, in the case of lack of clarity in the words used in the 
legislation, the terms of the treaty are relevant to enable the court to 




Constitutional law professor Charles Manga Fombad, who is an 
expert on constitutionalism and constitutional government in Africa, has 
argued that “[a]nother way in which the internationalization of the 
constitutional process through judicial interpretation is taking place are 
instances where there are lacunae, ambiguities or uncertainties in the 
relevant constitutional provisions.”566 He argues further that “[t]he 
general approach of common law jurisdictions is to adopt the interpretive 
principle that the uncertainties or ambiguities should be resolved in a 
manner that upholds any international instruments, especially human 
rights instruments which might have influenced the adoption of such 
provisions.”567 
As argued by the Honorable Justice Michael Kirby, an international 
legal scholar and a former Justice of the High Court of Australia, where 
the constitutional text makes reference to specific rights (e.g., 
fundamental human rights), which are recognized in international law, “it 
is highly desirable, indeed, obligatory, for judges within municipal 
systems to familiarize themselves with the international jurisprudence 
collecting around the same words in international and regional bodies 
devoted to expounding their meaning.”568 Various scholars of 
  
 565. Salomon v. Customs and Excise Comm’rs [1967] 2 QB 116 (Eng.) (emphasis 
added). 
 566. Fombad, supra note 494, at 456. 
 567. Id. at 456–57. 
 568. Michael Kirby, The Road from Bangalore: The First Ten Years of the 
Bangalore Principles on the Domestic Application of International Human Rights Norms, 
HIGH CT. OF AUSTRALIA, https://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/former-
justices/kirbyj/kirbyj_bang11.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2020). 
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international and constitutional law have argued that the general 
acceptance of the Bangalore Principles on the Domestic Application of 
International Human Rights Norms569 has produced “some sort of a duty 
on judges to adopt this interpretative principle” or approach.570 However, 
in the situation where the domestic constitution is clear and is not 
inconsistent with international law, the approach implicit in the 
Bangalore Principles will not apply.571 
It is important that States, including those in Africa, see “the evolving 
internationalization of domestic constitutional law as a global effort to 
improve governance and generally enhance the protection of human and 
peoples’ rights,”572 including those of children. It is becoming evident 
that municipal courts should “not blindly adhere to strict doctrines such 
as monism and dualism, but should take into consideration rulings of 
international and regional tribunals, with a view to enhancing the 
maintenance of good governance and adherence to the rule of law.”573 
The primary objective of law in any African country should be to (1) 
improve and enhance peaceful coexistence of population groups; (2) 
ensure the recognition and protection of human and peoples’ rights, 
including especially those of vulnerable groups, such as children, 
women, and religious and ethnic minorities; (3) provide an enabling 
environment for wealth creation, economic growth and human 
development; (4) protect children from harmful practices based on 
tradition and customs; and (5) make certain that domestic law, which 
includes customary law, does not violate provisions of international 
human rights instruments. 
Africa’s judges, including those who preside over traditional and 
customary tribunals/courts, as well as its policymakers, must not remain 
enslaved by legal traditions that are harmful to the rights of some groups 
of citizens (e.g., children). Instead, each country’s constitution, its 
legislative acts, and the customs and traditions of its various subcultures 
  
 569. See JOAN CHURCH, CHRISTIAN SCHULZE & HENNIE STRYDOM, HUMAN RIGHTS 
FROM A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE 160 (2007) (examining, 
inter alia, the origins of, and the, Bangalore Principles).  
 570. Fombad, supra note 494, at 457. 
 571. See id. See also Mbaku, International Law on the Sovereignty, supra note 
479, at 78. 
 572. Mbaku, International Law on the Sovereignty, supra note 479, at 78. 
 573. Id. 
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must comply with the provisions of international human rights 
instruments and adequately and effectively protect the rights of children. 
Judges in each African country should be willing “to look outside their 
own domestic legal traditions to the elaboration of international, regional 
and other bodies.”574 In the Australian case, Al-Kateb v. Godwin, Justice 
Kirby observed that “[t]he fact is that it is often helpful for national 
judges to check their own constitutional thinking against principles 
expressing the rules of a ‘wider civilization.’”575 Justice Kirby also 
argued that this approach to judicial reasoning does not constitute “an 
amendment of the Constitution [under the guise of interpretation] but an 
elaboration and enforcement of it, properly understood in the context of 
the world of today in which any national constitutional text must now 
operate.”576  
According to Professor Charles Manga Fombad, the willingness of 
municipal courts to “look outside their own domestic legal traditions” is 
“a universal trend that is bound to be copied in Africa as judges realize 
that they cannot isolate themselves from the rapid changes in legal 
thinking and analysis and from the fresh approaches and new insights 
generated by international jurisprudence to deal with common 
problems.”577 
African countries, like their counterparts in other regions of the world, 
must recognize and accept the fact that the most effective way to protect 
their children from harmful practices, including those emanating from 
the cultures and traditions of their various ethnocultural groups, is to 
make certain that domestic law, which includes not just the national 
constitution, but also customary law, does not offend provisions of 
international human rights instruments. In addition, national judges 
should look outside their domestic legal traditions to, for example, 
“insights generated by international jurisprudence”578 to help them render 
decisions that are in line with international human rights law and hence, 
effectively protect the rights of children. Finally, national judges can 
utilize international and comparative sources of law as interpretive tools 
  
 574. Michael Kirby, International Law—The Impact on National Constitutions, 21 
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 327, 345 (2006). 
 575. Al-Kateb v Godwin [2004] HCA 37, ¶190 (Austl.). 
 576. Kirby, supra note 571, at 346. 
 577. See Fombad, supra note 494, at 457–58. 
 578. Id. 
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or devices in order to make certain that judicial rulings reflect generally-
accepted international human rights standards and norms and hence, 
minimize harm to children and the violation of their rights. In doing so, 
domestic judges can bring customary law and the various customs and 
traditions of each country’s diverse ethnocultural groups into line with 
the national constitution and provisions of international human rights 
instruments. 
V. PROTECTING AFRICAN CHILDREN FROM HARMFUL 
TRADITIONAL PRACTICES: THE MODERATING IMPACT OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. Introduction 
Beginning in the early-1990s, many African countries engaged in 
constitutional exercises to either produce new constitutions or amend 
existing ones in an effort to bring their national laws, including 
customary laws, to conform with the provisions of various international 
human rights instruments.579 Post-apartheid South Africa was one of the 
African countries that was engaged in designing and adopting a new 
constitution.580 In their new constitution, the people of South Africa 
included the following provision regarding a declaration of a state of 
emergency, derogation from the Bill of Rights and international law: 
“Any legislation enacted in consequence of a declaration of a state of 
emergency may derogate from the Bill of Rights only to the extent that—
(b) the legislation—(i) is consistent with [South Africa’s] obligations 
under international law applicable to states of emergency.”581 
The South African Constitution also has a provision that deals with 
the role of international law in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. 
According to § 39(1)(b), “[w]hen interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, 
tribunal or forum must consider international law.”582 Thus, an 
interpretation that, for example, offends provisions of international 
  
 579. See, e.g., Mbaku, International Law on the Sovereignty, supra note 479, at 
78. 
 580. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 37(4)(b)(i). 
 581. Id. § 37(4)(b)(i). 
 582. Id. § 39(4)(1)(b). 
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human rights instruments, such as those of the CRC, must give way to 
one that is consistent with the provisions of the CRC. 
With respect to the country’s national security and security services, 
the Constitution mandates as follows: “National security must be pursued 
in compliance with the law, including international law”583 and “[t]he 
security services must act, and must teach and require their members to 
act, in accordance with the Constitution and the law, including customary 
international law and international agreements binding on [South 
Africa].”584 For example, in any effort to maintain peace and security, 
security forces must not behave in ways that offend provisions of 
international human rights instruments—this implies that state actors, in 
their effort to maintain law and order, must not infringe on or violate the 
rights of children.585  
Regarding international agreements, which include conventions and 
treaties, that South Africa was a party to before the new, post-apartheid 
Constitution came into effect, the Constitution states that “[South Africa] 
is bound by international agreements which were binding on [the 
country] when this Constitution took effect.”586 South Africa signed the 
CRC on January 29, 1993, and ratified it on June 16, 1995.587 The 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996—the post-apartheid 
constitution—was approved by the CC on December 4, 1996, and took 
effect on February 4, 1997. Hence, the CRC became binding on South 
Africa long before the post-apartheid constitution came into effect. 
Nevertheless, as made evident by § 231(5) of the post-apartheid 
constitution, the CRC’s provisions are binding on South Africa, and its 
courts must consider them when interpreting the Constitution and the 
country’s other laws. 
  
 583. Id. § 198(c). 
 584. Id. § 199(5). 
 585. For example, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) notes that 
while “[i]t is the State’s responsibility to maintain law and order, peace and security 
within its territory,” in doing so, the State must make certain “that law enforcement is 
carried out in a way that respects the State’s obligations under international human rights 
law” and this means that the activities of domestic law enforcement agencies “must 
comply with the applicable provisions of international human rights law.” INT’L COMM. 
OF THE RED CROSS, TO SERVE AND TO PROTECT: HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 
FOR POLICE AND SECURITY FORCES 31 (2014).  
 586. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 231(5). 
 587. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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With respect to customary international law, the Constitution states 
that “[c]ustomary international law is law in the Republic [of South 
Africa] unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of 
Parliament.”588 For example, state practice has established the rule that 
“[c]hildren affected by armed conflict are entitled to special respect and 
protection” as a norm of customary international law applicable in both 
international and non-international armed conflicts.589 Hence, according 
to § 232 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, this rule of 
customary international humanitarian law establishes rights that are 
justiciable in South African courts. The treatment of children affected by 
armed conflict in and by South African courts is bound by this norm of 
customary international humanitarian law since it is an integral part of 
domestic law in South Africa.  
The South African Constitution also deals with the role that 
international law can play in the interpretation of domestic legislation, 
when it states that “[w]hen interpreting any legislation, every court must 
prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent 
with international law over any alternative interpretation that is 
inconsistent with international law.”590 International law, then, can serve 
as an important and critical tool for the fight against practices, whether 
emanating from or supported by constitutional and statutory law or 
customs and tradition, that harm children and violate or infringe their 
rights. 
Finally, the Constitution deals with the development of the common 
law or customary law, when it states that “[w]hen interpreting any 
legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, 
every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights.”591 It is clear from this provision and others 
in the Constitution that South Africa’s domestic courts have a significant 
role to play in the development of law in the country. They also have the 
power to moderate or nullify laws that offend the Bill of Rights. 
  
 588. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 232. 
 589. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INTERNATIONAL 
COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, 
VOLUME I: RULES 479 (2005). 
 590. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 233. 
 591. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 39(2). 
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B. Domestic Courts, the Moderating Role of International Law and 
the Protection of Children’s Rights in Africa: Case Studies 
Since the early-1990s, many African countries have recognized that 
they are part of a global community of nations and as a consequence, the 
behavior of their governments cannot and must not ignore international 
law. In addition to adopting constitutions that acknowledge the country’s 
obligations under international law, many of these countries have also 
domesticated international law, creating rights that are directly justiciable 
in domestic courts, as well as, empowering their national courts to 
consider international law when interpreting the national constitution and 
legislative acts. 
In the following sections, we take a look at how international law is 
serving as an interpretive tool and enhancing the ability of domestic 
courts in African countries to protect the rights of children. In doing so, 
we shall examine several court decisions to determine the extent to 
which international and foreign law has affected the decision making-
processes of African judges.  
1. The State v. Williams (South Africa)592 
As examined earlier, § 39(1)(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa expressly clarifies the place of international law in South 
Africa’s legal system—”a court, tribunal or forum,” when “interpreting 
the Bill of Rights, . . . must consider international law.”593 Many scholars 
of South African constitutional law argue, however, that “the constitution 
envisages a position wherein international law, plays a more persuasive 
role in South Africa than any foreign case law.”594 To get an 
  
 592. S v. Williams & Others, 1995 (7) BCLR 861 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 593. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 39(1)(b). Note, however, that even though South 
African courts are required by the Constitution and hence, are bound, to consider 
international law when they interpret the provisions of the Bill of Rights, “there is no 
indication in the constitution itself as to the extent, if any, to which international law can 
be utilized as an interpretation tool” and the Constitution does not explicitly or implicitly 
indicate “whether or not there is any preferential treatment to be given to certain 
international instruments when interpreting rights.” Celumusa Delisile Zungu, The Role, 
Relevance and Application of International Law in South Africa, 8 OIDA INT’L J. SUST. 
DEVELOP. 85, 85–86 (2015). 
 594. Zungu, supra note 591, at 86. 
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understanding of how South African courts have utilized international 
law as a tool in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights, we shall examine 
a few judicial decisions, notably those of the country’s highest court, the 
Constitutional Court (“CC”). 
This case was referred to the CC “by the Full Bench of the Cape of 
Good Hope Provincial Division of the Supreme Court (Conradie, Scott 
and Farlam JJ).”595 The case represented a “consolidation of five 
different cases in which six juveniles were convicted by different 
magistrates and sentenced to receive a ‘moderate correction’ of a number 
of strokes with a light cane.”596 The issue that the CC had to decide was 
“whether the sentence of juvenile whipping, pursuant to the provisions of 
section 294 of the Criminal Procedure Act, is consistent with the 
provisions of the Constitution.”597 Justice Langa wrote and delivered the 
judgment for the Court, and in doing so, he made reference to many 
international human rights instruments, including the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;598 the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;599 the 
African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights;600 various 
Comments of the UN Human Rights Committee;601 the European 
Commission of Human Rights;602 the European Court of Human 
  
 595. Williams & Others, 1995 (7) BCLR 861, at ¶ 1. 
 596. Id. 
 597. Id. Section 294 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 deals with the whipping 
of juvenile males and states that “[i]f a male person under the age of twenty-one years is 
convicted of any offense, whether such conviction is a first or a subsequent conviction, 
the court convicting him may, in lieu of any other punishment, sentence him to receive in 
private a moderate correction of a whipping not exceeding seven strokes, which shall be 
administered by such person and in such place and with such instrument as the court may 
determine.” Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 § 294(1) (S. Afr.). The Constitution 
mentioned here is the South African Interim Constitution of South Africa, 1993. See 
generally S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993. 
 598. See Williams & Others, 1995 (7) BCLR 861, at para. 21 (fn 24). 
 599. See id.  
 600. See id. 
 601. See id. ¶ 26. 
 602. See id. ¶ 27. 
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Rights;603 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;604 as well as, the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.605 
Justice Langa also made references to decisions of the Supreme 
Courts of Namibia, Zimbabwe, Canada, the United States, and the 
German Constitutional Court.606 In his analysis, Justice Langa argued 
that Courts have an important role to play “in the promotion and 
development of a new culture ‘founded on the recognition of human 
rights,’ in particular, with regard to those rights which are enshrined in 
the Constitution.”607 He argued further that:  
It is a role which demands that a court should be particularly sensitive 
to the impact which the exercise of judicial functions may have on the 
rights of individuals who appear before them; vigilance is an integral 
component of this role, for it is incumbent on structures set up to 
administer justice to ensure that as far as possible, these rights, 




Cognizant of the country’s apartheid past and in recognition of the 
new post-apartheid order under which South Africans are building a new 
society, Justice Langa warned that “old rules and practices can no longer 
be taken for granted” and that “they must be subjected to constant re-
assessment to bring them into line with the provisions of the [new post-
apartheid Constitution].”609 Justice Langa made reference to § 30 of the 
Interim Constitution of South Africa,610 which is devoted to the rights of 
children and specifically states, that “[e]very child shall have the right 
not to be subject to neglect or abuse.”611 He then went on to argue that 
“as much as the Constitution recognizes the vulnerability of children as a 
  
 603. See id. 
 604. See id. ¶ 21 n. 24. 
 605. See id. ¶ 28. 
 606. See id. ¶ ¶ 37–60. 
 607. Id. ¶ 8. 
 608. See id. 
 609. Id. ¶ ¶ 8–9. 
 610. S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993 (this constitution was repealed by the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa). 
 611. Id. art. 30(1)(d). 
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group and sets out to protect them, juvenile whipping infringed their 
right to security and not to be subjected to abuse.”612 
Justice Langa also noted that the wording of several sections of South 
Africa’s Constitution conform with most international human rights 
instruments, which include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the African 
(Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.613 While defining and 
explaining concepts found in the South African Constitution, Justice 
Langa argued that the definitions “must necessarily reflect [the 
experiences of the South African people] and contemporary 
circumstances as the South African community, there is no disputing that 
valuable insights may be gained from the manner in which the concepts 
are dealt with in public international law as well as in foreign case 
law.”614 
The Court noted that the “[E]ighth [A]mendment to the [C]onstitution 
of the United States of America (Eighth Amendment) as well as Article 
12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Canadian Charter) 
prohibit ‘cruel and unusual punishment.’”615 With respect to cases of the 
Supreme Court of Namibia, Justice Langa noted that “[i]n Ex Parte 
Attorney-General, Namibia, Mahomed AJA had no difficulty in arriving 
at the conclusion that the infliction of corporal punishment, whether on 
adults or juveniles, was inconsistent with Article 8 of the Namibian 
[C]onstitution and constituted ‘inhuman or degrading’ punishment.”616 
In his analysis, Justice Langa, also cited to cases of the Supreme 
Court of Zimbabwe. In the cases of S v. Ncube,617 S v. Tshuma618 and S v. 
Ndhlovu,619 the Zimbabwe Supreme Court, “dealing with the issue of 
corporal punishment for adults, held that the practice was inhuman and 
degrading in violation of section 15(1) of the Declaration of Rights of the 
Zimbabwe Constitution which prohibits ‘torture or inhuman or degrading 
  
 612. Williams & Others, 1995 (7) BCLR 861, ¶ 18. 
 613. See id. ¶ 21. 
 614. Id. ¶ 23 (emphasis added).  
 615. Id. ¶ 28. 
 616. Id. ¶ 31. See also Ex parte: Attorney-General In Re: Corporal Punishment by 
Organs of State, [1991] S.C.N. 35 (Namib.).   
 617. See generally State v. Ncube, [2018] S.C.Z. 21 (Zim.). 
 618. See generally State v. Tshuma, [2017] S.C.Z. 126 (Zim.).  
 619. See generally State v. Ndhlovu, [2015] S.C.Z. 108 (Zim.).  
638 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 28.3 
punishment.’”620 Justice Langa also cited to another case from Zimbabwe 
in which “[j]uvenile whipping was held to constitute inhuman and 
degrading punishment by the Zimbabwe Supreme Court in S v. 
Juvenile.”621 
As part of his analysis, Justice Langa also cited to what he termed “a 
growing consensus in the international community,” which is, “that 
judicial whipping, involving as it does the deliberate infliction of 
physical pain on the person of the accused, offends society’s notions of 
decency and is a direct invasion of the right which every person has to 
human dignity.”622 Such a consensus, argues Justice Langa, “has found 
expression through the courts and legislatures of various countries and 
through international instruments. It is a clear trend which has been 
established.”623 The Williams Court also noted that 
The determinative test [in the case at hand] will be the values we find 
inherent in or worthy of pursuing in this society which has only 
recently embarked on the road to democracy. Already South Africa has 
lagged behind. The Constitution now offers an opportunity for South 
Africans to join the mainstream of a world community that is 
progressively moving away from punishments that place undue 
emphasis on retribution and vengeance rather than on correction, 
prevention and the recognition of human rights.
624
 
The conclusion reached by the CC, in this case, was that “[S]ection 
294 of the Act infringes the rights contained in sections 10 and 11(2) of 
the Constitution” and that that conclusion was “consistent with the view 
that has been expressed by many South African judges before.”625 He 
argued further that “the courts in [South Africa] have acknowledged the 
international consensus against corporal punishment and, in a sense, 
associated themselves with it in many judgments which have criticised, 
sometimes in the strongest terms, the infliction of corporal 
punishment.”626 In addition, “[i]n keeping with international trends, there 
  
 620. S v. Williams & Others, 1995 (7) BCLR 86, ¶ 32 (CC) (S. Afr.).  
 621. Id. See also S v. Juvenile [1989] S.C.Z. 61 (Zim.).  
 622. Williams & Others, 1995 (7) BCLR 861, ¶ 39. 
 623. Id. ¶ 39 (emphasis added). 
 624. Id. ¶ 50 (emphasis added). 
 625. Id. ¶ 53. 
 626. Id. ¶ 53. (emphasis added). 
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has been a gradual shift of emphasis away from the idea of sentencing 
being predominantly the arena where society wreaks its vengeance on 
wrongdoers. Sentences have been passed with rehabilitation in mind.”627 
Most importantly, the Williams Court argued, “[i]n addressing itself 
specifically to punishment, the Constitution ensures that the sentencing 
of offenders must conform to standards of decency recognised 
throughout the civilised world.”628 
After citing various international human rights instruments, the 
emerging consensus of values in the civilized international community, 
as well as other international sources, the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa declared invalid and unconstitutional certain provisions of the 
Criminal Procedure Act No. 51 of 1977. Specifically, the Court held as 
follows:  
The following provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (as 
amended) are inconsistent with the Republic of South Africa 
Constitution Act 200 of 1993 (as amended) and are, with effect from 
the date of this order, declared to be invalid and of no force and effect: 
(a) section 294 in its entirety; and  
(b) the words “or whipping” in section 290(2).629 
In the Williams case, the Constitutional Court of South Africa 
employed international and comparative sources of law as an interpretive 
device to make certain that the Court’s decision reflected generally-
accepted international human rights standards and norms. And, in doing 
so, the Court invalidated and declared unconstitutional provisions of a 
statute that were deemed harmful to children. 
  
 627. Id. ¶ 66. (emphasis added). 
 628. Id. ¶ 77. 
 629. Id. ¶ 96. 
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2. Christian Education South Africa v. The Minister of 
Education of the Government of the Republic of South 
Africa (South Africa) 
The issue to be decided in Christian Education South Africa v. 
Minister of Education630 concerned § 10 of the South African Schools 
Act, 1996 (Act No. 84 of 1996),631 which states that “(1) [n]o person may 
administer corporal punishment at a school to a learner; (2) Any person 
who contravenes subsection (1) is guilty of an offense and liable on 
conviction to a sentence which could be imposed for assault.”632 The 
appellant, Christian Education South Africa, is a “voluntary association” 
and “an umbrella body of 196 independent Christian schools in South 
Africa with a total of approximately [14,500] pupils.”633 The appellant 
sought an order of the Constitutional Court determining that § 10 of the 
South African Schools Act, 1996 be “declared unconstitutional and 
invalid to the extent that it prohibits corporal punishment in independent 
schools where parents have consented to its application[,]”634 as well as, 
“to the extent that it is applicable to learners at . . . independent schools . 
. . whose parents or guardian have given consent to such corporal 
punishment.”635 In the court a quo, the appellant’s case had been 
dismissed.636 The appeal was then brought before the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa. 
Christian Education South Africa and its constituent member schools 
“aver that corporal correction—the term they use for corporal 
punishment—is an integral part of [their Christian ethos] and that the 
blanket prohibition of its use in its schools invades their individual 
parental and community rights freely to practise their religion.”637 In an 
earlier submission to the Constitutional Court, Christian Education South 
Africa had referred to corporal punishment as “corporal correction” and 
  
 630. See Christian Educ. S. Afr. v. Minister of Educ., 2000 (10) BCLR 1051 (CC). 
 631. South African Schools Act 84 of 1996 § 10. 
 632. Id. § 10(1)–(2). 
 633. Christian Education South Africa, 2000 (10) BCLR 1051, ¶ 2. 
 634. Id. ¶ 3. 
 635. Id. ¶ 21. 
 636. This case had initially been heard before the High Court, South Eastern Cape 
Local Division. See Christian Educ. S. Afr. v. Minister of Educ. of the Gov’t of the 
Republic of S. Afr. 1999 (9) BCLR 951 (SE). 
 637. Christian Education South Africa, 2000 (10) BCLR 1051, ¶ 2.  
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had argued or contended that it was “part of the common culture of such 
schools and that such culture is protected by sections 15(1), 29(3) and 
31(1) of the Constitution [of South Africa].”638 The appellant also argued 
that “corporal correction, as it was administered at schools affiliated to 
the appellant, was not in conflict with the common law as it constituted 
moderate chastisement not amounting to an assault, and was imposed by 
a teacher with the consent of the learner’s parent or guardian.”639 It was 
also pointed out that “moderate corporal correction has been declared not 
to be contrary to either the United States Constitution or to the European 
Convention on Human Rights.”640 
The respondent in Christian Education South Africa was the Minister 
of Education who contended that “it is the infliction of corporal 
punishment, not its prohibition, which infringes constitutional rights.”641 
In addition, the respondent argued that “the claim of the appellant to be 
entitled to a special exemption to administer corporal punishment is 
inconsistent with [certain] provisions of the Bill of Rights,”642 including 
equality, human dignity, freedom and security of the person, and the 
right of the child “to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or 
degradation.”643 The respondent also placed reliance on § 31(2),644 which 
states that section 31(1) rights “may not be exercised in a manner 
inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights.”645 
The Director-General (“DG”) of the South African Department of 
Education submitted an affidavit in support of the respondent’s position 
in which the DG contended that “corporal punishment in schools is 
contrary to the Bill of Rights.”646 He went on to point out that “in 1996, 
Parliament adopted the National Education Policy Act, which its 
  
 638. Christian Educ. S. Afr., 1999 (9) BCLR 951, ¶ 2. 
 639. Id.  
 640. Id. 
 641. Christian Education South Africa, 2000 (10) BCLR 1051, ¶ 8.  
 642. Id.  
 643. Id. 
 644. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 31(1). Section 31 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa deals with cultural, religious and linguistic communities and 
details rights that cannot be denied these communities. They include the right “to enjoy 
their culture, practise their religion and use their language; the right to form, join and 
maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations and other organs of civil society.” 
Id. 
 645. Christian Education South Africa, 2000 (10) BCLR 1051, ¶ 8. 
 646. Id. ¶ 9.  
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preamble declared, was: “. . . to facilitate the democratic transformation 
of the national system of education into one which serves the needs and 
interests of all the people of South Africa and upholds their fundamental 
rights.”647 
The respondent, the Minister of Education, stated that: 
[T]he trend in democratic countries is to ban corporal punishment in 
schools. South Africa’s international obligations under the Convention 
Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, require the abolition of corporal punishment in schools, since it 
involves subjecting children to violence and degrading punishment.
648
  
While indicating that “he does not doubt the sincerity of the beliefs of 
the parents, nor does he dispute their right to practise their religion in 
association with each other,” he, however, asserts “that such conduct is 
not appropriate in schools or the education system.”649 
Justice Sachs, writing for the Court, began his analysis by taking a 
look at the concepts “freedom of religion, belief and opinion” and in 
doing so, he cited to Article 18(1) of the ICCPR, which states as follows: 
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion 
or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion 
or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 
650
 
Justice Sachs notes that South Africa’s Constitution complies with the 
principles referenced in the ICCPR. First, “language rights and rights of 
belief” are spelled out fully in §§ 15 and 30.651 In § 31, the emphasis is 
placed on the protection of “members of communities united by a shared 
language, culture or religion.”652 The Court also made mention of the fact 
  
 647. Id. 
 648. Id. ¶ 13.  
 649. Id. ¶ 14.  
 650. Id. ¶ 18–19 (emphasis added).   
 651. Id. at ¶ 23. See also S. AFR. CONST. §§ 15, 30, 1996. 
 652. Christian Education South Africa, 2000 (10) BCLR 1051, ¶ 23. 
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that § 31 of the Constitution of South Africa “closely parallels article 27 
of the ICCPR, which reads as follows: 
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, 
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in 
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own 




Section 36(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
states that: 
The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of 
general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, 
including—(a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose 
of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the 
relation between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive 
means to achieve the purpose.
654
 
The Court then asked whether “the negative impact which the Schools 
Act has on the practice of corporal correction in the schools of the 
appellant’s religious community, is to be regarded as reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
freedom and equality.”655 Justice Sachs notes with respect to the 
appellant’s submission that once the appellant had “succeeded in 
establishing that the Schools Act substantially impacted upon its 
sincerely held religious beliefs, the State was required to show a 
compelling state interest in order to justify its failure to provide an 
appropriate exemption.”656 The “proposed formulation,” argued Justice 
Sachs, “imports into our law a rigid ‘strict scrutiny’ test taken from 
American Jurisprudence,” a test which “requires any legislative 
  
 653. ICCPR, supra note 142, art. 27. 
 654. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 30(1).  
 655. Christian Education South Africa, 2000 (10) BCLR 1051, ¶ 28. 
 656. Id. ¶ 29. 
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provision which impacts upon the freedom of religion to be serving a 
‘compelling state interest.’”657 
Justice Sachs argues, however, that South Africa’s Bill of Rights 
“through its limitation clause, expressly contemplates the use of a 
nuanced and context-sensitive form of balancing.”658 Reference is made 
specifically to § 36(1) of South Africa’s Constitution. As the Court held 
in S v. Manamela,659 § 36 “requires an overall assessment that will differ 
from case to case.”660 The Manamela Court specifically noted that:  
In essence, the Court must engage in a balancing exercise and arrive at 
a global judgment on proportionality and not adhere mechanically to a 
sequential check list. As a general rule, the more serious the impact of 
the measure on the right, the more persuasive or compelling the 
justification must be. Ultimately, the question is one of degree to be 
assessed in the concrete legislative and social setting of the measure, 
paying the due regard to the means which are realistically available in 




The Manamela Court also noted that “[e]ach particular infringement 
of a right has different implications in an open and democratic society 
based on dignity, equality and freedom.”662 Justice Sachs, in Christian 
Education South Africa, concluded that:  
[L]imitations on constitutional rights can pass constitutional muster 
only if the Court concludes that, considering the nature and importance 
of the right and the extent to which it is limited, such limitation is 
justified in relation to the purpose, importance and effect of the 
provision which results in this limitation, taking into account the 
availability of less restrictive means to achieve this purpose. Though 
there might be special problems attendant on undertaking the 
limitations analysis in respect of religious practices, the standard to be 
  
 657. Id. 
 658. Id. ¶ 30. 
 659. See S v. Manamela, 2000 (5) BCLR 491 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 660. Christian Education South Africa, 2000 (10) BCLR 1051, ¶ 31.  
 661. Manamela, 2000 (5) BCLR 491, ¶ 32. 
 662. Id. ¶ 33.  
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applied is the nuanced and contextual one required by section 36 and 
not the rigid one of strict scrutiny.
663
 
In reaching its decision in Christian Education South Africa, the 
Court noted that “by ratifying the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, [the South African State] undertook to take all 
appropriate measures to protect the child from violence, injury or 
abuse.”664 Justice Sachs specifically cited to Article 5(5) of the 
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief,665 which states that 
“[p]ractices of a religion or belief in which a child is brought up must not 
be injurious to his physical or mental health or to his full 
development.”666 The Court went on to argue that “[c]ourts throughout 
the world have shown special solicitude for protecting children from 
what they have regarded as the potentially injurious consequences of 
their parents’ religious practices.”667 In addition, Justice Sachs argues, 
“[i]t is now widely accepted that in every matter concerning the child, 
the child’s best interests must be of paramount importance.”668 
Citing to the Canadian case P v. S, Justice Sachs noted the words of 
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé who stated as follows: 
[I]n ruling on a child’s best interests, a court is not putting religion on 
trial nor its exercise by a parent for himself or herself, but is merely 
examining the way in which the exercise of a given religion by a parent 
throughout his or her right to access affects the child’s best interests. 
I am of the view, finally, that there would be no infringement of the 
freedom of religion provided for in s. 2(a) were the [Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms] to apply to such orders when they are made in 
the child’s best interests. As the Court has reiterated many times, 
freedom of religion, like any freedom, is not absolute. It is inherently 
limited by the rights and freedoms of others. Whereas parents are free 
  
 663. Christian Education South Africa, 2000 (10) BCLR 1051, ¶ 31. 
 664. Id. ¶ 40.  
 665. See G.A. Res. 36/55, Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (Nov. 25, 1981) 
[hereinafter Declaration on Intolerance]. 
 666. Id. art. 5(5). 
 667. Christian Education South Africa, 2000 (10) BCLR 1051, ¶ 41. 
 668. Id.  
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to choose and practice the religion of their choice, such activities can 
and must be restricted when they are against the child’s best interests, 
without thereby infringing the parents’ freedom of religion. It is 
important to note that the trial judge’s order refers to the appellant’s 
“religious fanaticism” and not to the normal exercise of his religion in 
respect of his child. Like the trial judge and the Court of Appeal, I 
would dismiss this argument.
669
 
Justice Sachs noted the dissenting opinion of Mr. Klecker in the 
European Commission of Human Rights’ decision in Campbell and 
Cosans v. United Kingdom: 
Corporal punishment amounts to a total lack of respect for the human 
being; it therefore cannot depend on the age of the human being . . . 
The sum total of adverse effects, whether actual or potential, produced 
by corporal punishment on the mental and moral development of a 
child is enough, as I see it, to describe it as degrading within the 
meaning of Article 3 of the Convention.
670
 
In reaching its ruling in this case, the Constitutional Court (“CC”) of 
South Africa invoked the country’s obligations under international 
human rights law, notably the Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, and the Comments of the UN Human Rights 
Committee.671 The Court also cited to decisions of the European 
Commission of Human Rights, European Court of Human Rights, the 
German Constitutional Court, as well as those of the Supreme Courts of 
Namibia, Zimbabwe, Canada, the United States, and Germany.672 The 
CC also referred to various international human rights instruments, such 
as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and the Universal 
  
 669. P. (D.) v. S. (C.), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 141, 181–82 (Can. Que. S.C.C.). 
 670. Christian Education South Africa, 2000 (10) BCLR 1051, ¶ 45 (quoting 
Campbell and Cosans v. United Kingdom, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. 531, 556 (1982) (Klecker, 
dissenting)). 
 671. See id. ¶ 13. 
 672. See id. ¶¶ 41, 45–46. 
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Declaration of Human Rights.673 It then dismissed the appeal, effectively 
denying the appellant’s (Christian Education South Africa) claim for a 
constitutionally compelled exemption from the blanket prohibition of the 
use of corporal punishment in schools.674 
3. Bhe and Others v. The Magistrate, Khayelitsha; Charlotte 
Shibi v. Mantabeni Sithole and Others; South African 
Human Rights Commission and Women’s Legal Center 
Trust v. President of the Republic of South Africa (South 
Africa) 
The Constitutional Court (CC) of South Africa was called upon to 
jointly decide three cases, namely, Bhe and Others v. The Magistrate, 
Khayelitsha; Charlotte Shibi v. Mantabeni Sithole and Others; South 
African Human Rights Commission and Women’s Legal Center Trust v. 
President of the Republic of South Africa (hereinafter referred to jointly 
as “Bhe”).675 These three cases concerned intestate succession in South 
African customary law; more specifically, the case concerned the 
principle of primogeniture in customary law in South Africa.676 The 
applicants before the CC were “concerned with the rights of [their] 
daughters and sisters to succeed a deceased African male who had died 
without leaving a will.”677 
The CC noted that there were “two main issues in the cases before 
this Court.”678 The first, the CC argued, concerned the “question of the 
constitutional validity of section 23 of the [Black Administration Act 38 
of 1927].”679 The second issue to be decided by the CC concerned “the 
question of the constitutional validity of the principle of primogeniture in 
the context of the customary law of succession.”680 
  
 673. See id. ¶¶ 40–52. 
 674. See id. ¶ 52. 
 675. See generally Bhe v. Magistrate 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 676. See id. ¶¶ 2–3. 
 677. Simisola Obatusin, Customary Law Principles as a Tool for Human Rights 
Advocacy: Innovating Nigerian Customary Practices Using Lessons from Ugandan and 
South African Courts, 56 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 636, 666 (2018). 
 678. Bhe, 2005 (1) SA 580, ¶ 3. 
 679. Id. See also Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 (repealed 2005) (the 
original act used the word “native” instead of “black”). 
 680. Bhe, 2005 (1) SA 580, ¶ 3. 
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Justice Langa, writing for the entire Court, noted that there were three 
cases, which were “heard together, by direction of the Chief Justice, 
since they are all concerned with intestate succession in the context of 
customary law.”681 “The first case, Bhe and Others v The Magistrate, 
Khayelitsha and Others, (the Bhe case) followed a decision by the 
Magistrate of Khayelitsha and, on appeal, that of the Cape High 
Court.”682 Next, “Charlotte Shibi v Mantanbeni Freddy Sithole and 
Others (the Shibi case), concerned a decision of the Magistrate of 
Wonderboom which was successfully challenged in the Pretoria High 
Court.”683 The third case, South African Human Rights Commission and 
the Women’s Legal Center Trust v. President of the Republic of South 
Africa, was “an application for direct access to [the CC] brought jointly 
by the South African Human Rights Commission and the Women’s 
Legal Center Trust, respectively the first and second applicants.”684 
Justice Langa then proceeded to “set out the background in respect to 
each of the matters [before the Court].”685 The Court noted that the Bhe 
case came before it “as an application for confirmation of an order of the 
Cape High Court.”686 Ms. Bhe, the third applicant, sought: 
[N]o relief for herself but brings the application in the following 
capacities: (a) on behalf of her two minor daughters, namely 
Nonkululeko Bhe, born in 1994 and Anelisa Bhe, born in 2001; (b) in 
the public interest, and (c) in the interest of the female descendants, 
descendants other than eldest descendants and extra-marital children 
who are descendants of people who die intestate.
687
 
Nonkululeko and Anelisa were “the first and second applicants 
respectively and were the children of Ms Bhe and Mr Vuyo Elius 
Mgolombane (the deceased) who died intestate in October 2002.”688 The 
Court noted that the “Women’s Legal Centre Trust acted in this 
  
 681. Id. ¶ 5. 
 682. Id. ¶ 6. 
 683. Id.  
 684. Id. ¶ 7. 
 685. Id. ¶ 8. 
 686. Id. ¶ 9. 
 687. Id. ¶ 10. 
 688. Id. 
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application ‘in the public interest.’”689 The respondents were the 
Magistrate of Khayelitsha, the President of the Republic of South Africa, 
and the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development. The 
Commission for Gender Equality, a Section 187 of the Constitution 
public institution, “was admitted as amicus curiae and presented helpful 
written and oral submissions to the Court.”690 
The two minor children of Ms. Bhe’s were born out of wedlock and 
had failed to qualify as heirs in their father’s intestate estate. After the 
death of their father, the deceased’s father was appointed the sole heir 
and representative of the estate “by the Magistrate in accordance with 
section 23 of the [Black Administration Act 38 of 1927] and the 
regulations.”691  
Justice Langa noted that “[u]nder the system of intestate succession 
flowing from [S]ection 23 and the regulations, in particular regulation 
2(e), the two minor children did not qualify to be the heirs in the intestate 
estate of their deceased father.”692 “According to these provisions, the 
estate of the deceased [had] to be distributed according to “Black law and 
custom.”693 Justice Langa then noted the decision of the Court a quo (i.e., 
the High Court), which was that “the legislative provisions that had been 
challenged and on which the father of the deceased relied, were 
inconsistent with the Constitution and were therefore invalid.”694  
In the Shibi case, the matter before the Court concerned an application 
by Charlotte Shibi, whose brother had died intestate in Pretoria in 
1995.695 Since Shibi’s deceased brother was an African, “his intestate 
estate fell to be administered under the provisions of section 23(10) of 
the [Black Administration Act 38 of 1927].”696 In this case and, for 
similar reasons, Ms. Shibi was not allowed, by the Magistrate of 
Wonderboom, to inherit the estate of her deceased brother. Ms. Shibi 
challenged the Magistrate’s decision, as well as, the manner in which the 
estate had been administered, in the High Court.697 Subsequently, the 
  
 689. Id. 
 690. Id. ¶ 11. 
 691. Id. ¶ 15. 
 692. Id. ¶ 16. 
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 694. Id. ¶ 19.  
 695. See id. ¶ 21. 
 696. Id. ¶ 22. 
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High Court “set aside the decision of the Magistrate and declared Ms 
Shibi to be the sole heir” and “awarded damages against the deceased’s 
two cousins, that is, first and second respondents in this case.”698 
The Constitutional Court then noted that the South African Human 
Rights Commission “is a state institution supporting democracy under 
Chapter 9 of the Constitution.”699 In its mandate, the Commission is, inter 
alia, to “promote respect for human rights and a culture of human rights . 
. . [and] to take steps to secure appropriate redress where human rights 
have been violated.”700 The Women’s Legal Centre Trust, on the other 
hand, “is a non-governmental organization whose [main stated] objective 
‘is to advance and protect the human rights of all women in South Africa, 
particularly black women who suffer many intersecting forms of 
disadvantage.’”701 In accordance with section 38(a) of the Constitution of 
South Africa, the Women’s Legal Centre Trust was acting in its own 
interest,702 as well as in the interest of the public.703 The Court noted that 
the Women’s Legal Centre Trust was also acting in “the interest of a 
group or a class of people” as made possible by section 38(c) of the 
Constitution.704 
The relief that the applicants in South African Human Rights 
Commission and Another v. President of the Republic of South Africa 
and Another sought was “wider than that in the Bhe and Shibi cases.”705 
In addition to the provisions of the Black Administration Act that was 
declared invalid by the Cape and Pretoria High Courts, the applicants in 
the matter before the Constitutional Court claimed that:  
[T]he whole of [S]ection 23 [of the Black Administration Act], 
alternatively subsections (1), (2) and (6) of section 23, should be 
declared unconstitutional and invalid because of their inconsistency 
with the Constitution’s equality provisions (section 9), the right to 
  
 698. Id. ¶ 27. 
 699. Id. ¶ 29. 
 700. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, §§ 184(1)(a), 2(b). 
 701. Bhe, 2005 (1) SA 580, ¶ 29. 
 702. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 38(a). 
 703. See id. § 38(d). 
 704. See id. § 38(c). 
 705. Bhe, 2005 (1) SA 580, ¶ 31. 
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The Court then reviewed the legislative framework that purports to 
give effect to customary law in South Africa.707 In addition, the Court 
also examined provisions of the Constitution that create a place, within 
the South African legal system, for customary law. The Court states that 
“[c]ertain provisions of the Constitution put it beyond doubt that our 
basic law specifically requires that customary law should be 
accommodated, not merely tolerated, as part of South African law, 
provided the particular rules or provisions are not in conflict with the 
Constitution.”708 For example, the Court notes that §§ “30 and 31 of the 
Constitution entrench respect for cultural diversity.”709 Additionally, § 
39(2) requires a court that is “interpreting customary law to promote the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.”710 Finally, the Court 
makes reference to §§ 39(3) and 211 of the Constitution, which state, 
respectively, “that the Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any 
other rights or freedoms that are recognised or conferred by customary 
law as long as they are consistent with the Bill of Rights” and that the 
law “protects those institutions that are unique to customary law.”711 The 
Court then concluded that since customary law is law in South Africa, it 
must be interpreted by South Africa’s courts, “as first and foremost 
answering to the contents of the Constitution,” and be “protected by and 
subject to the Constitution in its own rights.”712 
The Court then noted that “an approach that condemns rules or 
provisions of customary law merely on the basis that they are different to 
those of the common law or legislation, such as the Intestate Succession 
Act, would be incorrect.”713 Thus, argued the Court, “[a]t the level of 
constitutional validity, the question in [the case before the CC] is not 
  
 706. Id. See also S. AFR. CONST., 1996, §§ 9, 10, and 28. 
 707. Bhe, 2005 (1) SA 580, ¶ 35–39.  
 708. Id. ¶ 41.  
 709. Id. See also S. AFR. CONST., 1996, §§ 30, 31. Section 30 deals with 
“[l]anguage and culture,” while section 31 deals with “[c]ultural, religious and linguistic 
communities.” S. AFR. CONST., 1996, §§ 30–31. 
 710. Bhe, 2005 (1) SA 580, ¶ 41. See also S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 39(2). 
 711. Bhe, 2005 (1) SA 580, ¶ 41. See also S. AFR. CONST., 1996, m§§ 39(3), 211. 
 712. Bhe, 2005 (1) SA 580, ¶ 41.  
 713. Id. ¶ 42. 
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whether a rule or provision of customary law offers similar remedies to 
the Intestate Succession Act. The issue is whether such rules or 
provisions are consistent with the Constitution.”714 
Justice Langa argued that “the constitutional validity of rules and 
principles of customary law depend on their consistency with the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights.”715 He then proceeded to examine 
different sections of the Constitution, which he argued were said to have 
been violated by the “impugned provisions” of the Black Administration 
Act. These include §§ 10 (rights to human dignity), 9 (equality), and 28 
(the rights of children).716 The learned Justice then proceeded to note that 
“[t]wo prohibited grounds of discrimination are relevant in this case” and 
the “first relates to sex,” which Justice Langa chose not to examine in 
detail, “except to remark that the importance of protecting children from 
discrimination on the grounds of sex is acknowledged in the African 
Charter on the Rights of the Child.”717 
The second ground argued Justice Langa, “relates to the prohibition of 
unfair discrimination on the ground of ‘birth’ in section 9(3).”718 The 
learned Justice then made specific reference to international law and its 
role in constitutional interpretation in the Republic of South Africa. He 
argued that “[i]n interpreting both section 28 and other rights in the 
Constitution, the provisions of international law must be considered.”719 
The Republic of South Africa “is a party to a number of international 
multilateral agreements designed to strengthen the protection of 
children.”720 He then moved on to examine the types of protections that 
  
 714. Id.  
 715. Id. ¶ 46. 
 716. See id. ¶ 48, 49–51, 52.  
 717. Id. ¶ 53. See also ACRWC, supra note 99, art. 3 (stating in Article 3 that 
“[e]very child should be allowed to enjoy the rights and freedoms in this Charter, 
regardless of his or her race, ethnic group, color, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status.”).  
 718. Bhe, 2005 (1) SA 580, ¶ 54. Section 9(3) of the Constitution of South Africa 
states that “[t]he state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone 
on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or 
social origin, color, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, 
culture, language and birth.” Id. § 9(3). 
 719. Bhe, 2005 (1) SA 580, ¶ 55.  
 720. Id. Among these agreements are the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (1990), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1999), the 
African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1996), and the African Charter 
 
2020] International Law, African Customary Law 653 
these international human rights instruments provide for children. For 
example, the CRC, he notes, makes clear and asserts that children, by 
reason of their “physical and mental immaturity,” require “special 
safeguards and care.”721 
Justice Langa makes specific reference to Article 2 of the CRC, which 
imposes an obligation on States Parties to ensure that the rights set forth 
in the Convention shall be enjoyed by every child within the jurisdiction 
of each State Party regardless of or “irrespective of the child’s or his or 
her parent’s or legal guardian’s race, color, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, 
disability, birth or other status.”722 
The learned Justice then moved on to examine provisions in the 
ICCPR which provide protections for children. Specifically, Article 
24(1) expressly states that:  
Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, color, 
sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the 
right to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a 
minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.
723
 
With respect to the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child, Justice Langa notes that Article 3 of this international human 
rights instrument provides that: 
Every child shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and 
freedoms recognized and guaranteed in this Charter irrespective of the 
child’s or his/her parents’ or legal guardians’ race, ethnic group, color, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national and social 




on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (2000). Id. at n.65 (the dates in parentheses are the 
dates on which South Africa ascended to the individual agreements).  
 721. Bhe, 2005 (1) SA 580, ¶ 55. See also Preamble to United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, supra note 8. (citing the Declaration of the Rights of the 
Child, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1959). 
 722. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 8, at 46, 
art.2(1). 
 723. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Convention on Civil and Political 
Rights, art. 24(1) (Dec. 16, 1966). 
 724. ACRWC, supra note 99, art. 3. 
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The next international human rights instrument that the learned 
Justice refers to is the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,725 particularly, the Convention’s 
Article 14,726 which prohibits discrimination. Justice Langa notes that 
“the European Court on Human Rights has held that treating extra-
marital children differently to those born within a marriage constitutes a 
suspect ground of differentiation in terms of article 14 of the Charter.”727 
The learned Justice then goes on to note that the U.S. Supreme Court has, 
in Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., held that discriminating on 
the grounds of “illegitimacy” is “illogical and unjust.”728 
Justice Langa then argues that: 
The prohibition of unfair discrimination on the ground of birth in 
section 9(3) of [the Constitution of South Africa] should be interpreted 
to include a prohibition of differentiating between children on the basis 
of whether a child’s biological parents were married either at the time 
the child was conceived or when the child was born.
729
 
He stated further that “extra-marital children did, and still do, suffer 
from social stigma and impairment of dignity.”730 Thus, “[t]he 
prohibition of unfair discrimination in our Constitution is aimed at 
removing such patterns of stigma from [South African] society.”731 
Accordingly, “when section 9(3) prohibits unfair discrimination on the 
  
 725. See Bhe, 2005 (1) SA 580, ¶ 56. See generally Council of Europe, European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 
1950, ETS No. 005 [hereinafter Protection of Humans]. 
 726. See Protection of Humans, supra note 723, art. 14. Article 14 states as 
follows: “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, color, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, 
property, birth or other status.” See European Convention, supra note 704, art. 14. 
 727. Bhe, 2005 (1) SA 580, ¶ 56. See also Marckx v. Belgium, App. No. 6833/74, 
2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 330, ¶¶ 38–39 (1979); Inze v. Austria, App. No. 8695/79, 10 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 394, ¶ 41 (1987). 
 728. Bhe, 2005 (1) SA 580, ¶ 56 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 
U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (holding that “[t]he status of illegitimacy has expressed through the 
ages society’s condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage. But 
visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust.”). 
 729. Id. ¶ 59. 
 730. Id.  
 731. Id.  
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ground of ‘birth’, it should be interpreted to include a prohibition of 
differentiation between children on the grounds of whether the children’s 
parents were married at the time of conception or birth.”732 If, however, 
differentiation is made “on such grounds,” argues Justice Langa, “it will 
be assumed to be unfair unless it is established that it is not.”733 
In the Court a quo, argues Justice Langa, Section 23 of the Black 
Administration Act “was correctly described as a racist provision which 
is fundamentally incompatible with the Constitution.”734 He argued 
further that the “Constitutional Court has often expressed its abhorrence 
of discriminatory legislation and practices which were a feature of [South 
Africa’s] hurtful and racist past and which are fundamentally 
inconsistent with the constitutional guarantee of equality.”735 Thus, 
“Section 23 cannot escape the context in which it was conceived” and the 
fact that “[i]t is part of an Act which was specifically crafted to fit in 
with notions of separation and exclusion of Africans from the people of 
‘European’ descent.”736 In addition, Section 23 was “part of a 
comprehensive exclusionary system of administration imposed on 
Africans, ostensibly to avoid exposing them to a result which, ‘to the 
Native mind,’ would be ‘both startling and unjust.’”737  
Justice Langa then reviews several South African judicial rulings that 
expose legislative acts designed for the “native administration,” which 
include the Black Administration Act, as legal instruments designed to 
advance racial discrimination and exploit the African peoples. He then 
concludes “that construed in the light of its history and context, [S]ection 
23 of the [Black Administration Act] and its regulations are manifestly 
discriminatory and in breach of section 9(3) of our Constitution.”738 He 
went on to state, that “[t]he discrimination they perpetuate touches a raw 
nerve in most South Africans. It is a relic of our racist and painful past. 
Th[e] Court has, on a number of occasions, expressed the need to purge 
the statute book of such harmful and hurtful provisions.”739 
  
 732. Id.  
 733. Id.  
 734. Id. ¶ 60. 
 735. Id.  
 736. Id. ¶ 61. 
 737. Id.  
 738. Id. ¶ 68. 
 739. Id. 
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For the Court, the only question left to be resolved was “whether the 
discrimination occasioned by [S]ection 23 and its regulations is capable 
of justification in terms of [S]ection 36 of our Constitution.”740 
According to Section 36 of the Constitution, “[t]he rights in the Bill of 
Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the 
extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking 
into account all relevant factors.”741 He then cited to S v. Manamela and 
Another (Director-General of Justice Intervening): 
[T]he Court must engage in a balancing exercise and arrive at a global 
judgment on proportionality and not adhere mechanically to a 
sequential check-list. As a general rule, the more serious the impact of 
the measure on the right, the more persuasive or compelling the 
justification must be. Ultimately, the question is one of degree to be 
assessed in the concrete legislative and social setting of the measure, 
paying due regard to the means which are realistically available in our 




Justice Langa states that “[t]he rights violated are important rights, 
particularly in the South African context” and that “[t]he rights to 
equality and dignity are of the most valuable of rights in any open and 
democratic state.”743 The rights in question, according to Justice Langa, 
“assume special importance in South Africa because of [the country’s] 
past history of inequality and hurtful discrimination on grounds that 
include race and gender.”744 Finally, Justice Langa states: “[i]t is clear 
from what is stated above that the serious violation by the provisions of 
section 23 of the rights to equality and human dignity cannot be justified 
in [the country’s] new constitutional order.”745 Thus, “[i]n terms of 
  
 740. Id.  
 741. S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 36(1). 
 742. S v. Manamela, 2000 (3) SA 1 (CC), ¶ 32 (S. Afr.).  
 743. Bhe, 2005 (1) SA 580, ¶ 71.  
 744. Id.  
 745. Id. ¶ 73.  
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[S]ection 172(1(a) of the Constitution,746 [S]ection 23 must accordingly 
be struck down.”747 
Justice Langa then next examines the “context in which the rules of 
customary law, particularly in relation to succession, operated and the 
kind of society served by them,”748 the “position of the extra-marital 
child,”749 and the “effect of changing circumstances.”750 The Court 
concludes that customary law, including especially the rules of 
succession, “have not been given the space to adapt and to keep pace 
with changing social conditions and values.”751 The most worrying part 
of customary law in South Africa, Justice Langa explains, is that it has 
been “distorted in a manner that emphasizes its patriarchal features and 
minimizes its communitarian ones.”752 He then concluded that “[t]he 
primogeniture rule as applied to the customary law of succession cannot 
be reconciled with the current notions of equality and human dignity as 
contained in the Bill of Rights.”753  
Ultimately, after discussing what it argued were the positive aspects 
of customary law— “consensus-seeking,” ability to provide for “family 
and clan meetings which offer excellent opportunities for the prevention 
and resolution of disputes and disagreements,”754 and making references 
to provisions of various international human rights instruments that 
South Africa has ratified—the Court rendered its ruling.  
First, the Court set aside the orders of the Cape High Court in the 
matter of Bhe and Others v. The Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others, and 
  
 746. Section 172 of the Constitution of South Africa deals with the powers of 
courts in constitutional matters. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 172. It states as follows:  
(1) When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court— (a) must declare 
that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the extent of 
its inconsistency; and (b) may make any order that is just and equitable, including— (i) 
an order limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of invalidity; and (ii) an order 
suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period and on any conditions, to allow 
the competent authority to correct the defect.  
Id. § 172(1)(a). 
 747. Bhe, 2005 (1) SA 580, ¶ 73. 
 748. Id. ¶ 75. 
 749. Id. ¶ 79. 
 750. Id. ¶ 80. 
 751. Id. ¶ 82. 
 752. Id. ¶ 89. 
 753. Id. ¶ 95. 
 754. Id. ¶ 45 
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the Pretoria High Court in the matter of Charlotte Shibi v. Mantabeni 
Freddy Sithole and Others.755 Second, the Court declared Section 23 of 
the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 “inconsistent with the 
Constitution and invalid.”756 Third, the Regulations for the 
Administration and Distribution of the Estates of Deceased Blacks 
(R200) and which were published in Government Gazette No. 10601 of 
February 6, 1987, as amended, were declared to be invalid.757 Fourth, 
“[t]he rule of male primogeniture as it applies in customary law to the 
inheritance of property [was] declared to be inconsistent with the 
Constitution and invalid to the extent that it excludes or hinders women 
and extra-marital children from inheriting property.”758 Fifth, the Court 
declared § 1(4)(b) of the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 to be 
“inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid.”759 
Specifically, with respect to the three cases, the Court held, in the 
matter of Bhe and Others v. The Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others, 
that Nonkululeko Bhe and Anelisa Bhe are the sole heirs of the deceased 
estate of Vuyo Elius Mgolombane.760 In the matter of Charlotte Shibi v. 
Mantabeni Freddy Sithole and Others, the Court declared Charlotte Shibi 
as the sole heir of the deceased estate of Daniel Solomon Sithole.761 
4. Attorney General v. Dow (Botswana) 
In this case, Attorney General v. Unity Dow (“Unity Dow”),762 the 
applicant was Unity Dow, a citizen of Botswana, who was born in 
Botswana of parents who were members of one of the country’s 
ethnocultural groups.763 She was married to Peter Nathan Dow, a citizen 
of the United States who had been resident in Botswana for nearly 
fourteen years.764 A child, named Cheshe Maitumelo Dow, was born to 
the couple on October 29, 1979, before they were married on March 7, 
  
 755. Id. ¶ 136(1).  
 756. Id. ¶ 136(2). 
 757. See id. ¶ 136(3). 
 758. Id. ¶ 136(4). 
 759. Id. ¶ 136(5). 
 760. See id. ¶ 136(11)(a). 
 761. See id. ¶ 136(11)(b). 
 762. See Attorney-General v. Dow, 1992 BLR 119 (CA) (Bots.). 
 763. See id. at 125.  
 764. See id.  
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1984. After their 1984 marriage, they had two more children.765 The 
applicant also indicated that she and her family had established their 
home in Raserura Ward in Mochudi and that “all the children [regarded] 
that place and no other as their home.”766 
Under the laws in existence in Botswana prior to the enactment of the 
Citizenship Act of 1984, Cheshe Dow, the child born to the couple 
before their 1984 marriage, was a citizen of Botswana, and hence, a 
Motswana. Nevertheless, in terms of the Citizenship Act of 1984, the two 
children born during their marriage were not citizens of Botswana and as 
such, aliens in the land of their birth.767 The applicant (Unity Dow) 
argued before the High Court of Botswana that Sections 4 and 5 of the 
Botswana Citizenship Act of 1984 offended the country’s Constitution 
because they are discriminatory and a limitation on her basic rights and 
freedoms.768 The relevant sections are: 
4 (1) A person born in Botswana shall be a citizen of Botswana by birth 
and descent if, at the time of his birth – (a) his father was a citizen of 
Botswana; or (b) in the case of a person born out of wedlock, his 
mother was a citizen of Botswana. (2) A person born before the 
commencement of this Act shall not be a citizen by virtue of this 
section unless he was a citizen at the time of such commencement. 
5 (1) A person born outside Botswana shall be a citizen of Botswana by 
descent if, at the time of his birth – (a) his father was a citizen of 
Botswana; or (b) in the case of a person born out of wedlock, his 
mother was a citizen of Botswana. (2) A person born before the 
commencement of this Act shall not be a citizen by virtue of this 
section unless he was a citizen at the time of such commencement.
769
 
The High Court noted that “[i]n order to fully understand [the 
applicant’s] contentions it is advantageous to record that at Independence 
  
 765. See id. The two children were named Tumisang Tad Dow (born on March 26, 
1985) and Natasha Selemo Dow (born on November 26, 1987). Id.  
 766. Id. 
 767. See id. 
 768. See Attorney General v. Unity Dow, MISCA. 124/90, at 30 (High Ct. 
Botswana June 11, 1991) (unreported), https://uniteforreprorights.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/10/botswana.pdf. 
 769. Dow, 1992 BLR at 125. 
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and up to 1984, the qualifications for citizenship were set out in the 
Constitution at Sections 20–29. Section 21 reads as follows”:770 
Every person born in Botswana on or after 30th September, 1966 shall 
become a citizen of Botswana at the date of his birth: 
Provided that a person shall not become a citizen of Botswana by virtue 
of this section if at the time of his birth 
(i) neither of his parents is a citizen of Botswana and his father 
possesses such immunity from suit and legal process as is accorded to 
the envoy of a foreign sovereign power accredited to Botswana; or 
(ii) his father is a citizen of a country with which Botswana is at war 
and the birth occurs in a place then under occupation by that country.
771
 
The High Court went on to note that these provisions were repealed 
by the Citizenship Act of 1984 and that, as a result, “a child born out of 
wedlock of a citizen mother and a non-citizen father is a citizen but if 
born of a marriage between its mother and a non-citizen father that child 
is an alien.”772 Counsel for the applicant, the High Court noted, relied on 
Section 3 of the Constitution, which states as follows: 
Whereas every person in Botswana is entitled to the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of the individual, that is to say, the right, whatever his 
race, place of origin, political opinions, color, creed or sex, but subject 
to respect for the rights and freedoms of others and for the public 
interest to each and all of the following, namely: 
(a) life, liberty, security of the person and the protection of law; 
(b) freedom of conscience, of expression and of assembly and 
association; and  
(c) protection for the privacy of his home and other property and from 
deprivation of property without compensation, the provisions of this 
Chapter shall have effect for the purpose of affording protection to 
those rights and freedoms subject to such limitations of that protection 
  
 770. Unity Dow, MISCA. 124/90, at 31.  
 771. Id. (quoting S. AFR. CONST., 1996, § 21). 
 772. Id.  
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as are contained in those provisions, being limitations designed to 
ensure that the enjoyment of the said rights and freedoms by any 




The High Court went on to note that Section 5 of the Constitution 
guarantees the right to liberty and the right to the protection of the law.774 
Section 7 provides that “[n]o person shall be subjected to torture or to 
inhuman or degrading punishment or other treatment” and Section 14 
states that “[n]o person shall be deprived of his freedom of 
movement.”775 The question that the Court was tasked with answering 
was “does the provision that the children born in Botswana of a female 
citizen married to a non-citizen are not citizens of Botswana, offend 
against the Constitution?”776 
In his analysis of the case, Justice Horwitz sought help from other 
jurisdictions, including the Privy Council777 and the Supreme Court of 
Zimbabwe,778 especially as it relates to constitutional interpretation. He 
also made mention of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which deals with family life,779 as 
well as, “decisions on which have recognized the family unit and the 
right to protection of illegitimate children.”780 In addition, Justice 
Horwitz also mentions the UN Declaration of the Rights of the Child, 
which contains the following principle: “[the child] shall, wherever 
possible, grow up in the care and under the responsibility of his parents, 
and, in any case, in an atmosphere of affection and of moral and material 
security; a child of tender years shall not, save in exceptional 
circumstances, be separated from his mother.”781 
  
 773. Id.  
 774. Id.  
 775. Id.  
 776. See id. at 32.  
 777. See id. at 33.  
 778. See id. at 35.  
 779. See Protection of Human Rights, supra note 723.  
 780. Attorney General v. Unity Dow, MISCA. 124/90, at 33 (High Ct. Botswana 
June 11, 1991) (unreported), https://uniteforreprorights.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/10/botswana.pdf. 
 781. Declaration of the Rights of the Child, supra note 23, principle 6. 
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Moreover, Justice Horwitz referenced Article 24 of the International 
Convention on Civil and Political Rights, which states, at Article 24(1), 
that “[e]very child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, 
color, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, 
the right to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a 
minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.”782 The Court then 
proceeded to outline what it argued were “certain consequences of the 
[Botswana] Citizenship Act [1984] affecting the Applicant.”783  
First, Justice Horwitz stipulated that “[n]ot only the husband but the 
children are liable to be expelled from Botswana.”784 Second, “if the 
husband were to decide to leave both Botswana and his wife, (the 
applicant), the children, assuming they are left behind can only continue 
to live in Botswana if they are granted residence permits.”785 Third, 
assuming that the applicant (Unity Dow), “did not want to follow her 
husband, or he did not want her to do so, she does not really have a free 
decision. She can only do so at the price of her children. (It must be 
remembered that this would not be the position with a male citizen 
married to an alien female).”786 
The Court then went on to examine the effect of Section 4 of the 
Botswana Citizenship Act (1984) on the fundamental liberties of the 
applicant. Mr. Browde, one of the applicant’s counsels, argued that the 
applicant, by reason of Section 4 of the Citizenship Act, was: 
[D]enied the following human rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 
Constitution—the right to liberty, protection of the law, immunity from 
expulsion from Botswana, protection from being subjected to degrading 
treatment, and not to be discriminated against on the basis of her sex. 
The Applicant suffers from adverse consequences of the relevant 
clauses of the Section only because she is a woman.
787
  
Justice Horwitz stated that this was “a fair and correct conclusion to 
be drawn from the wording of the Section especially in comparison with 
  
 782. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Convention on Civil and Political 
Rights, (Dec. 16, 1966). 
 783. Unity Dow, MISCA. 124/90, at 35.  
 784. Id. at 37. 
 785. Id.  
 786. Id.  
 787. Id. at 38. 
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the original citizenship rights which stemmed from the now repealed 
Sections of the Constitution.”788 
Justice Horwitz then went on to discuss “discrimination generally” 
and address the following question: “[I]s Section 4 of the Citizenship Act 
discriminatory?”789 In doing so, Justice Horwitz argued that he was 
“strengthened in [his] view by the fact that Botswana is a Signatory to 
the O.A.U. Convention on Non-Discrimination.”790 However, he argued 
that the signing of the Convention by Botswana “does not give it the 
power of law in Botswana.”791 Nevertheless, the Court states that:  
[T]he effect of the adherence by Botswana to the Convention must 
show that a construction of the section which does not do violence to 
the language but is consistent with and in harmony with the convention 
must be preferable to a ‘narrow construction’ which results in a finding 
that [S]ection 15 of the constitution permits unrestricted discrimination 
on the basis of sex.
792
 
Justice Horwitz then agreed with Mr. Browde that “the general effect 
of the provisions of the Citizenship Act which have been attacked before 
[Justice Horwitz] is to interfere with the dignity of the person. The effect 
is to lower a person in her position and reputation, and that can be 
regarded as degrading treatment.”793 He continued by stating that 
“Section 4 is discriminatory in its effect on women in that, as a matter of 
policy,”794 
(i) It may compel them to live and bear children outside wedlock.  
(ii) Since her children are only entitled to remain in Botswana if they 
are in possession of a residence permit and since they are not granted 
permits in their own right, their right to remain in Botswana is 
dependent upon their forming part of their father’s residence permit.  
  
 788. Id.  
 789. Id. 
 790. Id. at 39. 
 791. Id. 
 792. Id. 
 793. Id. at 41. 
 794. Id. 
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(iii) The residence permits are granted for no more than two years at a 
time, and if the applicant’s husband’s permit were not to be renewed 
both he and applicant’s minor children would be obliged to leave 
Botswana.  
(iv) In addition Applicant is jointly responsible with her husband for 
the education of their children. Citizens of Botswana qualify for 
financial assistance in the form of bursaries to meet the costs of 
university education. This is a benefit which is not available to a non-
citizen. In the result the applicant is financially prejudiced by the fact 
that her children are not Botswana citizens. 
(v) Since the children would be obliged to travel on their father’s 
passport the applicant will not be entitled to return to Botswana with 
her children in the absence of their father.
795
 
Justice Horwitz then went on to hold that “Sections 4 and 5 of the 
Citizenship Act Cap 01:01 are declared ultra vires the Constitution of 
Botswana.”796 Although this case was essentially about the rights of 
Unity Dow, a Motswana, and the wife of an American citizen living in 
Botswana, it is evident that the decision of the High Court also dealt 
specifically with the rights of their two children and the children of 
Botswana generally. 
After the High Court’s ruling in favor of Unity Dow, the Attorney-
General of Botswana brought an appeal against the judgment before the 
Court of Appeal (“CA”).797 Judge Amissah, writing for the CA, began his 
analysis of the case by noting that “[t]he facts of the case which gave 
cause for the respondent’s798 complaint were well summarized by the 
learned judge a quo.”799 Nevertheless, he went on to provide a summary 
of the facts of the case for the benefit of the various parties to the case 
before the CA. 
The Appellant’s appeal was based on several grounds, which 
included, inter alia, whether the applicant, Unity Dow, had the relevant 
  
 795. Id.  
 796. Id. at 42.  
 797. See Attorney-General v. Dow, 1992 BLR 119 (CA) (Bots.). 
 798. In the Court of Appeal case, the appellant was the Attorney-General of the 
Republic of Botswana and the respondent was Unity Dow. Id. at 124. 
 799. Id.  
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“locus standi to apply to the High Court for redress pursuant to section 
18 of the Constitution.”800 In his analysis, Judge Amissah noted “that 
Botswana is one of the credible prime movers behind the promotion and 
supervision of the [African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights],”801 
which provides that:  
Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and 
freedoms recognized and guaranteed in the present Charter without 
distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social 
origin, fortune, birth or other status.
802
  
In addition, he made reference to paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 12 of 
the Banjul Charter: 
1. Every individual shall have the right to freedom of movement and 
residence within the borders of a state provided he abides by the law. 
2. Every individual shall have the right to leave any country including 
his own, and to return to his country. This right may only be subject to 
restrictions, provided for by law for the protection of national security, 
law and order, public health or morality.
803
 
Justice Amissah then took note of the pronouncements of Judge 
Agudah in Petrus and Another v. The State.804 In that case, Judge Agudah 
noted that at paragraph thirty-seven, “[t]he peoples of [Botswana] form 
an integral part of the modern civilised world community now used to 
the enjoyment of the usual democratic freedoms under humane 
Governments” and that “Botswana is a proud member of the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) and of the United Nations (UN); 
and must be presumed to be willing to abide by all the protocols of those 
  
 800. Id. at 127.  
 801. Id. at 153.  
 802. Id. at 156. See also Banjul Charter, supra note 159, art. 2. 
 803. Id. art. 12(1–2). 
 804. See Attorney-General v. Dow, 1992 BLR 119,154 (CA) (Bots.). See generally 
Petrus v. State, 1984 BLR 14, ¶ 37 (CA) (Bots.) (discussing a case of the Court of Appeal 
of Botswana, the country’s highest and final court). 
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bodies which it has agreed to.”805 Judge Amissah noted that he was in 
agreement: 
[T]hat Botswana is a member of the community of civilized states 
which has undertaken to abide by certain standards of conduct, and, 
unless it is impossible to do otherwise, it would be wrong for its courts 
to interpret its legislation in a manner which conflicts with the 
international obligations Botswana has undertaken.
806
  
He argued further that “[t]his principle, used as an aid to construction 
as is quite permissible under section 24 of the Interpretation Act, adds 
reinforcement to the view that the intention of the framers of the 
Constitution could not have been to permit discrimination purely on the 
basis of sex.”807 
After analyzing the decision of the Court a quo, Judge Amissah 
concluded that that decision “was right in holding that section 4 of the 
Citizenship Act infringes the fundamental rights and freedoms of the 
respondent conferred by sections 3 (on fundamental rights and freedoms 
of the individual), 14 (on protection of freedom of movement) and 15 (on 
protection from discrimination) of the Constitution.”808 Finally, Judge 
Amissah held that “[t]he declaration of the Court a quo that sections 4 
and 5 of the Citizenship Act (Cap 01:01) are ultra vires the Constitution, 
is, accordingly, varied by deleting the reference to section 5. Otherwise, 
the appeal is dismissed.”809 
5. C.K. (A Child) (Through Ripples International as Her 
Guardian and Next Friend & 11 Others v. Commissioner 
of Police/Inspector General the National Police Service 
& 3 Others (Kenya) 
C.K. (A Child) (Through Ripples International as Her Guardian and 
Next Friend & 11 Others v. Commissioner of Police/Inspector General 
  
 805. Petrus, 1984 BLR 14 (CA), ¶ 37. 
 806. Dow, 1992 BLR 119 at 154. 
 807. Id.  
 808. Id. at 160.  
 809. Id. 
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the National Police Service & 3 Others810 concerned petitions brought by 
eleven children who were victims of “defilement, child abuse, and other 
forms of sexual violence” before the Kenya High Court at Meru.811 The 
petitioners “alleged that the police had failed to effectively investigate 
their complaints and take the necessary action, which would have 
brought the perpetrators to account for their unlawful acts.”812 
Justice Makau, writing for the Court, noted that the twelve petitioners 
based their petition, dated October 11, 2012, on various articles of “the 
Constitution of Kenya, 2010, [several provisions] of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, [several articles] of the African Charter on 
the Rights and Welfare of the Child, [several articles] of the African 
Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, Section[s] 3, 5, 15 and 22 of the 
Children Act 2001 (Chapter 141) of the Laws of Kenya, the Sexual 
Offenses Act, 2006 (Act No. 3 of 2006) and the Police Act (Chapter 84) 
of the Laws of Kenya.”813 
The issues put before the Kenya High Court (“Court”) for 
adjudication were the following: 
1. A declaration to the effect that the neglect, omission, refusal and/or 
failure of the police to conduct prompt, effective, proper and 
professional investigations into the first eleven petitioners’ complaints 
of defilement violates the first eleven petitioners’ fundamental rights 
and freedoms—(a) to special protection as members of a vulnerable 
group; (b) to equal protection and benefit of the law; (c) not to be 
discriminated against; (d) to inherent dignity and the right to have the 
dignity protected; (e) to security of the person; (f) not to be subjected to 
any form of violence from public or private sources or torture or cruel 
or degrading treatment; and (g) to access justice as respectively set out 
in Articles 21(1), 21(3), 27, 28, 29, 48, 50(1) and 53(1(c) of the 
Constitution [of the Republic of Kenya].  
2. A declaration to the effect that the neglect, omission, refusal and/or 
failure of the police to conduct prompt, effective, proper and 
professional investigations into the first eleven petitioners’ respective 
  
 810. See C.K. (A Child) v. The Commissioner of Police (2012) 8 K.L.R. 1, 11 
(H.C.K.) (Kenya). 
 811. CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS ET AL., LEGAL GROUNDS: REPRODUCTIVE 
AND SEXUAL RIGHTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN COURTS, VOLUME III 33 (2017). 
 812. Id. at 33. 
 813. C.K., 8 K.L.R, at 2. 
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complaints violates the first eleven petitioners’ fundamental rights and 
freedoms under—(a) Articles 1 to 8 (inclusive) and 10 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights[;] (b) Articles 2, 4, 19, 34 and 39 of the 
United Nations Convention on the rights of the child; (c) Articles 1, 3, 
4, 16 and 27 of the African Charter on the Rights and welfare of the 
child; and (d) Articles 2 to 7 (inclusive) and 18 of the African Charter 
on Human and peoples’ rights. 
3. An order of mandamus directing the 1st respondent together with his 
agents, delegates and/or subordinates to conduct prompt, effective, 
proper and professional investigations into the 1st to 11th petitioners’ 
respective complaints of defilement and other forms of sexual violence. 
4. [A]n order of mandamus directing the 3rd respondent together with 
his agents, delegates and/or subordinates to—(a) formulate the National 
Policy Framework envisioned by Section 46 of the Sexual Offences 
Act, 2006 through a consultative and participatory process, ensuring its 
compliance with the Constitution and to disseminate, implement and 
widely and regularly publicize the National Policy Framework, and (b) 
[m]ake and/or cause the National Policy Framework in (a) above to be 
made a mandatory component of the training curricular at all police 
training colleges and institutions. 
5. An order of mandamus directing the 3rd respondent together with his 
agents, delegates and/or subordinates to implement the guidelines 
provided in the Reference Manual on the Sexual Offences Act, 2006 
for prosecutors, Sections 27–36, excepting section 34. 
6. An order of mandamus directing the 1st respondent together with his 
agents, delegates and/or subordinates to implement Article 244 of the 
Constitution in as far as it is relevant to the matters raised in this 
Petition. 
7. An Order directing the Respondents to regularly and/or account to 
the Honorable Court, for such period as the Honourable Court may 
direct, on compliance and/or implementation of the orders set out in 
paragraphs (3) to (6) (inclusive) above. 
8. The costs of and incidental to this petition. 
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9. Such other, further, additional, incidental and/or alternative reliefs or 
remedies as the Honorable court shall deem just and expedient.
814
 
In its analysis, the Court determined that the petitioners “were 
survivors of sexual violence and child abuse, that they had suffered 
physical and psychological harm, and that they had reported the crimes 
to various police stations.”815 Justice Makau stated as follows: 
I further find that the petitioners in this petition have suffered horrible, 
unspeakable and immeasurable harm due to acts of defilement 
committed against them. They each suffered physical harm in the form 
of internal and external wounds from the perpetrators[‘] assaults and 
some suffered consequences of unwanted pregnancies vested on 
children not physically mature enough to bear children. The petitioners 
have suffered psychological harm from assaults made worse by the 
threat, fear and reality of contracting HIV/AIDS and other sexually 
transmitted diseases or infections.
816
 
The police, the Court noted, had failed to perform their jobs, and in 
doing so, they had caused further harm to the petitioners. Justice Makau 
noted that “[w]hereas the perpetrators are directly responsible for the 
harms, to the petitioners, the respondents’ herein cannot escape blame 
and responsibility.”817 The learned judge went on to hold that: 
The respondent’s ongoing failure to ensure criminal consequence 
through proper and effective investigation and prosecution of these 
crimes has created a “climate of [i]mpunity” for commission of sexual 
offences and in particular defilement. As a result of which the 
perpetrators know they can commit crimes against innocent children 




 814. Id. at 2.  
 815. CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS ET AL., supra note 809, at 34. See also 
C.K., 8 K.L.R, at 4. 
 816. C.K., 8 K.L.R, at 7. 
 817. Id. at 7. The respondents were the Commissioner of Police/Inspector General 
of the National Police Service, the Director of Public Prosecutions, and the Minister for 
Justice, National Cohesion & Constitutional Affairs. See id. 
 818. Id. at 7. 
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The Court determined that, although the petitioners visited various 
police stations after each sexual attack and “gave names of the 
perpetrators being people they knew,” the police failed to take 
appropriate action.819 Instead, the police “showed disbelief, blamed the 
victims, humiliated them, yelled at and ignored them as they put them 
under vigorous cross-examination and failed to take action.”820 The 
learned judge went on to hold that “[t]he respondents are,” in his view, 
“directly responsible for psychological harm caused by their actions and 
inactions,” and that the petitioners have been severely damaged 
psychologically.821 
The C. K. (A Child) Court took note of the South African Supreme 
Court of Appeal case, Van Eeden v. Minister of Safety and Security,822 a 
case in which the “police allowed a dangerous criminal and serial rapist 
[Mohamed] to escape from custody.”823 Mohamed, the serial rapist, 
whom the police had allowed to escape from custody, later brutally 
attacked and “sexually assaulted, raped and robbed” the appellant, a “19-
year old woman.”824 The Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa 
subsequently held, in Van Eeden, that a fundamental breach of the 
petitioners’ freedom had occurred when the police “failed to pursue the 
perpetrators of child abuse and sexual violence.”825 Specifically, the 
Court held as follows: 
The fundamental values enshrined in the Constitution include human 
dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human 
rights and freedoms . . . everyone has the right to freedom and security 
of the person, which includes the right to be free from all forms of 
violence from either public or private sources . . . In all the 
circumstances of the present case I have come to the conclusion that the 
[p]olice owed the appellant a legal duty to act positively to prevent 
  
 819. Id. at 7. 
 820. Id. at 7. 
 821. Id. at 7. Specifically, Makau J held that the petitioners have “become self-
doubtful, self-loathing, self-blam[ing], and have low self-esteem.” Id. at 7. 
 822. See id. at 7. See generally Van Eeden v. Minister of Safety and Security, 
2002 (1) SA 389 (SCA) (S. Afr.).  
 823. C.K., 8 K.L.R, at 7. 
 824. Van Eeden, (1) SA 389, ¶ 1.The perpetrator was named André Gregory 
Mohamed. See id. at para. 1. 
 825. CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS ET AL., supra note 809, at 34. 
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Mohamed’s escape . . . I have reached this conclusion mainly in view 
of the State’s Constitutional imperatives to which I have referred.826 
The C.K. (A Child) Court then cited to Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) et 
al. v. U.S.,827 a case of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, “in support of the proposition that the state had a positive 
obligation to protect the vulnerable, such as children, and its failure to do 
so did not need to be intentional in order to constitute a breach of this 
obligation.”828 In Jessica Lennan, the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (“the IACHR”) noted that: 
The claimants assert[ed] in their petition that the United States [had] 
violated Articles I, II, V, VI, VII, IX, XVIII and XXIV of the American 
Declaration by failing to exercise due diligence to protect Jessica 
Lenahan and her daughters from acts of domestic violence perpetrated 
by the ex-husband of the former and the father of the latter, even 
though Ms. Lenahan held a restraining order against him.
829
 
The claimants also alleged that “the police failed to adequately 
respond to Jessica Lenahan’s repeated and urgent calls over several hours 
reporting that her husband had taken their three minor daughters (ages 
[seven], [eight], and [ten]) in violation of the restraining order, and 
asking for help.”830 In addition, contended the claimants, “the State never 
duly investigated and clarified the circumstances of the death of Jessica 
Lanahan’s daughters, and never provided her with an adequate remedy 
for the failures of the police.”831 The C.K. (A Child) Court agreed with 
the IACHR which found that “a State may incur international 
responsibility for failing to act with due diligence to prevent, investigate, 
sanction and offer reparations for acts of violence against women; a duty 
which may apply to actions committed by private actors in certain 
circumstances.”832 Justice Makau, then noted that “[t]he courts have 
  
 826. C.K., 8 K.L.R, at 7–8. 
 827. See generally Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) et al. v. United States, Case 
12.626, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 80/11 (2011). 
 828. CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS ET AL., supra note 809, at 34. 
 829. Jessica Lenahan, Case 12.626, ¶ 2. 
 830. Id.  
 831. Id. 
 832. Id. ¶ 126. 
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found that [the] State has a clear duty to investigate crime and found 
[that] the failure to do so constitute[s] a Constitutional violation of 
claimant’s rights.”833 
The Court in C. K. (A Child) also agreed with the principle stated in 
the Kenyan case, R V Commissioner of Police & 3 Others ex-parte 
Phylis Temwai Kipteyo HC. Misc. Appl. 27 of 2008, (2011) Eklr 
(Gungoma),834 that “once a report is made to the police, the police have a 
duty to take the appropriate steps and actions to investigate and 
apprehend the perpetrators, and the failure to do so violated 
constitutional rights of the victims as guaranteed under Article 244 of the 
Constitution of Kenya 2010.”835 The C. K. (A Child) Court specifically 
cited to the part of the ruling in the R V Commissioner of Police case, 
which states that:  
All the same, the life of the victim and the interests of the family are 
protected by the constitution and the statutes. The State through the 
Respondents herein are responsible for security of citizens in this 
country. It is the duty of the state to inquire into any crime or suspected 
crime affecting any of its subjects. It is the duty of the State to 




Justice Makau went on to note that he agreed with the decision in R V 
Commissioner of Police that “once a report or complaint is made it is the 
duty of the police to move with speed and promptly, commence 
investigation and apprehend and interrogate the perpetrators of the 
offense and the investigation must be [sic] conducted effectively, 
properly and professionally short thereof amounts to violation of 
fundamental rights of the complainant.”837 In addition, stated the learned 
Judge, “[i]n the instant case the police owed a [c]onstitutional duty to 
  
 833. C.K. (A Child) v. The Commissioner of Police (2012) 8 K.L.R. 1, 8 (H.C.K.) 
(Kenya). 
 834. See generally Republic v. Commissioner of Police, Mohammed & 3 Others 
Ex-Parte Phylis Temwai Kipteyo, (2008) H.C.K. 1, 4 (Kenya).  
 835. CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS ET AL., supra note 809, at 34. 
 836. See Republic, (2008) H.C.K, at 4. This holding was also quoted by Makau J 
in C.K. (A Child) v. The Commissioner of Police (2012) 8 K.L.R. 1, 8 (H.C.K.) (Kenya). 
See also JUDICIAL BENCH BOOK ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN COMMONWEALTH EAST 
AFRICA 278 (Commonwealth Secretariat ed. 2017). 
 837. C.K., 8 K.L.R, at 8. 
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protect the petitioners’ right and that duty was breached by their neglect, 
omission, refusal and/or failure to conduct prompt, effective, proper and 
professional investigations and as such they violated the petitioners’ 
fundamental rights and freedoms as entrusted in the Constitution.”838 
The C. K. (A Child) Court also made reference to the Constitution of 
Kenya, 2010; specifically Article 244, which deals with the National 
Police Service. Article 244 (a)–(e) states as follows: 
The National Police Service shall— 
(a) strive for the highest standards of professionalism and discipline 
among its members; 
(b) prevent corruption and promote and practice transparency and 
accountability; 
(c) comply with constitutional standards of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms; 
(d) train staff to the highest possible standards of competence and 
integrity and to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms and 
dignity; and  
(e) foster and promote relationships with the broader society.
839
 
In addition, the Court also cited to Article 27 of the Constitution of 
Kenya, which deals with “[e]quality and freedom from 
discrimination.”840 Specifically, Justice Makau cited to Articles 27(1) and 
27(4), which state as follows:  
(1) Every person is equal before the law and has the right to equal 
protection and equal benefit before the law . . . (4) The State shall not 
discriminate directly or indirectly against any person on any ground, 
including race, sex, pregnancy, marital status, health status, ethnic or 
  
 838. Id. at 8.  
 839. CONSTITUTION art. 244 (a)–(e) (2010) (Kenya). 
 840. Id. art. 27. 
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social origin, colour, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, 
culture, dress, language or birth.
841
 
Justice Makau noted that the petitioners had “contend[ed] that 
“gender-based sexual violence constitutes discrimination and referred 
[him] to Article 1 of the Convention [on] the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, which defines discrimination against 
women.”842 Justice Makau then held that: 
Having considered the petitioners[‘] petition and affidavit in support 
and the fact the police did not take appropriate action to ensure justice 
to the petitioners I find the police failure to conduct prompt, effective, 
proper, corruption free, and a professional investigation into 
petitioners[‘] complaints of defilement and other form[s] of sexual 
violence amounts to discrimination contrary to the expressly and 
implied provisions of Article 27 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 and 
contrary to Article 244 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010.
843
 
In addition, Justice Makau stated, “the [p]olice failure to effectively 
enforce Section 8 of the Sexual Offenses Act, 2006 infringes upon the 
petitioners[‘] right to equal protection and benefit of the law contrary to 
Article 27(1) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 and further by failing to 
enforce existing defilement laws the police have contributed to 
development of a culture of tolerance for pervasive sexual violence 
against girl children and impunity.”844 The learned Judge concluded that 
the respondents (i.e., the police) were “responsible for [the] violation of 
the petitioners’ rights under Article 27 of the Constitution of Kenya, 
2010” and that they (the police) were “obligated by law to protect girl 
  
 841. Id. arts. 27(1), 27(4). 
 842. C.K., 8 K.L.R, at 8. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women defines discrimination against women as “any 
distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or 
purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, 
irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any 
other field.” CEDAW, supra note 160, at art. 1. 
 843. C.K., 8 K.L.R, at 8–9. 
 844. Id. at 9. 
2020] International Law, African Customary Law 675 
children from defilement and ensure effective investigation of defilement 
claims.”845 
Next, Justice Makau cited to a case by the European Court of Human 
Rights, Case of M.C. v. Bulgaria,846 and took note of part of the holding 
in that case, which states as follows: 
[T]he investigation of the applicant’s case and, in particular, the 
approach taken by the investigator and the prosecutors in the case fell 
short of the requirements inherent in the States’ positive obligations—
viewed in the light of the relevant modern standards in comparative and 
international law—to establish and apply effectively a criminal-law 
system punishing all forms of rape and sexual abuse.
847
 
The Court thus finds that in the present case there has been a violation 
of the respondent State’s positive obligations under both Articles 3 [on 
torture and inhuman/degrading treatment] and 8 [on protection of the 
law] of the Convention.
848
 
Another international case that Justice Makau cited was the Case of 
C.A.S. and C.S. v. Romania of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) where the ECtHR in that case held that “an ineffective 
investigation of sexual assault charges violates the [European 
Convention on Human Rights].”849 The learned Judge cited specifically 
to the section of the ECtHR’s ruling, which states that: 
[I]t [i.e., the investigation] should in principle be capable of leading to 
the establishment of the facts of the case and to the identification and 
punishment of those responsible. This is not an obligation of result, but 
one of means. The authorities must have taken the reasonable steps 
available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, 
including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony, forensic evidence, and so 
on. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to 
establish the cause of injuries or the identity of the persons responsible 
will risk falling foul of this standard, and a requirement of promptness 
  
 845. Id. at 9.  
 846. See generally Case of M.C. v. Bulgaria, 2003-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 33, ¶ 185. 
 847. Id.  
 848. Id. ¶ 187. 
 849. C.K., 8 K.L.R, at 9 (quoting Case of C.A.S. and C. S. v. Romania, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (2012). 
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and reasonable expedition is implicit in this context. In cases under 
Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention where the effectiveness of the 
official investigation has been at issue, the Court has often assessed 
whether the authorities reacted promptly to the complaints at the 
relevant time. Consideration has been given to the opening of 
investigations, delays in taking statements and to the length of time 
taken for the initial investigation.
850  
Additionally, Justice Makau also sought supporting case law from the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa, the country’s highest court. 
Specifically, the learned judge cited to Carmichele v. Minister of Safety 
and Security,851 a case that involved the brutal and vicious attack of Alix 
Jean Carmichele. The attacker, Francois Coetzee, was subsequently 
“convicted of attempted murder and housebreaking in the Knysna 
regional court and was sentenced to an effective term of imprisonment of 
twelve-and-a-half years.”852 
The victim (the “applicant”) then instituted proceedings in the Cape of 
Good Hope High Court (“the High Court”) against the Minister for 
Safety and Security and the Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development for damages related to the attack.853 In her petition, the 
applicant claimed that “members of the South African Police Service and 
the public prosecutors at Knysna had negligently failed to comply with a 
legal duty they owed to her to take steps to prevent Coetzee from causing 
her harm.”854 At the completion of the applicant’s case, “[Justice Chetty] 
found that there was no evidence upon which a court could reasonably 
find that the police or prosecutors had acted wrongly.”855 
Justice Chetty subsequently “granted an order of absolution from the 
instance in favour of the respondents with costs.”856 Thereafter, and with 
leave of the High Court, the applicant took her case to the Supreme Court 
of Appeal (“SCA”), but the SCA dismissed the appeal with costs.857 The 
  
 850. Case of C.A.S. and C. S., Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 70. 
 851. See generally Carmichele v. Minister of Safety and Security, 2001 (4) SA 
938, ¶ 1 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 852. Id. 
 853. See id. ¶ 2. 
 854. Id. 
 855. Id. ¶ 3.  
 856. Id. 
 857. See id.  
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applicant then sought relief at the CC. It was to the ruling of the CC in 
Carmichele that Justice Makau, writing for the Court in C.K. (A Child), 
sought supporting case law. Justice Makau cited specifically to this 
section of the judgment in Carmichele: 
The courts are under a duty to send a clear message to the accused, to 
other potential rapists and the community. We are determined to protect 
the equality, dignity and freedom of all women, and we shall show no 
mercy to those who seek to invade those rights. 
South Africa also has a duty under international law to prohibit all 
gender-based discrimination that has the effect or purpose of impairing 
the enjoyment by women of fundamental rights and freedoms and to 
take reasonable and appropriate measures to prevent the violation of 
those rights. The police is one of the primary agencies of the state 
responsible for the protection of the public in general and women and 
children in particular against the invasion of their fundamental rights by 
perpetrators of violent crime.
858
 
Justice Makau next sought supporting case law from the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (the “Inter-American Court”). 
Specifically, the learned judge cited to the Case of González et al. 
(“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico,859 which involved “the assassination of three 
women, in three separate incidents, who were all found dead in the same 
cotton field in Ciudad Juárez.”860 In addition to “finding violations of 
several articles of the American Convention [on Human Rights], mainly 
due to the severe investigative deficiencies that marred prosecution of the 
women’s assassins, the Court also found violations of the Convention on 
the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women 
  
 858. Id. ¶ 62. In addition to granting the applicant’s application for special leave to 
appeal, Ackermann and Goldstone JJ, writing for the Court, also granted her costs. Id. ¶ 
84. That is, the appeal was upheld with costs, the order of the Supreme Court of Appeal 
was set aside and a new order was “substituted for that of the High Court: ‘The 
application for absolution from the instance is dismissed with costs’” and the High Court 
ordered to proceed with the trial. Id.  
 859. See generally González v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205 (Nov. 16, 2009). 
 860. Monica Rodriguez, Case Summary, González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. 
Mexico, 36 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1971, 1971 (2014). 
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(Convention of Belém do Pará).”861 The Inter-American Court found that 
the State of Mexico had infringed on the rights of the three assassinated 
women to equality and non-discrimination in relation to their torture, 
rape, and murder.862 
The C. K. (A Child) Court cited specifically to the following part of 
the ruling in the Cotton Field case: 
Evidence provided to the Court indicates, inter alia, that officials of the 
state of Chihuahua and the municipality of Juárez made light of the 
problem and even blamed the victims for their fate based on the way 
they dressed, the place they worked, their behavior, the fact that they 
were out alone, or a lack of parental care.
863
  
The Court therefore finds that, in the instant case, the violence against 
women constituted a form of discrimination, and declares that the State 
violated the obligation not to discriminate contained in Article 1(1) of 
the [American] Convention [on Human Rights], in relation to the 
obligation to guarantee the rights embodied in Articles 4(1), 5(1), 5(2) 
and 7(1) of the American Convention [on Human Rights].
864
 
Justice Makau noted that on issues of sexual violence, freedom, and 
security of the person, Kenyan courts have held that the State of Kenya 
“has an obligation to protect all citizens from violence and ensure their 
security of person.” This, states the learned judge “is enshrined in Article 
29 of [the] Constitution [of Kenya].”865 
Justice Makau then turned to Articles 48 and 50 of the Constitution of 
the Republic of Kenya, 2010. Article 48 deals with “access to justice” 
and imposes an obligation on the State to “ensure access to justice for all 
persons and, if any fee is required, it shall be reasonable and shall not 
impede access to justice.”866 Article 50 deals with a “fair hearing” and 
states that: 
  
 861. Id. 
 862. González, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, ¶ 146–47. 
 863. Id. ¶ 154 
 864. Id. ¶ 402. 
 865. C.K. (A Child) v. The Commissioner of Police (2012) 8 K.L.R. 1, 9 (H.C.K.) 
(Kenya). 
 866. CONSTITUTION art. 48 (2012) (Kenya).  
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(1) Every person has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved 
by the application of law decided in a fair and public hearing before a 
court or, if appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or 
body. (2) Every accused person has the right to a fair trial.
867
 
Thus, these two articles of the Kenyan Constitution impose an 
obligation on the State to make certain that access to the country’s courts 
is not “unreasonably or unjustifiably impeded.”868 In the situation where 
there is a legitimate issue (e.g., complaint, dispute, or wrong) that can be 
resolved by the courts, or where and if appropriate, by an independent 
and impartial tribunal or body, the State must ensure that citizens are 
able to have access to these conflict resolution mechanisms.  
In the country’s criminal justice system, the police play a very 
important role, particularly with respect to the prevention of criminal 
activities and the investigation of crimes in order to provide the courts 
with the necessary information to fully adjudicate criminal matters 
brought before them. If the police abdicate this important function or 
role, there is most likely to be a miscarriage of justice, and many citizens 
may be denied justice. Justice Makau noted that the centrality of the 
police in criminal justice in Kenya is evidenced by the functions set out 
for the police in § 24 of the National Police Service Act, 2014.869 
According to § 24, the functions of the Kenya police service are: 
(a) provision of assistance to the public when in need; 
(b) maintenance of law and order; 
(c) preservation of peace; 
(d) protection of life and property; 
(e) investigation of crimes; 
(f) collection of criminal intelligence; 
(g) prevention and detection of crime; 
  
 867. Id. art. 50. 
 868. C.K., 8 K.L.R, at 10.  
 869. National Police Service Act (2014) Cap. 84 § 24 (Kenya). 
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(h) apprehension of offenders; 
(i) enforcement of all laws and regulations with which it is charged; 
and  
(j) performance of any other duties that may be prescribed by the 




Justice Makau then noted that the police in the case before the Court 
(i.e., C. K. (A Child)) had failed to “conduct prompt, effective, proper, 
corrupt free and professional investigations into the petitioners[‘] 
[complaints].”871 They had, instead, demanded bribes as a precondition 
for performing their jobs, which included investigating the petitioners’ 
complaints and determining the nature, extent, and type of harm inflicted 
on the petitioners. By doing so, the police had violated the petitioners’ 
right to access justice and to have their disputes resolved by the country’s 
courts in a fair manner in accordance with Article 50(1) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Kenya.872 
The learned Judge also noted that the Constitution of the Republic of 
Kenya also provides various protections for children. Specifically, 
Article 53 provides as follows: 
(1) Every child has the right— 
(a) to a name and nationality from birth; 
(b) to free and compulsory basic education; 
(c) to basic nutrition, shelter and health care; 
(d) to be protected from abuse, neglect, harmful cultural practices, all 
forms of violence, inhuman treatment and punishment, and hazardous 
or exploitative labor; 
  
 870. Id. § 24(a)–(j). 
 871. C.K., 8 K.L.R, at 10.  
 872. See KENYAN CONSTITUTION art. 50(1) (2012) (Kenya). 
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(e) to parental care and protection, which includes equal responsibility 
of the mother and father to provide for the child, whether they are 
married to each other or not; and 
(f) not to be detained, except as a measure of last resort, and when 
detained, to be held— 
(i) for the shortest appropriate period of time; and 
(ii) separate from adults and in conditions that take account of the 
child’s sex and age. 




Article 53(1) imposes an obligation on the State to make certain that 
all citizens, including the petitioners, are “protected from abuse, neglect, 
harmful cultural practices, all forms of violence, inhuman treatment and 
punishment, and hazardous or exploitative labor.”874 The C. K. (A Child) 
Court then noted that the failure of the police to take action on the 
petitioners’ complaints about their defilement at the hands of people who 
included relatives, violated the petitioners’ rights under Article 53 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Kenya, 2010. In addition, the operation 
of a “child’s best interest[s]” prescribed by the Constitution at Article 
53(2) mandates not just that the Government of Kenya enact laws to 
protect the rights of children but that the government make certain that 
those laws are effectively and duly enforced by all relevant state agencies 
(e.g., the police and the courts).875 Failure to fully enforce these laws, 
Justice Makau stated, would amount to a violation of the country’s 
constitution. 
Justice Makau then makes reference to the UN Convention on the 
Rights and Child, which imposes an obligation on States Parties to: 
[T]ake all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational 
measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental 
violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment 
  
 873. Id. art. 53(1). 
 874. C.K., 8 K.L.R, at 10.  
 875. Id.  
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or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s), 
legal guardian(s) or any other person who has the care of the child.
876
 
The learned judge made the following ruling: 
Having considered the evidence in the petitioners’ affidavit and the 
petition herein, the relevant articles in the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, 
the general rules of international law, treaty or convention ratified by 
Kenya and other related and relevant laws applicable in Kenya, I am 
satisfied that the petitioners have proved their petition and that the 
failure on part of the respondents to conduct prompt, effective, proper 
and professional investigations into the petitioners[‘] complaints of 
defilement and other forms of sexual violence infringes on the 
petitioners[‘] fundamental rights and freedoms, under Articles 21(1), 




In C. K. (A Child), the petitioners relied on various international and 
regional human rights bodies (e.g., the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the 
European Court on Human Rights) to support their arguments. The 
petitioners also made use of other authorities, including the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa. The petitioner’s decision to anchor 
their claim on not only the Constitution of the Republic of Kenya, but 
also on international and regional authorities, directly implicated certain 
provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Kenya, notably Article 
2(5–6), which states that “[t]he general rules of international law shall 
form part of the law of Kenya” and that “[a]ny treaty or convention 
ratified by Kenya shall form part of the law of Kenya under this 
Constitution.”878 
In the Court’s decision, Justice Makau accepted the petitioners’ 
reliance on regional and international authorities. For example, Justice 
Makau accepted the petitioners’ argument that sexual violence 
constitutes discrimination against women under the Convention on the 
  
 876. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 9, art. 
19(1). 
 877. C.K., 8 K.L.R, at 10.  
 878. CONSTITUTION art. 2(5)–(6) (2012) (Kenya). 
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Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.879 
Specifically, the C.K. (A Child) Court held that: 
[T]he neglect, omission, refusal and/or failure of the police to conduct 
prompt, effective, proper and professional investigations into the first 
eleven petitioners’ respective complaints violates the first eleven 
petitioners’ fundamental rights and freedoms [under]— 
(a) Articles 1 to 8 (inclusive) and 10 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights,  
(b) Articles 2, 4, 19, 34 and 39 of the United Nations Convention on 
the rights of the child; 
(c) Articles 1, 3, 4, 16 and 27 of the African Charter on the Rights and 
welfare of the child, and (d) Articles 2 to 7 (inclusive) and 18 of the 
African Charter on Human and people’s rights.880  
The C.K. (A Child) Court relied on authorities from regional and 
international bodies to make its decisions. In addition, the Court also 
cited authorities from the highest courts in countries, such as South 
Africa and the United States. By utilizing international law, notably 
international human rights law, as an interpretation tool, Kenyan courts 
are gradually bringing domestic law into compliance with the provisions 
of international and regional human rights instruments, even if these 
international provisions have not been fully domesticated to create rights 
that are justiciable in national courts. The decision in C.K. (A Child) 
joins others around the world that are using international law as tools of 
interpretation to define and make explicit the important role that the 
government must play in protecting its citizens, particularly the girl-child 
and women, from harm, either by state or none-state actors.  
In addition, this decision also joins others by international and 
regional bodies, such as the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, 
the European Court of Human Rights, and various domestic courts, such 
as the Constitutional Court of South Africa, which recognize the 
obligations imposed on States by national constitutions, as well as, 
international human rights instruments, to be diligent in investigating, 
  
 879. See CEDAW, supra note 160, art. 1.  
 880. C.K., 8 K.L.R, at 11.  
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prosecuting, and bringing to justice anyone engaged in gender-based 
violence. States which fail to fulfill this obligation are in breach of 
various domestic and international instruments, which provide protection 
for the rights of girls and women. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Since the end of the Second World War and the subsequent founding 
of the United Nations, international law, and particularly international 
human rights law, has advanced significantly, especially in its ability and 
capacity to protect the rights of children. In the area of the exploitation of 
children for military purposes, for example, the international community 
has adopted additional legal protections for children. In 1977, a majority 
of the Member States of the United Nations adopted Additional Protocols 
I and II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 effectively prohibiting the 
recruitment and subsequent use of children under the age of fifteen years 
in military activities.881 
Since then, other international legal instruments, designed to provide 
various protections to children, have been adopted at both the 
international and regional levels. These include, but are not limited to, 
the UN Declaration on the Rights of the Child;882 the UN Convention on 
the Rights of the Child 1989;883 the Optional Protocols to the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child;884 the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child, 1990;885 the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, 1948;886 the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights;887 and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.888 
  
 881. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 77(2), https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/INTRO/470. 
 882. See generally Declaration of the Rights of the Child, supra note 23. 
 883. See generally United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra 
note 9. 
 884. Sex Trafficking Protocol, supra note 63.  
 885. See generally ACRWC, supra note 99.  
 886. See generally UDHR, supra note 27, at 71.  
 887. See generally ICESCR, supra note 134.  
 888. See generally ICCPR, supra note 142.  
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The effectiveness of these international protections for children, 
however, depends, to a large extent, on the ability of States to 
domesticate the provisions of these various international and regional 
human rights instruments and create rights that are justiciable in 
domestic or municipal courts. Without the internationalization of 
national constitutional law, citizens of many African countries continue 
to be subjected to laws, customs, and traditions that fail to protect their 
fundamental and human rights. This is especially true of vulnerable 
groups, such as children, particularly the girl-child; women; and ethnic 
and religious minorities.  
In many African countries, the customary, traditional, and religious 
practices of various ethnocultural groups discriminate against and violate 
the rights of children, as well as subject them to various atrocities (e.g., 
female genital mutilation, breast ironing, and servitude service in fetish 
shrines). For example, in 2005, the CESCR, which had met to consider a 
report from the Government of Zambia on the implementation of the 
ICESCR, observed that “the persistence of customs and traditions 
harmful to women, children, and older persons” was one of the factors 
impeding the full and effective implementation of the ICESCR.889 In 
addition, the CESCR stated that “the prevalence of customary law—
certain traditions, customs and cultural practices—leads to substantial 
discrimination against girls and women” and that “the harsh living 
conditions of widows and girl orphans due to, among other things, 
harmful traditional practices such as ‘widow-cleansing’, early marriages 
and denial of inheritance,” as well as, “the large number of street 
children, especially in the capital Lusaka, who are particularly exposed to 
physical and sexual abuse, prostitution, and a high risk of being infected 
with HIV/AIDS,” are all factors contributing to the failure of Zambia to 
fully implement the ICESCR.890 
Throughout the continent, the failure of African countries, such as 
Zambia, to internationalize their constitutional law, has allowed the 
continued existence of laws (constitutional and customary) and customs 
and traditions that harm children. In 1954, the UNGA adopted a 
resolution, which, inter alia, called for the abolition of “customs, ancient 
  
 889. CESCR, supra note 190, ¶15. See also CONST. OF ZAMBIA (2016) § 23(4). 
 890. CESCR, supra note 190, ¶¶ 14, 23, 24. 
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laws and practices” that are harmful to children.891 Emphasis was placed 
on completely eliminating child or early marriages and the betrothal of 
young girls before they reach the age of puberty.892 
The adoption of the UDHR by the UNGA in 1948 set the foundation 
for the multilateral effort to recognize and protect human rights generally 
and the rights of historically vulnerable groups, such as children, in 
particular. As subsequent UN human rights instruments (e.g., the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Children) have shown, the emphasis has 
been placed on outlawing and eliminating all practices, regardless of 
their source, that are harmful to children. In recent years, for example, 
UN Women, an international organization dedicated to empowering 
women, has called on all countries to abolish female genital mutilation 
(“FGM”), child marriage, and other practices harmful to children.893  
Threats to the rights and liberties of children in the African countries 
come from (i) constitutional law that is not fully internationalized and 
hence, does not conform with the provisions of international human 
rights instruments; (ii) customary law and traditional practices that harm 
children; (iii) judiciaries that do not have the necessary independence and 
capacity to fully perform their functions; and (iv) bureaucracies, 
including national police units, that are pervaded by corruption and 
hence, are not capable of performing their functions fully and effectively. 
As the discussion in this Article has shown, the solution to this quagmire 
lies, first, in domesticating international law and producing national 
constitutions that reflect the provisions of international human rights 
  
 891. See Status of Women in Private Law: Customs, Ancient Laws and Practices 
Affecting the Human Dignity of Women, supra note 205. 
 892. Id.  
 893. See UN Women Executive Director Calls for Action to End Female Genital 
Mutilation and Child Marriage in an Event in Senegal, UN WOMEN (June 17, 2019), 
http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2019/6/news-executive-director-calls-
for-action-to-end-fgm-and-child-marriage-in-senegal. UN Women is the “United 
Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women.” See About UN 
Women, UN WOMEN, https://www.unwomen.org/en/about-us/about-un-women (last 
visited Feb. 29, 2019). Specifically, it is a UN entity that works to empower women 
throughout the world. See id. It became operational in January 2011. See Video: UN 
Women Executive Board, First Regular Session 2011, UN WOMEN (Jan. 24, 2011), 
https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2011/1/video-un-women-executive-board-
first-regular-session-2011. 
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instruments, and second, reforming customary law to make certain that it 
conforms to the new and improved national constitutions.  
Although the internationalization of national constitutions and reform 
of customary law may take some time and hence is a long-term project, it 
is important to note that this must be done in order to deal fully and 
effectively with the continued abuse and exploitation of children in the 
African countries. In the short term, however, domestic courts can, 
through constitutional interpretation, eliminate those laws, whether 
customary or otherwise, that harm children. In fact, these processes are 
already taking place in some African countries. For example, in the case 
of State v. Williams & Others, the South African Constitutional Court 
invalidated and declared unconstitutional provisions of a statute that 
were deemed harmful to children.894 Although it did not deal directly or 
specifically with children, the Tanzanian High Court case of Ephrahim v. 
Pastory895 provided an opportunity for Tanzanian courts to use 
international human rights law to challenge and subsequently invalidate 
“customs and traditions that discriminate against women and violate their 
rights.”896 
Justice Mwalusanya, who wrote the decision for the High Court, listed 
several international human rights instruments that have been ratified by 
the United Republic of Tanzania, and then declared as follows:  
The principles enunciated in the above named [international human 
rights instruments] are a standard below which any civilised nation will 
be ashamed to fall. It is clear from what I have discussed that the 
customary law under discussion flies in the face of our Bill of Rights as 
well as the international conventions to which we are signatories.
897
 
After determining that the Haya Customary Act was 
unconstitutionally discriminatory, Justice Mwalusanya then turned to the 
Ephrahim case to determine how the High Court should rule.898 He then 
ruled as follows: 
  
 894. S v. Williams & Others, 1995 (7) BCLR 86, ¶ 96 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 895. See Ephrahim v. Pastory, (2001) AHRLR 236 (Tanz.). 
 896. Mbaku, International Law on the Sovereignty, supra note 479, at 103. 
 897. Ephrahim, (2001) AHRLR 236, ¶ 10. 
 898. Mbaku, International Law on the Sovereignty, supra note 479, at 105. 
688 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 28.3 
I have found as a fact that section 20 of the Rules of Inheritance of the 
Declaration of Customary Law, 1963, is discriminatory of females in 
that, unlike their male counterparts, they are barred from selling clan 
land. That is inconsistent with article 13(4) of the Bill of Rights of [the 
Tanzanian] Constitution which bars discrimination on account of sex. 
Therefore under the Section 5(1) of Act 16 of 1984 I take section 20 of 
the Rules of Inheritance to be now modified and qualified such that 
males and females now have equal rights to inherit and sell clan land.
899
 
In conclusion, Justice Mwalusanya made a powerful statement about 
the rights of women in Tanzania: 
From now on, females all over Tanzania can at least hold their heads 
high and claim to be equal to men as far as inheritances of clan land 
and self-acquired land of their fathers is concerned. It is part of the long 
road to women’s liberation. But there is no cause for euphoria as there 
is much more to do in the other spheres. One thing which surprises me 
is that it has taken a simple, old rural woman to champion the cause of 
women in this field and not the elite women in town who chant jejune 




The Ephrahim Court was faced with a serious conflict, which 
involved the country’s recent internationalization of constitutional law 
and the rights of its citizens under customary laws that conflicted with 
the country’s modernized and internationalized constitution. In the early-
1990s, when the Ephrahim case was decided, the people of Tanzania had 
revised their constitution and incorporated a Bill of Rights and other 
provisions reflecting those found in various international human rights 
instruments.901 The new constitutional changes guaranteed 
nondiscrimination and equal treatment of all citizens before the law. The 
Ephrahim Court recognized its duty to modify customary law and bring 
it into compliance with the provisions of the national constitution, which, 
  
 899. Ephrahim, (2001) AHRLR 236, ¶ 42.   
 900. Id. ¶ 44.  
 901. See Mbaku, International Law on the Sovereignty, supra note 479, at 106. 
See also Chris Maina Peter, Five Years of the Bill of Rights in Tanzania: Drawing a 
Balance-Sheet, 4 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 131, 131 (1992). 
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through recent amendments, had “been brought into line with provisions 
of international human rights instruments.”902 
The Ephrahim Court modified customary law to allow and enhance 
the ability of “women to realize the rights guaranteed them under the 
Constitution of Tanzania.”903 By doing so, the Ephrahim Court made 
clear that in the case of a conflict between international human rights 
norms and customary law, the latter must give way to the former. The 
function performed by the High Court in Tanzania and the Constitutional 
Court in South Africa, to modify, through invalidation, customary laws 
that violate the rights of citizens, including children, or are in violation of 
constitutional provisions, is a noble one and one that must be emulated 
by other countries in Africa.  
With respect to the domestication of international law, some countries 
have already started the process, although they still have a long way to 
go. For example, the Constitution of the Republic of Benin makes the 
provisions of the UDHR and those of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights “an integral part” of the country’s constitution, as well as 
of “Béninise law.”904 This process of domestication of international and 
regional law creates rights that are directly justiciable in Béninese courts.  
With respect to the way forward for the protection of the rights of 
children in Africa, including especially the minimization of traditional 
and customary practices that harm children, each African country must 
undertake certain forms of institutional reforms. First, each country 
should internationalize their national constitutions in order to 
domesticate international human rights instruments and make the 
instrument’s provisions an integral part of the national constitution. In 
other words, each country should make the rights contained in 
international human rights instruments directly justiciable in domestic 
courts.  
Second, each country should make certain that customary law is 
modified enough to comply with both the national constitution and the 
provisions of international human rights instruments. In doing so, each 
country can rid itself of customary, traditional, and religious practices 
that harm children. Third, each country should provide itself with a 
judiciary that is independent enough and has the capacity to fully and 
  
 902. Mbaku, International Law on the Sovereignty, supra note 479, at 106–07. 
 903. Id. at 107.  
 904. CONSTITUTION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DU BÉNIN, Dec. 11, 1990, pmbl (Benin). 
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effectively enforce the laws and serve as a check on the exercise of 
government power. Such a judiciary can, as has been illustrated by the 
Constitution Court of South Africa in The State v. Williams & Others,905 
the High Court of Tanzania in Ephrahim v. Pastory,906 the Constitutional 
Court of Zimbabwe in S v. Chokuramba,907 declare invalid, 
unconstitutional or in contravention of the constitution, certain 
provisions of legislative acts or customary laws that violate the rights of 
citizens or are contrary to an internationalized national constitution. 
It is important to note that how well a State enforces its laws and 
effectively protects its children is dependent, to a large extent, on the 
quality of the State’s governance institutions. Thus, in addition to 
internationalizing constitutional law, as well as, bringing traditional and 
customary practices into line with international human rights law, the 
State must provide itself with a governing process undergirded by the 
rule of law. Such a governing process, at the minimum, must be 
characterized by the separation of powers with effective checks and 
balances, including an independent judiciary, a robust civil society that is 
capable of checking on the exercise of government power (and hence, 
able to contribute to the minimization of bureaucratic corruption), and a 
free and independent press. Fidelity to the rule of law implies that no 
one, regardless of their economic and political position or standing in 
society, is above the law. Such a governing process should minimize 
engagement by both state- and non-state actors in behaviors and practices 
that harm children and violate their fundamental rights.  
 
  
 905. See S v. Williams & Others, 1995 (7) BCLR 86 (CC) (S. Afr.) (declaring that 
“[t]he provisions of section 294 of the [Criminal Procedure] Act [No. 51 of 1977] violate 
the provisions of sections 10 and 11(2) of the Constitution . . . [and] are therefore 
unconstitutional”). See id at para. 92. 
 906. See Ephrahim v. Pastory, (2001) AHRLR 236 (Tanz.) (finding that “section 
20 of the Rules of Inheritance of the Declaration of Customary Law, 1963 is 
discriminatory of females . . . [and] is inconsistent with Article 13(4) of the Bill of Rights 
of our Constitution” and therefore is “now modified and qualified such that males and 
females have now equal rights to inherit and sell clan land”). See id. at 13. 
 907. S v. Chokuramba, CCZ 10–2019] CCZ 1, 70 (Zim.) (declaring that “[t]he 
order of the court a quo declaring s 353 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 
[Chapter 9:07] to be invalid for the reason that it is in contravention of s 53 of the 
Constitution is confirmed”). See id. at 70. 
